Samizdat and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union

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SZ 1

Koan *

A group of people happens to find itself in the same cage with a group of monkeys. The cage is locked. The keys are in the hands of the monkeys. The keys are enchanted: whoever touches them, becomes a monkey himself. How to get out of the cage?

There is no general answer here. This riddle must be solved every day, every hour, all through life.

April 1966

* From Grigorii Pomerants, **Neopublikovannoe** (Unpublished Works), Frankfurt/Main 1972, p. 198.

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PREFACE

During the autumn of 1972, when I was working on certain legal aspects of political dissent in the Soviet Union, I discovered with some amazement that there was a rich and variegated collection of essayistic literature, written by Soviet citizens and devoted to a discussion of the political system and political future of the Soviet Union. This literature, by its very nature, was unsuitable for official publication in the USSR and was available only in the form of *samizdat* (typewritten copies, transferred by hand). Much of this material can be consulted in a small number of research institutions in the West, but has not received, for various reasons, wide publicity.

I decided therefore to write a short survey of political *samizdat* literature, in order to introduce to a wider audience a development which, from the political as well as the human point of view, I considered important and inspiring. If I succeed in arousing interest in this development my ambition is fulfilled. I set myself the task of writing this survey, not because of any special qualifications, but because nobody else seemed to be doing it.*

My original plans provided for a collection of translated *samizdat* documents, to be accompanied by a general introductory chapter. After some consideration I abandoned this plan; instead I decided to offer a single narrative, generously interspersed with quotations from *samizdat* sources. This solution inevitably puts more emphasis on the personal choice of the quotations. In the other solution, however, the personal element would still be unavoidable in the selection of the fragments to be included (because the literature is far too rich to include everything), while on the other hand the inclusion of complete documents in an anthology would entail much unnecessary repetition and the inclusion of much that would be irrelevant for the purpose of the book.

The opportunity to spend the academic year 1972-1973 at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences

* In the meantime Borys Lewytzkyj's *Politische Opposition in der Sowjetunion* appeared, see Chapter 2, note 6.

(N.I.A.S.) in Wassenaar enabled me to get a good part of the basic research done.

I gratefully acknowledge the help of two good friends: Dr. Albert Boiter, Director of Research at Radio Liberty, Munich, whose advice and assistance in locating materials was invaluable, and Dr. Bernard Rudden, Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, who read the final draft of the book. For its shortcomings I am myself responsible.

F. J. M. Feldbrugge

Chapter 1

SAMIZDAT: ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION

In a general sense any copy of a document which has been produced in the Soviet Union outside the chain of state publishing houses may be referred to as *samizdat*. The production and circulation of *samizdat* documents has increased so dramatically during the last nine years that there is reason to speak of a *samizdat* movement which must be regarded as a major development on the internal political scene.

Origins

Historically, the beginning of the *samizdat* movement may be connected with the political processes following the fall of Krushchev in November 1964. The few years of Soviet history dominated by this personage had witnessed (after the inauguration of the de-Stalinization campaign at the 20th Party Congress in 1956) the revival of some amount of cultural and scientific freedom. Once Krushchev's successors were safely in the saddle they soon decided that the limits of personal expression were to be drawn much tighter, particularly where the ideological and political unity of the country was involved. This decision was highlighted dramatically by the trial of Siniavskii and Daniel in February 1966. Although it is clear now that this trial was itself the consequence of a more general previous decision to revive certain elements of the Stalinist control system, it has rightly been considered, inside the Soviet Union as well as abroad, as a political watershed. The prosecution and subsequent conviction of Siniavskii and Daniel evoked wide-spread protest from various strata of Soviet society. These protests displayed many shades of timidity, circumspection, audacity and aggressiveness but in some way they all expressed concern about a return of Stalinism. The various forms of reaction and repression to which the regime subjected the first wave of protest caused a secondary protest movement and so on *ad infinitum* or at least until the present day. Of course not each individual act of protest against some activity of Soviet authorities is ultimately connected with the Siniavskii-Daniel trial but the main figures in the dissident movement have all in some way been involved in the chain of events which started with that trial. To give an example,

the physicist Tverdokhlebov reported in September 1973, about a KGB (State Security Committee) search of his flat during which several materials pertaining to the Committee for Human Rights were confiscated (AS 1478).[1] In December 1971, this Committee (of which Tverdokhlebov was a member) requested the authorities to be allowed to be present at the trial of Vladimir Bukovskii charged with "anti-Soviet propaganda" (art. 70 of the Russian Criminal Code; cf. AS 1146). The basis of this charge was that Bukovskii had sent abroad materials tending to show that certain political dissidents had been committed to lunatic asylums in the Soviet Union (cf. AS 1077).[2] One of the cases specifically mentioned by Bukovskii concerned Iakhimovich, a former kolkhoz chairman and teacher from Latvia. Iakhimovich had been arrested in 1969 in connection with this protest (AS 11) against the trial of Ginzburg and Galanskov (he was convicted, declared to be of unsound mind and sent to a psychiatric hospital). Ginzburg had been tried in January 1968, for producing a White Book on the Siniavskii-Daniel trial (this activity was equally considered to constitute anti-Soviet propaganda).[3]

In this manner hundreds of lines could be drawn connecting individual acts of protest and individual documents and most of them converge on the trial of Siniavskii and Daniel. However, this trial not only produced an endless chain reaction of protests but also stimulated the emergence of a more generalized political debate. Judging from the numbers of *samizdat* documents that reached the West one may conclude that compared to 1965 the number more than doubled in the years 1966 and 1967; for 1968 and subsequent years the numbers were more than five times those of 1965 (and 1965 itself exceeded previous years). Since only a small section of the total *samizdat* production is of a more abstract and general political nature, the very few documents from before 1966 which can be ranged in the latter category bear the character of isolated essays. Increasingly, after 1966, *samizdat* authors who discuss the political situation inside the Soviet Union have read each other, refer to, and criticize other *samizdat* documents containing political views. In this way a genuine political debate came about and distinguishable groupings and currents took shape which together may be regarded as an articulate political opposition. It is the purpose of this work to provide an introduction to, and summary survey of, the theories and ideas of this opposition.

From a legal point of view the existence of the *samizdat* phenomenon must be linked to the system of censorship in force in the Soviet Union. Before the Second World War the existence of censorship was more or less openly admitted. Its organization was spelled out in a governmental decree of June 6, 1931, which regulated the Chief Department for Literature (*Glavlit*). All printed works had to receive a visa from Glavlit before being published. *Glavlit*'s approbation appeared in the colophon of every

Soviet book (certain Party and government publications being excluded) in the form of a 5-digit number. At present the operation of censorship is less visible. A security check on all printed works is carried out by the Chief Department for the Protection of Military and State Secrets (an organization set up in 1966). General censorship functions (embracing ideological and political supervision of the contents of printed works) are assigned to the State Committee for the Press and its subordinate agencies. The State Committee for the Press controls the publishing houses and this is the actual point where censoring takes place (this was already the system under the 1931 decree; its art. 4 provided that *Glavlit* representatives were attached to individual publishing houses). At present the censorship number in Soviet books consists of a letter and a 5-digit number. The name *Glavlit* is still used colloquially in referring to the censor.

The censorship system is complemented by the prohibition on the acquisition, possession or transfer of printing presses or any other technical means of duplication (roneographs, gestetners, photocopiers, etc.). For practical reasons only typewriters and cameras are excluded (under Stalin even typewriters were subject to registration). All other means of duplication may be acquired only after police permission.[4]

Through the years Soviet authors have of course acquired a fairly precise idea of what will and what will not be passed by the censor. Consequently, a Soviet citizen who wants to disseminate something he believes likely to be unacceptable to officialdom has to resort to "overcoming Gutenberg"—usually by having his work typed out with as many carbon copies as possible. If any of the original set of copies is retyped (again with a number of carbon copies) a snowballing process will start which may ultimately result in a degree of dissemination comparable to that of printed works which are free on sale in the bookstores.

The entire process is referred to as *samizdat*. This term is modeled on the shortened form—*gosizdat*—of State Publishing House (*Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo*). (There are separate state publishing houses for literary, historical, medical, legal, musical works, for children's books, for fine arts, etc.; these houses used to bear a name derived from the *gosizdat* abbreviation: *Gosmedizdat*, *Gosiurizdat*, etc. However, in 1962 most names of this type were changed into something less disagreeable to the ear.) According to Julius Telesin, a Russian writer who emigrated to Israel in 1970, the word *samizdat* occurs first in the late fifties when a Moscow poet, exasperated with the operation of the censorship system, bound together the typewritten sheets of his poems and wrote *Samsebiaizdat* ("Publishing House for Oneself") in the place where the name of the publishing house would normally appear.[5] He also used the term *samizdat* with the same meaning but, as Telesin observes, *samizdat* ("self-publishing house") subsequently acquired a wider meaning. At present it does not

necessarily mean that the *samizdat* publisher publishes his own work but that he does the publishing himself, i.e. outside the official publishing network.

The term *samizdat* has not yet penetrated to the official reference works for the Russian language, although it has been encountered (usually as "the so-called *samizdat*") in Soviet newspapers and periodicals. It has produced its own derivatives such as *samizdatchik* (somebody who engages in the production and distribution of *samizdat*) and an adjective *samizdatovskii*. The meaning of the term *samizdat* has developed well beyond the possibilities of its analogon *gosizdat*. It can be used as a simple name (of a quasi-publishing house), or to indicate the publishing process ("a work appearing in *samizdat*"), or, in an even wider sense, the distribution network and the mood of political discontent connected with the *samizdat* publishing process. Also, the product itself is sometimes called *samizdat* ("to have *samizdat* in the house"). The term is also used adjectivally in expressions as "*samizdat* typists", "*samizdat* works", etc.

Furthermore, several new terms have been formed after the *samizdat* model. Imported works in Russian circulating privately are referred to as *tamizdat* (Russ. *tam* = "over there"); this category consists mostly of émigré publications. The term *radizdat* is sometimes used for *samizdat* transscriptions of foreign radio broadcasts, while *magizdat* or *magnitizdat* refers to taped copies of *samizdat* or *radizdat* items.

The phenomenon which the term *samizdat* denotes is of course much older than its name. It is well known that long before the war Russian authors were writing "for the desk drawer", as it was often called. One particularly interesting aspect of the present *samizdat* movement is that it has made public important documents, sometimes even from the thirties and twenties, which had remained hidden and unknown for all these years. Nevertheless, "desk drawer" works from the Stalin era lack an essential characteristic of *samizdat* works—they were, as a rule, not meant for publication or at least not until better days. In those times of direct and widespread terror, engaging in *samizdat* publishing would be both futile as a means of dissemination and suicidal for all participants.

Samizdat as a source of information about Soviet society

For Soviet citizens *samizdat* is primarily a means of expressing oneself and of communicating with one another in a sphere outside the censor's supervision. Western readers will look at *samizdat* chiefly as a source of information on topics which are covered inadequately by official Soviet sources—either because the subject itself is not likely to be discussed at all (e.g. political reforms; the use of psychiatry against political dissidents)

or because the official representation of certain facts may be suspected to be less than fully candid (e.g. national policies; economic performance). There is another point of difference as regards Soviet and Western readers of *samizdat*: the masses of *samizdat* materials available to these two groups are not identical. In the West all available *samizdat* materials constitute a single block which in principle is accessible to anybody who has the necessary linguistic qualification and knows where to look for it. In the Soviet Union one should distinguish between *samizdat* documents which are generally available to the *samizdat* reading public, which are available only in specific local or social groups, and documents which have not come to our notice at all, the existence of which may only be suspected.

If one considers it to be the primary aim of a *samizdat* author to communicate something to a more or less general (be it large or small) public, *samizdat* literature may be divided into successful *samizdat* (which reached a general reading public in the USSR) and unsuccessful *samizdat* (which did not reach such a public). The latter category may further be divided into totally unsuccessful *samizdat* (which never went beyond the author himself), *samizdat* which was intercepted by the authorities at an early stage (when it had been read by a few people only) and *samizdat* circulating in a small and closed circle. Of course such *samizdat* documents do not themselves become known in the West, but reports about them may be found in other *samizdat* documents. For instance, the Chronicle of Current Events (one of the most important *samizdat* periodicals, see p. 49) reported in its No. 10 about the confiscation of several manuscripts belonging to M. P. Iakubovich, a pensioner living in Karaganda and one of the few survivors of the great purge trials of the 'thirties. Another *samizdat* periodical, Political Diary (*Politicheskii Dnevnik*, see p. 49) circulated for a number of years among a small number of Party members and nothing was known about it until somebody handed a dozen different copies to a Western contact. There must, in all probability be other *samizdat* documents, the circulation of which is confined to closed groups and which thereby remain unknown to the more general reading public in the Soviet Union and *a fortiori* to the Western reader.

A *samizdat* document which managed to "break out" and reach a general public can still have various degrees of success. This would depend on a number of factors. Short documents are easier to copy and circulate faster. Some documents command more interest than others and will be copied more avidly. Documents in non-Russian languages are naturally more limited in their circulation. It is known, for instance, that a number of *samizdat* documents circulates in Armenia and possibly very widely, but such documents would still stand a poor chance of moving outside Armenian-speaking circles and are therefore virtually unknown in the

West (see p. 53). Also, the majority of *samizdat* documents are in themselves of ephemeral importance; once the interest in a specific incident has died down the document retains little *samizdat* value. Still, the difference between successful and unsuccessful *samizdat* remains essential because a successful *samizdat* document usually stays available and accessible (albeit with some difficulty); if there is a reawakening of interest the *samizdat* process can always be revived.

One might summarize the existence of these various categories of successful and unsuccessful *samizdat* in the Soviet Union by saying that the entire mass of *samizdat* documents in the USSR is fragmented into a number of larger or smaller clusters (whereas the mass of *samizdat* materials available in the West constitutes a single block). How do the two masses compare? It is by no means only the most successful form of *samizdat* which finds its way across the Soviet borders. Of course, documents which command a wide circulation will have a better chance of getting abroad, but it is precisely the possibility of handing documents to foreign visitors which may make it easier for Soviet citizens who can come in contact with such visitors to send documents abroad than to launch them successfully through the *samizdat* process. The mass of *samizdat* materials available in the West does therefore contain numerous documents which were initially unknown among the general *samizdat* reading public in the USSR. Once a *samizdat* document has arrived in the West, it can at any time be broadcast back to the Soviet Union and start a second life as *radizdat*.

As the overwhelming majority of *samizdat* arriving in the West is in Russian, first publication usually takes place in one of the many Russian language periodicals appearing in Europe and America. The most important among these, as sources for *samizdat* materials, are *Posev* (The Sowing, a socio-political monthly published in Western Germany and closely linked to the NTS, the principal Russian émigré organization), *Grani* (Frontiers, a literary review, published in Western Germany and equally closely related to the NTS), *Russkaia Mysl'* (Russian Thought, a socio-political weekly, published by Russian émigré circles in Paris), *Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia* (The Messenger of the Russian Student Christian Movement, published in Paris and specializing in religious *samizdat*), and *Novyi Zhurnal* (The New Journal, a literary review published in New York). Ukrainian *samizdat* is published chiefly in Ukrainian émigré periodicals such as *Suchasnist'* (The Present Time) and *Ukraïns'kyi Samostiinyk* (The Ukrainian Independent). English translations of many socio-political *samizdat* documents may be found in Survey of Soviet and East-European Affairs (London).

The Arkhiv Samizdata

The fullest collection of *samizdat* in the West is the *Arkhiv Samizdata* (*Samizdat* Archive), set up in 1971, and located at the Research Department of Radio Liberty in Munich. In connection with its Russian language broadcasting programmes for the USSR, Radio Liberty had begun collecting *samizdat* documents in 1968. Newly arrived documents are published in weekly bulletins, called *Materialy Samizdata*. When the *Arkhiv Samizdata* was started Radio Liberty therefore already possessed hundreds of documents. By the end of 1974 the collection had grown to more than 1800 items. *Samizdat* documents from the Radio Liberty collection are referred to under the letters AS (*Arkhiv Samizdata*) and a serial number. This practice is followed also in this work. In 1972 a complete collection of *Arkhiv Samizdata* materials began to be published under the title *Sobranie Dokumentov Samizdata* (Collected *Samizdat* Documents). This collection, on the basis of the materials available at the end of 1973, was intended to embrace some 1500 documents arranged according to serial number (i.e. roughly in chronological order of arrival) and numbers approximately 18.000 pages divided over 30 volumes. In many cases the order of arrival does not correspond with the date of the document since the time which it takes a document to reach the West may very widely from one piece to another. Apart from the volumes containing documents in order of serial number, 16 volumes are devoted to specific themes (Russian Orthodox, Baptist, Roman Catholic, Jewish, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian *samizdat*, the "Chronicle of Current Events", the "Political Diary" and the journal *Veche*). As a rule the *Arkhiv Samizdata* does not include poetry, novels and other works of *belles lettres* except short bibliographical references and poems or other short pieces with some socio-political relevance.

In order to offer an insight into the variety of the materials included in the *Arkhiv Samizdata* we may try to distinguish according to theme and year of origin. Although in many cases the distinguishing line may be hard to draw the following breakdown is tentatively suggested.

a. *Documents concerning individual complaints or specific themes*

This is by far the largest group.

Typical examples are: AS 417: Letter of 20 Soviet scientists protesting against the enforced hospitalization of Zhores Medvedev (4 June 1970); AS 1143: I. F. Fedorov, a Leningrad pensioner, Letter to Rudenko (21 May 1972); AS 1496: E. Bonner and A. Sakharov,

Letter to Iu. B. Andropov requesting him to put Viktor Khaustov on parole (28 October 1973).

Documents devoted to specific Jewish, religious or national themes have not been included in this group.

b. *Literary and philosophical samizdat*

As stated before, most essays and poetry included in the *Arkhiv Samizdata* have some political significance (this is presumably the reason to utilize the *samizdat* process).

Typical examples: AS 897: O. Altaev, The dual consciousness of the intelligentsia and pseudo-culture (1970); AS 1466: Natalia Gorbanevskaia, In memory of Iurii Galanskov, a poem (11 November 1972).

c. *General political writings*

This category embraces articles and even some books which aim at a more or less general discussion and analysis of the Soviet political system. Documents of this kind form the basis of this study.

Some examples: AS 403: Anon., What is it you want? Notes about the class structure of Soviet society (1969); AS 1500: R. A. Medvedev, The problem of democratization and the problem of détente (October 1973).

d. *Religious samizdat*

The principal sections within this group concern the Baptists, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Lithuanian Roman Catholics. The Baptists are particularly active in *samizdat*. There are also a small number of documents regarding the Uniates (a formerly numerous group from the Western Ukraine, adhering to the old Slavonic liturgy and to the Roman Catholic Church) and the Buddhists. Islam is notably absent in *samizdat* literature but geographical factors may in part be blamed for this (the Islamic population is to be found mostly outside Russia proper—Azerbaidzhan, Central Asia and the region of the Urals). Documents concerning the Jewish religion have been classed under e.

Examples of religious *samizdat* are: AS 1065: Barnaul Baptists, Letter to U Thant (1971); AS 1385: Chronicle of the Lithuanian

Catholic Church No. 6 (May 1973); AS 1149: Archbishop Pavel Golyshev of Novosibirsk and Barnaul, Report to Patriarch Pimen (6 February 1972).

e. *Jewish samizdat*

Jewish *samizdat* is a comparative latecomer and does not start until 1968. Most of it is concerned with individual acts of discrimination, often in connection with the expression of the wish to emigrate to Israel.

Some examples: AS 1084: Iosif Begun, Letter to the CPSU Central Committee Agitation and Propaganda Department protesting against an article by G. Deborin in *Izvestiia* of 5 January 1972 on zionism (20 January 1972); AS 1295: Aleksandra Dubrova, Letter to Andropov about harassment of her son since 23 October 1972, she demands it to be ended and their exit visas to Israel be returned (13 December 1972).

f. *National samizdat*

This category embraces documents attacking the official nationalities policy, complaining about specific acts of national discrimination and oppression or otherwise devoted to the nationality question in the USSR. Most numerous are documents concerning the Crimean Tatars, followed by another large contingent of Ukrainian documents (most of them in Ukrainian). Other significant groups of national *samizdat* concern the Meskhetians (a small Turkic-speaking nation from Southern Georgia), the Armenians and the Lithuanians. Jewish *samizdat* is not included in this group. Chapter 7 contains a more detailed discussion of national *samizdat*.

Examples of national *samizdat* among Radio Liberty's *Materialy Samizdata* are: AS 86: Crimean Tatar Information Bulletin No. 82 (1 January 1969); AS 919: S. Karavanskii, Petition to Gomulka about Soviet nationality policy (27 September 1965); AS 1215: Appeal of Armenians in Karabakh (Azerbaidzhan SSR) to the People of Armenia for help against "Azerbaidzhani chauvinism" (undated).

g. *Official Soviet documents*

This group consists chiefly of official reports about searches (which should be handed to the inhabitant of the premise which has been searched), arrests, etc.; psychiatric reports about dissidents; documents issued by the prison administration, copies of court sentences and the like.

Examples: AS 292: Trial of 8 Baptists in Sumgait (Azerbaidzhan), Text of the indictment (17 January 1969); AS 293: Trial of 8 Baptists in Sumgait, Text of sentences (31 March 1969); AS 296: Trial of 8 Baptists in Sumgait, Affidavit by the Chief of the Building Administration about the exemplary work record of M. P. Kabanov (30 July 1969).

h. *Trial reports and "final words"*

Official reports of trials of political dissidents have not appeared in Soviet court bulletins, but since the Siniavskii-Daniel trial in February, 1966, it has been the practice among Soviet dissidents to prepare *verbatim* reports (as far as possible) immediately after the trial by comparing notes (usually made surreptitiously) and relying on the memory of several observers. An impressive number of reports has been compiled in this way, providing not only a vivid account of the confrontation between the Soviet regime and its dissident citizens, but also rare information about the actual operation of the Soviet legal system. In many cases the final words spoken by the accused have been incorporated in the trial reports, but a number of speeches from the dock also circulate separately and for this reason have been included in this group of documents.

Some examples: AS 1069: Vladimir Bukovskii, Final words at his trial in Moscow (5 January 1972); AS 1077: Trial of Vladimir Bukovskii in Moscow, transcript (5 January 1972).

i. *Non-dissident Soviet documents*

This category covers a not very large number of documents of completely "loyal" character which have ended up in *samizdat* because of their specific interest to dissident circles.

As examples one could mention AS 1019: a letter of I. S. Narskii, professor of philosophy at Moscow University, to Keldysh (president of the USSR Academy of Sciences) in which Narskii indignantly rejects rumours that he is of Jewish descent (10 October 1970); or AS 42: Transscript of a Teachers' Union meeting in Moscow held to punish teacher V. M. Gerlin for signing a protest petition about the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial (16 April 1968); or AS 460: the text of Khrushchev' secret speech, held at the 20th Party Congress on 25 February 1956 (On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences).

j. *Documents of foreign origin*

The *Arkhiv Samizdata* contains a few bibliographical notes about foreign works circulating in *samizdat* (or sometimes in the original form) in the Soviet Union (AS 463: note concerning Avtorkhanov's *Tekhnologiia Vlasti*, a work of an émigré author published in Western Germany and in English under the title "Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party—A Study in the Technology of Power"; AS 464: note concerning Djilas' "The New Class"). From other *samizdat* sources it is clear that quite a large number of works originally published in the West circulates in the Soviet Union.

In Table 1 the materials included in the *Arkhiv Samizdata* have been arranged according to year of origin (or publication, if the year of origin could not be established) and according to the foregoing division of documents in ten different groups (an eleventh category "various" has been added). Documents classed under any of the groups b.-k. have not been counted under a. ("documents concerning individual complaints or specific themes"). In a small number of cases documents have been classed in two groups so that the sum total on Table 1 (2094) somewhat exceeds the total number of documents listed in the *Arkhiv Samizdata* (also, some AS numbers cover several *samizdat* documents). For instance, AS 932: The trial of Mykhailo Masiutko, a Ukrainian nationalist (21 March 1966), has been listed under f. ("national *samizdat*") and under h. ("trial reports").

In fact, as has been pointed out, a strict and unambiguous classification of *samizdat* documents cannot be imposed: national and religious *samizdat* overlap each other (in the case of the Lithuanian catholics), religious and philosophical *samizdat* are sometimes difficult to distinguish, and groups g. ("official Soviet documents"), h. ("trial reports") and i. ("non-dissident Soviet documents") cut across most other groups.

The time dimension is certainly not the least interesting aspect of the *samizdat* materials of the *Arkhiv Samizdata*. In this respect two categories may be discerned: documents which began circulating in *samizdat* immediately or soon after having been written (the vast majority) and documents which have been unnoticed or "dormant" for some length of time and which at some later date have been published in *samizdat*. The most extreme example is AS 1179, an article "Jews in Russia" written in 1884 by Nikolai Leskov, which together with a foreword written around 1920 by Iu. Gessen began circulating in *samizdat* in 1972. (No. 9 of the Chronicle (Reddaway p. 363) even mentions an article by Zaitsev, published in 1877 in Geneva, which was circulating in *samizdat* in 1969.) Other old materials which acquired a second life in *samizdat* are: AS 889, a lecture on church architecture given in 1918 by the orthodox priest P. Florenskii;

AS 890, a letter to Florenskii by Archbishop Ilarion Troitskii, dated 22 October 1927 (this document was reportedly distributed at a 1971 Russian Orthodox Church Council in Zagorsk): AS 1340, an unpublished letter of Lenin, dated 10 February 1922, approving the use of force against the Russian Orthodox Church; under the same number AS 1340: Patriarch Tikhon's message about the famine and the confiscation of church property (28 February 1922); AS 1341: childhood reminiscences of Father P. Florenskii (written in 1923); AS 1150: the transscript (from official sources) of the hearing of Patriarch Tikhon as a witness in an anti-religious trial on 26 April 1922. In the case of old materials it is of course interesting to know when the new process of circulation began. The date of appearance in *Materialy Samizdata* or in other Western periodicals which regularly publish *samizdat* does often provide an indication; occasionally other *samizdat* sources make mention of the appearance of "new" old *samizdat*; e.g. Lenin's letter on religious persecution (AS 1340) was discussed in two issues of the Chronicle of Current Events (Nos. 9 and 15).

Most documents in AS have specifically been written for *samizdat* publication or are at least put into *samizdat* soon after having been written (in particular the large group of letters addressed to various Soviet agencies). In such cases the moments of writing and of publication in *samizdat* virtually coincide. The time-lag between the moment of publication in *samizdat* and of publication in the West varies considerably. Sometimes it may be a matter of days and indeed a statement by a figure of international renown, like Sakharov, may be made public in the West before it has really begun to circulate inside the USSR (e.g. AS 1505, statement by Sakharov concerning Roy and Zhores Medvedev, made on 20 November 1973 and included in No. 46 of *Materialy Samizdata*, dated 30 November 1973). An interval of several months is quite normal and there is nothing extraordinary about *samizdat* materials appearing in the West one or two years after their apparent appearance in the Soviet Union.

After all these caveats it will be clear that the picture provided by Table 1 allows only a few general and tentative conclusions. One might venture the following:

1. *Samizdat* publishing really gets started in 1966.
2. It increases dramatically in 1968.
3. The 1968 level is more or less maintained in the following years.
4. Religious and national *samizdat* had begun a few years earlier and do not show such a sharp increase in 1968.
5. Jewish *samizdat* starts later and is unknown before 1968.

These conclusions are fully supported by information available from other sources. The Siniavskii-Daniel trial, in February 1966, as a major manifestation of the political attitudes of the post-Khrushchev regime, sparked off a wave of protest which, interacting with the regime's reply,

TABLE 1

Distribution of *samizdat* materials in *Arkhiv Samizdata* (as on 13 September 1974)

	before 1965	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	total
A. Documents concerning individual complaints or specific themes	15	9	34	33	103	63	65	71	68	104	219	784
B. Literary and philosophical *samizdat*	19	5	6	6	11	12	21	10	9	13	8	120
C. General political writings	7	3	7	7	20	28	28	21	12	17	33	183
D. Religious *samizdat*	32	13	22	26	36	47	93	42	75	48	53	487
E. Jewish *samizdat*	1	—	—	—	7	15	49	34	35	20	15	176
F. National *samizdat*	5	15	26	22	29	33	21	9	17	9	17	203
G. Official Soviet documents	12	1	1	4	4	11	5	2	5	3	4	52
H. Trial reports and "final words"	2	—	8	3	7	5	4	5	4	1	4	43
I. Non-dissident Soviet documents	4	1	3	1	1	2	—	—	2	2	3	19
J. Documents of foreign origin	2	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	4
K. Various	1	—	—	2	2	5	1	—	1	5	6	23
TOTAL	100	47	107	104	220	222	287	194	228	223	362	2094

grew into a widespread movement. This movement and the existing currents of religious and national dissatisfaction (which were already expressing themselves in a modest flow of *samizdat* documents) mutually reinforced each other. The deep and fundamental connections between political dissent and religious reorientation can only be mentioned here (see also pp. 116-117). There is undoubtedly also a connection between the regime's anti-semitic policies (and Jewish reaction against them) and the general movement of political dissent. This movement is largely a concern of intellectuals, a stratum among which Jews are particularly numerous. The incidence of Jews on the lists of known political dissidents in the Soviet Union is remarkably high. It would not be entirely unprecedented if the Soviet authorities attempted to recruit latent anti-semitism among the populace in a campaign against its political opponents.

The overwhelming majority of AS documents is in Russian; a few dozen are in Ukrainian and a very small number in Lithuanian. Two documents consist, not of written text, but of portrait drawings of political prisoners made by Iurii Ivanov in the Mordovian camp No. 17-a. (AS 488 and 558). AS 1017 is a film with sound-track of statements by several dissidents.

There is an occasional document in AS which almost completely lacks the element of political dissent which may be regarded as the prime characteristic of real *samizdat*: e.g. AS 514, a letter by A. G. Feofilaktova to the U.N. Human Rights Commission asking for aid in publication of a technical study about a new system of equipment for the fishing industry, or AS 394, a letter of workers in Kremenchug to the Central Committee, complaining about their housing conditions.

After this discussion of the contents of the *Arkhiv Samizdata* one may inquire how the *Arkhiv* compares with other bodies of *samizdat* literature, in particular with the *samizdat* literature which is more or less generally available to its specific reading public in the USSR. Before going into this it should once more be stressed that the *Arkhiv Samizdata* as a collection of *samizdat* materials available in the West is incomplete in three respects: a. as the collection of documents was started in 1968 a number of earlier documents (which were already available at that time) have not been included; b. literary works are as a rule not included; c. a comparatively small but still not negligible amount of documents has been published in the West (mostly in Russian language periodicals) and has not been reprinted in the *Arkhiv*.

The best insight into the question of how much and what kinds of *samizdat* reached the West can be acquired by comparing the *Arkhiv* with lists of *samizdat* materials circulating in the Soviet Union as provided by known *samizdat* sources. The most important source in this respect is the section "*samizdat* news" in the Chronicle of Current Events. In its issues

12-27 (February 1970-October 1972) this section mentioned 180 titles of *samizdat* documents currently circulating in the USSR. Of these, 85 have been included in the *Arkhiv Samizdata* and a few more have been reproduced in other Western sources. This would allow us to conclude that the total number of *samizdat* documents which were at that time circulating in the Soviet Union would at least be double the number of documents included in the *Arkhiv* (about 1500), i.e. 3000. The actual number of *samizdat* documents in the USSR is probably greater because, as explained before, *samizdat* in non-Russian languages or circulating locally stands a much poorer chance of wide dissemination in the USSR and will therefore not pass the Soviet border as easily.

On the other hand, on account of the risks involved in storing *samizdat* documents, there is certainly no collection in the Soviet Union (excepting the KGB archives) which could compete with the holdings of Radio Liberty. Judging from reports about searches, the number of *samizdat* documents in the possession of individual Soviet citizens rarely exceeds fifteen of twenty.

The degree of dissemination of *samizdat* documents inside the Soviet Union can be learned from *samizdat* literature itself. Some documents are often mentioned and must be known to the majority of regular *samizdat* readers. This category embraces the best known literary works (Solzhenitsyn's novels, Galich's songs, etc.) but also Sakharov's Memorandum (see p. 96), several works by the Medvedev brothers, Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?", the Chronicle of Current Events and many others.

One of the great merits of the Chronicle of Current Events is that its section on *samizdat* news usually provides a synopsis of the documents mentioned (which seems to imply that the documents quoted in this section have actually been in the possession of the editors of the Chronicle and are not merely known from hearsay). In this way our field of vision is considerably widened beyond the boundaries imposed by the *Arkhiv Samizdata*. In this work, which deals primarily with the political ideas of dissenting circles in the Soviet Union, we have not hesitated to make use of this second-hand material.

The Chronicle's practice seems the more commendable if we observe that the potential importance of certain unavailable *samizdat* works can only be inferred from occasional references in other, available, works. Some *samizdat* sources make mention of a certain Radonezhskii, whose work "World, Man, Time" is regarded as of great significance by them. Roy Medvedev's "A Book on Socialist Democracy" (see p. 78) contains, along with quotations from many known *samizdat* documents, just enough references to a piece entitled "The Word is also Act" (*Slovo tozhe delo*) to make the reader thoroughly curious. Other potentially important works

are "The Transformation of Bolshevism", summarized in No. 8 of the Chronicle[6] and Iu. Gesin, "On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", reported in AS 1411 as a *samizdat* work published in Leningrad in 1970. From the summary of "The Transformation of Bolshevism" one would conclude that the book's anonymous author is close to the dissident Marxists-Leninists discussed in chapter 3.

The practice of samizdat

The actual operation of the *samizdat* publishing system is well known, both from *samizdat* sources themselves as well as through information provided by (former) Soviet citizens who have emigrated during the last few years. Many *samizdat* documents concern themselves in passing with the problems facing the production and dissemination of *samizdat* and a few articles are even exclusively devoted to this subject.

In discussing these problems we can limit ourselves to texts; the desirability of avoiding censorship will usually be connected with texts—linguistic expressions of ideas. Purely visual (non-verbal) images are less likely to offend the censor and are also more difficult to reproduce adequately. The visual counterpart of *samizdat* literature embraces among other things non-conformist painting and sculpture (i.e. not acceptable as "Soviet art") and pornographic pictures.[7] Photographs and films may also be ranged in this category. In the preceding section it has been mentioned that the *Arkhiv Samizdata* contains a number of charcoal drawings of political prisoners and a film (with sound-track). Purely audial expressions (music) are not considered as *samizdat*, along the same lines. The offensiveness to the censor of protest songs (such as the works of Galich) is of course in the text and not in the music (although non-conformist music undoubtedly exists in the Soviet Union just as non-conformist literature).

Words are capable of reproduction by word of mouth, writing and various electronic devices. Oral reproduction is suitable only for very short and compact pieces of information. These may reach the West as short messages, rumours and political anecdotes; none of these are regarded as *samizdat*. Words may be transmitted electronically by radio, tape, sound-track and similar methods. Radio transmissions from abroad, especially those in Russian and at dictation speed, may be the source of a special kind of *samizdat* which is sometimes referred to as *radizdat*.

The importance of Russian-language broadcasts can hardly be overestimated as a primary source of *samizdat* and as a mechanism in the dissemination process of already existing *samizdat*. This importance is underlined in several *samizdat* documents.

"One has to bear in mind what incredible amounts of work and what risks are required to achieve quite modest results in the dissemination of *samizdat* in our conditions. Without a permanent platform, the voice of which would reach the remotest corners of the earth, the democratic movement would become known only among the intelligentsia of the big cities and, alas, in certain bureaucratic circles, but would not reach the people for whose rights it is fighting. In that spiritual and cultural famine, which people in the West cannot even imagine and in which every member of the Russian intelligentsia lives (especially in the province where no *samizdat* and no literary news penetrates) Radio Liberty is the only source of spiritual food. Its possible closure—there are various but insistent rumours about it—or even a decrease in its activities would mean spiritual, cultural and informational starvation for tens and hundreds of thousands in whom, thanks to these broadcasts, a sense of freedom and self-consciousness was born or shall be born in the future." (AS 1086)

Inside the USSR amateur radio transmission is allowed after permission from the authorities and under the usual conditions (conversation must be restricted to the exchange of technical information); it is unlikely that registered radio amateurs will engage in activities that have even the faintest connection with *samizdat*. Radio pirating has been a problem of some importance to the Soviet authorities for a number of years and there are indications that radio pirates have broadcast from time to time politically unpalatable material.[8] However, the comparative ease of detection and the great risks involved make it unlikely that the broadcasting of uncensored messages by Soviet radio amateurs will ever become an important source of *samizdat*.

The use of tapes (*magizdat* or *magnitizdat*) for the dissemination of uncensored materials has been mentioned in the preceding section. It appears that tapes are used extensively for the reproduction of protest songs and other musical performances which are otherwise unavailable.

The normal reproduction method for written texts is by typewriter or through photography. The advantages of photography are: an infinite number of copies can be made from one negative; the text cannot be deformed; the method is almost soundless and takes little time. The disadvantages are: long documents become extremely bulky in photographed form; cost; the original to be photographed must be of suitable quality (many *samizdat* documents are almost illegible); not many people have the required professional skills. As a result of this the vast majority of *samizdat* documents consists of typewritten texts.

It is interesting to note, however, that one *samizdat* periodical, "Free Thought" (see p. 161), contained an article entitled "Photography as a method of reproduction of textual information" (by K. Glukhov), which explained in detail how photography could be used in producing *samizdat*. The article supplied full technical information on the type of camera and photographic paper to be used, exposure times, equipment required, etc.

The *samizdat* process begins, of course, with an author who writes or types out the original version. This may be given or lent to others who may make copies and this is how a document starts its *samizdat* life. For the practice of *samizdat*, however, the reproduction of existing documents is a more important matter than the creation of new documents. It is in regard to reproduction that a number of specific difficulties arise. The possessor of a *samizdat* document will often have acquired possession for a few days only; he has to hand it back to its owner, or on to a third person. It is not unusual that a document is given on loan for a short time in order to have it copied and that the borrower is obliged to return the original together with three or four carbon copies. The short-term possessor will therefore have to arrange (and sometimes even beforehand) to have the document retyped, either by himself or by a competent and reliable typist. In the latter case the typist must be paid or, more commonly, will require one or more copies for herself (*pace* Women's Lib, in the first state to guarantee constitutionally the equality of the sexes typing is a woman's profession; a typist is a *mashinistka*, a *mashinist* being something quite different). Consequently it becomes imperative to use as large a number of carbon copies as is feasible. By using tissue paper *samizdat* typists may go as far as fifteen copies at a time. Of course the bottom copies are barely legible and the durability of tissue paper copies is poor. While retyping *samizdat* a certain amount of circumspection will have to be observed in order not to arouse the suspicion of perhaps unreliable neighbours.[9]

There are some indications that official facilities have occasionally been used in preparing *samizdat*. The first version of Sakharov's first major *samizdat* work ("Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom") is known to have been typed in short fragments by a number of typists at the institute where the author was then working.[10] No. 27 of the Chronicle reports that the KGB took test-samples of the typefaces of all typewriters in the Leningrad branch of the publishing house of *Goslitizdat* and its subsidiary offices during the summer of 1972.

The time involved in retyping *samizdat* is directly related to the circulation speed. A one-page document can go through a cycle of reproduction within one day which means that, theoretically, thousands of copies could be available within a week. Longer documents not only require more time to retype but also to negotiate the loan and recruit the typist. These difficulties can be eased by employing several typists and by piecemeal reproduction, but still a forty-page essay needs much more time to become

widely known. In the case of lengthy *samizdat* documents the reading problem is sometimes solved by "reading sessions" where a number of friends meet in the apartment of one of them and pages are being handed on to the next person as they have been read.

Samizdat is distributed by hand and rarely through the mail—a channel regarded as extremely hazardous. Official interference with the correspondence of known dissenters is well documented. Several prominent *samizdat* authors have complained about this, pointing out that the secrecy of correspondence is guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution.

The entire *samizdat* process bears much resemblance to the situation in Europe before the invention of printing. There is no easy access to a common pool of information and indeed such a pool hardly exists at all. As a result the distribution of information is uneven and patchy. Also, the whole manner of reproduction encourages inaccuracies of various kinds. Words and sentences are changed or omitted, other things are added, works are broken up and reproduced in fragments only and "families" of versions come into being.

In one respect the present situation in the Soviet Union is worse than in Europe before the invention of printing. *Samizdat* authors use their typewriters not because the printing press does not exist but because it is not available to them. The limits imposed on intellectual life in the ancient and medieval world were the undesired results of insufficient technology. In the Soviet Union these limits have consciously been created by the state. In old times the flow of information was restricted but relatively free while *samizdat* is the direct result of, and reaction against, state interference. As such it is strongly disliked by the regime which does everything in its power to put an end to it. (The legal position of *samizdat* will be discussed in the next section.)

One of the worst handicaps of the prevailing system of *samizdat* distribution is the weak connection or absence of connection between the source and the reader. In two types of cases the author of a *samizdat* document is usually known by name: a very few internationally known and highly prominent persons have the courage, and can afford, to sign their works (Sakharov, the Medvedev brothers, Chalidze; others, it must be added, have the courage but could not afford it: Amalrik, Bukovskii and many, many others); documents addressed to Soviet authorities are normally signed by the authors. In the latter case, however, unless the author is desperate or has suicidal intentions, he will be inclined to abstain from a too controversial expression of his opinions. This means that in most cases where the reader would like to establish contact with the author, in order to support, question or criticize the latter's position, he can only launch his reaction into the *samizdat* channel available to him and hope that it will somehow some day reach the addressee. Several

suggestions have been made to overcome this difficulty but as yet none have proved successful. The most ambitious plan was proposed in the journal "Free Thought" (see p. 161) in an article by S. Topolev (presumably a pseudonym) entitled "From *Samizdat* to *Kolizdat*" (the new term *kolizdat* refers to collective publishing and the desirability of enlarging the scale of *samizdat* publishing). Topolev proposed to change over to a periodical basis for *samizdat* publishing. These periodicals were to be financed by subscriptions, payment for which was to be handed on through the same channels by which the periodical would reach the subscriber but in the opposite direction. Articles and contributions would reach the editors of the periodical in the same way. The system apparently never worked.

Attempts to overcome the limitations imposed by the typewriter and the camera as means of multiplication have been somewhat more successful. A group of Baptists have operated for some time a clandestine printing press (see AS 878, about the founding of the *Khristianin* Publishing House) and some of its products (strictly religious literature) have reached the West (AS 879 and 1326). Others have managed to put together primitive hectographs and similar machines. This can be done by producing the necessary parts oneself or by buying them or appropriating them in another way. Charges of posession, use or appropriation of such instruments have occurred in several indictments against political dissidents.[11]

Legal aspects

Even a cursory glance at *samizdat* materials will convince the reader that the great majority of them are in some way concerned with legal questions and with law in general.

This may be illustrated by taking the first out of every hundred documents in the *Arkhiv Samizdata*; the following list then results:

1. Letter on Ginzburg-Galanskov trial
101. Open letter about trial of Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan
201. Ginzburg's White Book about Siniavskii-Daniel Trial (bibl. note)
301. Open letter to world churches by Council of Prisoner's Relatives of the Evangelical Baptist Church
401. Text of Indictment of 10 Crimean Tatars in Tashkent trial
501. Letter by Iliasova to U.N. Human Rights Commission about actions of the authorites in her village to prevent her family from living there

601. *Iskhod* (Exodus) No. 4, issue devoted to the Leningrad trial of alleged plane hijackers
701. Article on Assembly of Orthodox Bishops
801. Letter to U Thant by Council of Prisoners' Relatives of the Evangelical Baptist Church
901. V. Lobko, Articles and speeches on Ukrainian language and culture
1001. *Politicheskii Dnevnik* (Political Diary) No. 3
1101. Article about use of psychiatric hospitals against political dissidents
1201. Ozerov, *Tupolevskaia Sharaga* (bibl. note concerning memoirs from a special penitentiary institution for engineers and scientists)
1301. *Bratskii Listok* (Fraternal Bulletin) 1972, No. 1
1401. Documents concerning parental custody case of Aleksandr Temkin and his daughter Marina
1501. Letter to Amnesty International by 11 Moscow intellectuals, requesting registration as Soviet branch of Amnesty
1601. M. S. Agurskii, Appeal to the American intelligentsia (in response to an article by A. Kan against Solzhenitsyn)
1701. Chronicle of Current Events No. 28.

The legal dimensions of the contents are not immediately obvious from the titles of AS 701, 901, 1001, 1301, 1601 and 1701, but a closer scrutiny will probably show that almost any *samizdat* document somehow touches on themes of law and administration of justice.

The legal elements in *samizdat* literature itself concern primarily the many aspects of repression of various forms of dissent in the Soviet Union. In most cases such repression assumes the shape of legal sanctions against dissidents: penalties imposed by criminal courts and a variety of other measures based on provisions of administrative law, ranging from official warnings to committal to psychiatric hospitals. The majority of *samizdat* materials is devoted to accounts of, and protests against, such legal sanctions.

Beyond and behind this mass of protest, which is of necessity in most cases of a factual and detailed nature, law enters the dialogue between the regime and the dissidents on a much more general plane. Many dissidents, through their experiences with specific illegalities committed by the regime, have come to the conclusion that the lack of regard for the law and particularly the low respect in which human rights are held by the authorities constitute the most serious defect of the Soviet social and political system. Consequently for many of the *samizdat* dissidents a full

restoration of civil rights and an unequivocal abjuration of the gigantic lawlessness of the Stalin period have become the most basic prerequisites for social and political improvement.

The size of this section as part of an introductory chapter does not allow anything more than a summary discussion of the legal issues raised in the preceding paragraphs. For further information the reader is referred to specialized literature.[12]

The most effective weapon of the Soviet authorities in combating *samizdat* is the Criminal Code. The provisions under which producers, distributors and possessors of *samizdat* are usually charged are arts. 70 and 190-1. According to the first paragraph of art. 70:

> "Agitation or propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting or weakening Soviet authority or of committing particular, especially dangerous crimes against the state, dissemination for the same purpose of slanderous fabrications defamatory to the Soviet political and social system, as well as dissemination or production or harbouring for the same purpose of literature of such content,
> shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from six months to seven years, with or without additional exile for a term of from two to five years, or by exile for a term of from two to five years."

Shortly after the trial of Siniavskii and Daniel (who were convicted under art. 70—anti-Soviet propaganda) a new art. 190-1 was introduced, entitled "Knowingly disseminating false fabrications which defame the Soviet political and social system", which read:

> "The systematic dissemination in oral form of deliberately false fabrications, discrediting the Soviet political and social system, as well as the production or dissemination in written, printed or other form of works of such content,
> shall be punished by deprivation for a term not exceeding three years, or by corrective labour for a term not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one hundred roubles."

The main difference between arts. 70 and 190-1 is in the anti-Soviet purpose which is required for the application of art. 70: the offender must have acted specifically with the intention to subvert or weaken Soviet authority (or Soviet power, the Russian word *vlast'* allowing either translation).

The operative words in the definitions of arts. 70 and 190-1 are the terms "slanderous fabrications defamatory to the Soviet political and social system" and "deliberately false fabrications discrediting the Soviet political and social system". There is abundant evidence from whole

strings of trials of political dissidents that any statement about the Soviet Union which the authorities find sufficiently objectionable may be regarded by the courts as a slanderous or false fabrication which discredits the Soviet political and social system. In many instances such a verdict is already rendered by the (totally state- and party-controlled) newspapers before the actual trial has taken place. Also, the state attorney (*prokuror*), a representative of the hierarchically organized *Prokuratura*, has an important function in enlightening the court with regard to a "correct socio-political evaluation" of the offence. Some famous examples of defamation of the Soviet social and political system (anti-Soviet propaganda in the sense of art. 70) are: the fantastic fictional stories of Siniavskii; Ginzburg's collection of documents concerning the Siniavskii-Daniel trial (court proceedings, judgment, letters of protest to the authorities by numerous Soviet citizens, etc.): Bukovskii's letter (accompanied by official reports from Soviet psychiatrists) alleging that political dissidents were compulsorily placed in psychiatric hospitals. Because the Soviet court is as yet not in a position to determine independently of the regime what is true or false and whether the Soviet political and social system has been discredited, the formula is an empty mould which is mallable at will by the regime itself.

Similarly, the distinction between anti-Soviet propaganda (art. 70) and slander of the socio-political system (art. 190-1) cuts no ice. On paper anti-Soviet propaganda (which carries a maximum penalty of seven years or even twelve years if one adds the five years of exile which may be imposed additionally) requires an intention on the part of the offender to subvert or weaken Soviet power, and such an anti-Soviet purpose is not required for the offence of art. 190-1 (maximum of three years). However, "the purpose of weakening or subverting Soviet power" is a formula which is obviously wide open to abuse in the hands of the representatives of this selfsame power. What the distinction in fact boils down to is that art. 70 is utilized when the authorities desire to make a show of ferociousness, and art. 190-1 when a somewhat lower profile is preferred.

Arts. 70 and 190-1 are the standard provisions used against authors and distributors of *samizdat* although it should be emphasized that *samizdat* in itself is nowhere forbidden by Soviet law. There is no law against the possession and use of typewriters and cameras and the distribution of carbon copies or photographed copies of a text. The very fact, however, of utilizing the *samizdat* procedure must look extremely suspect in the eyes of Soviet authorities, because what other aim could be served by this procedure than avoidance of the censor? The Soviet Criminal Code (and in particular arts. 70 and 190-1) being what it is, one has to admit that with sufficient ill will almost any *samizdat* document can be construed as discrediting in some way the Soviet socio-political system.

Apart from the most important and incisive measures against *samizdat* supplied by the Criminal Code, Soviet criminal procedure law offers a number of instruments which may be used for counteracting *samizdat* and for intimidating and harassing *samizdat* authors and distributors. In this respect one could point to rules concerning searches of persons and premises and seizure of documents. Other means of repression employed against participants of the *samizdat* movement include: expulsion from the Party, dismissal from one's job, dismissal from professional organizations, the removing of disability status, refusal of routine requests (e.g. concerning housing and residence) and an almost infinite arsenal of other measures which the most grandiose bureaucracy in world history has at its disposal in dealing with its subjects. Of these only committal to a psychiatric hospital should be mentioned specifically because its effect may be even more serious than a long term of imprisonment. The decision to send somebody with undesirable political ideas to a lunatic asylum is more difficult to appeal than a criminal sentence; the term is usually indefinite; the position of the inmates of psychiatric hospitals lack the rudiments of legal protection afforded to ordinary prisoners.

Another legal aspect of *samizdat* literature is the copyright problem. This was of little importance while the Soviet Union remained outside the scope of the international conventions on this subject. It grew into an important issue when the Soviet government, in an apparent attempt to impede the publication of *samizdat* materials abroad, joined the Geneva Convention in 1973.

The question of copyright in *samizdat* works has a number of facets of which only the most important can be indicated briefly here.[13]

Internally, Soviet authors of *samizdat* works will have copyright in such works under the general conditions of Soviet law, viz. the work must be available in some objective form (i.e. not merely in the mind of the author) and it must be the result of some creative activity. The requirement of creativity returns in a slightly different shape where Soviet law limits copyright to works of science, literature and art. The requirement of creativity is construed generously in Soviet law but it still would seem to exclude a number of *samizdat* documents, such as *verbatim* reports of trials and official interviews and possibly also a number of documents consisting of simple letters of protest to various authorities concerning incorrect or unlawful behaviour of official agencies. On the other hand there can be no doubt that there is copyright in many other *samizdat* materials, such as articles, essays, stories, novels, etc.

Soviet law, as a rule, does not permit the transfer of copyright, but only of limited user rights. Normal *samizdat* procedure should therefore be regarded as the transfer by the author of the right of further reproduction to the first and subsequent "generations" of receivers of the copies of his

work. One should take for granted that every Soviet author who launches his work into *samizdat* knows how the system works. Well-known Soviet authors, such as Solzhenitsyn, whose works regularly appear in *samizdat* in the Soviet Union have never claimed that their copyright was infringed by the *samizdat* procedure. Neither has the Soviet government ever asserted that the *samizdat* phenomenon, embarrassing and disagreeable as it is to Soviet authorities, is in any way contrary to Soviet copyright law. From all this this one may conclude that as long as a work remains inside the Soviet Union there is no copyright problem.

First publication of *samizdat* materials abroad raised few special problems before the Soviet Union joined the Universal Copyright Convention (also called the Geneva Convention as opposed to the older Bern Convention). Most of the Western countries including the United States are a party to the Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union's accession became effective as from 27 May, 1973. The principal duty of members of the Geneva Convention is to afford the same copyright protection as offered to their own citizens to citizens of other member states and to works first published in a member state. The Soviet Union, in order to adapt its copyright legislation to the Convention, introduced a number of changes in its civil codes and related legislation. One of the changes provided for the setting up of an All-Union Copyright Agency which was to act as an intermediary in all dealings concerning copyright between Soviet authors and foreigners. Any copyright agreement between Soviet and foreign parties in avoidance of the Agency was declared null and avoid and made the Soviet party liable to legal sanctions. As the Copyright Agency would of course act as a branch of the censor's office and refuse to handle any *samizdat* material, this arrangement provided the Soviet government with yet another instrument to harass *samizdat* authors. In practice the new system would affect only the position of a relatively small number of prominent authors who were known by their real name (people like Solzhenitsyn, Amalrik, Levitin-Krasnov, etc.), because most *samizdat* authors write anonymously or under a pseudonym in order to avoid recognition; for them it would be altogether absurd to consider dealing with the Copyright Agency.

The Soviet Union's accession to the Geneva Convention also created problems for publishers of *samizdat* materials in the West. In Western countries where *samizdat* materials were published the Soviet authors were to be granted equal protection (protection as offered by domestic law). This means that the situation may differ from country to country (provided the country in question is a member of the Convention). The domestic law of the country concerned will have to answer the question as to whether the publisher can be regarded as having the Soviet author's permission. As a general rule it may be taken for granted that a Soviet author who

deliberately puts a work in *samizdat* implicitly allows its further reproduction and publication. It would be reasonable to require in the case of commercial publication of original *samizdat* materials that royalties for the Soviet author should be reserved.

Anonymous *samizdat* works (and also those published under a pseudonym) will in practice not give rise to many difficulties in the West because no potential complainant is available in such cases. A trickier situation occurs in the case of Western publication of a *samizdat* work by a known Soviet author. In that case it is conceivable that the Soviet authorities might ask the author whether the work was published with his permission. If the author answers affirmatively he is liable to prosecution. If he denies to have given permission the authorities may pressure him into prosecuting the Western publisher in his own country.

It is to be expected, however, that the Soviet Union's attempt to exercize censorship abroad will ultimately remain unsuccessful (although budgetary considerations may have played a role in acceding to the Convention, it has subsequently become evident that one of the prime motives was the desire to curb the spread of *samizdat* literature). An all-out campaign to suppress the publication of *samizdat* would involve the Soviet government in lengthy, costly and complicated legal battles in many countries, resulting in much adverse publicity, and in the end ineffectual because there would always remain a number of countries where the Soviet ban could cannot be enforced. Also, Western courts will undoubtedly be ill-disposed towards any attempts on the part of the Soviets to extend censorship outside Soviet borders.

Chapter 2

SAMIZDAT AS A FORM OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Introduction

The emergence of *samizdat* in the late 'sixties has turned out to be an event of cardinal importance on the internal scene in the Soviet Union. It has created hitherto unknown opportunities in a great many spheres of cultural, social, political and religious life in the USSR. In the preceding chapter the main *genres* of *samizdat* literature have been sketched in outline; in this chapter, in accordance with the general purpose of this study, we intend to look at *samizdat* as a political phenomenon, as the expression of various currents of political dissent. This implies that the remainder of this work will concentrate on the 100 to 150 documents available in the West which can be regarded as political essays or studies; of course, many *samizdat* works display the characteristics of several *genres* and may deal with philosophical, political, social, economic, historical, religious and other problems simultaneously: insofar as they are sufficiently explicit on political issues they will be discussed here.

An orderly discussion of political documents of widely varying content requires some sort of classification. Our first and principal job in this chapter will be an inquiry into the various ways of distinguishing between, and classifying, oppositional currents in the Soviet political landscape. The result of this enquiry provides the outline for the following chapters. Beyond this there are some general aspects of *samizdat* as a form of political opposition which lend themselves to treatment in this chapter. First among these is the question of the organisation of political dissent (apart, that is, from its political orientation): how far is the "*samizdat* movement" to be regarded as an organized entity or rather what is the degree of organisation of various *samizdat*-producing groups? A closely related question concerns the periodicals published in *samizdat*; in almost all cases these are the products of more or less stable groups.

Finally, although the strategy and tactics of the several oppositional groups will be discussed in the appropriate chapters, there are certain types of political action which do not seem to be connected intimately with any particular political current; these may suitably be explained in this chapter too. In this way we move from the abstract to the concrete, from the realm

of ideas to the world of action, by first discussing the classification of political ideologies, then the organization of political groups, and finally particular types of political action. It is the unity of ideology and action which allows us to consider *samizdat*, the chief manifestation of this unity, as a form of political opposition.

Distinguishing political currents

A great many ways to arrange the mass of political *samizdat* may be devised. One of the most obvious is the chronological approach. In a general way this method has been employed to some extent in the preceding chapter in sketching the historical origins and development of the *samizdat* movement. A purely chronological description of political *samizdat*, however, without reference to changes in content and direction, does not appear to be very useful. The introduction of the time element can bear fruit when it is coupled to other distinguishing features of documents or groups of documents, provided always that a sufficient number of documents is available to allow generalizations about developments in time. If, for instance, document A in 1966 advocates peaceful means of protest and document B in 1970 argues the preparation of armed insurrection, it would clearly be unwarranted to deduce therefrom a shift in oppositional strategy. Accordingly, the time element is brought in only in the chapter on the "Democrats", where the number of documents is large enough to serve as the basis for conclusions about developments in time.

Another criterion for dividing the mass of political *samizdat* into manageable sections would be subject matter. What do *samizdat* authors say about such things as the role of the Communist Party, the function of the official Marxist-Leninist ideology, the political system, civil rights, the economic structure of the country, the social composition of its population, etc.? The organization of a discussion of political *samizdat* along such lines has much to commend itself. On the other hand, a brief investigation in this direction would show that viewpoints expressed in regard to these questions (which must be central in any political discussion) are closely connected with the principal political creeds. It is therefore more economical to distinguish first between the main currents of political *samizdat* and only afterwards to describe the views taken by identifiable groups with regard to specific issues. The classification of political *samizdat* into several main currents will be tackled in this chapter; the following chapters, devoted to these currents, will endeavour to describe the views of specific groups on broad political issues. *Samizdat* views on a few special themes are discussed separately in Chapter 8; inclusion of these narrower themes in the chapters on the main political currents would

unnecessarily inflate these chapters, while at the same time the views on such themes are less closely related to political standpoints.

What finally remains is an analysis of political *samizdat* according to political ideology, creed or whatever one chooses to name the set of ideas and desires behind any form of political action.

Various descriptions of the political currents among the opposition in the Soviet Union are offered by *samizdat* authors themselves, but the question of distinguishing between these currents and defining them is not answered explicitly. Many authors refer to various groups or trends but fail to spell out the relevance of their distinctions. For instance, K. Vol'nyi in "The Intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement" (AS 607) writes:

> "At the present time there are two trends in the democratic movement [by this term Vol'nyi means the entire oppositional movement]: (a) liberal ("14 Points"), which demands democratization under the leadership of the CPSU and (b) radical ("Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union" 1969) which is trying to gain the support of all organized and unorganized political forces of society in order to build a free democratic society within the framework of a law-based state."

As the rest of Vol'nyi's article does not return to this distinction between two main trends, we have to rely on exterior sources to find out what Vol'nyi means (and this is made more difficult by the fact that the document which Vol'nyi names "14 Points" has not been identified among available *samizdat* materials). Both trends are said to aim primarily at democratization; the former seeks to achieve this "under the leadership of the CPSU", but such leadership does not seem to be excluded by the latter trend (it tries to gain the support "of all organized . . . political forces of society"). Vol'nyi's distinction can therefore be understood only in the light of other information concerning the various currents of dissent in the Soviet Union.

A more explicit and better argued exposition of these currents is offered by Amalrik in "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?". According to him:

> "It can be said that during the last fifteen years at least three ideologies have emerged, on which the opposition bases itself. These are 'true Marxism-Leninism', a 'Christian' and a 'liberal' ideology.
>
> 'True Marxism-Leninism' holds that the regime has distorted the aims of Marxist-Leninist ideology, that it fails to apply Marxism-Leninism in practice and that a return to the genuine principles of Marxism-Leninism is necessary to restore the health of our society.
>
> The 'Christian' ideology believes that the principles of Christian

morality should be adopted as guidelines for public life, these principles to be interpreted in a somewhat Slavophile sense, emphasizing the special role of Russia."

(In a footnote Amalrik clarifies this statement by stressing that this "Christian" ideology should be understood as a political doctrine and not as a religious-philosophical or church ideology.)

> "The 'liberal' ideology has as its final goal the transition to a democratic society of the Western type, retaining all the same the principle of social and state property."

In Amalrik's view the political opposition cannot simply be equated to the sum of these three ideologies and their adherents. The political opposition (which is termed, somewhat confusingly, Democratic Movement by Amalrik; see further pp. 131-132) embraces representatives of all three trends; however, the participants in the movement do not as a rule have a clear awareness of their own ideological position. Furthermore, there are no precise borderlines between the three ideologies; in fact they are in many instances strongly intertwined.

An extra lead in understanding Amalrik's distinctions is provided by some of the names he mentions of representatives of the three ideologies: Kosterin, Grigorenko and Iakhimovich as "true" Marxists; the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (see p. 150) as adherents of a "Christian" ideology, and Litvinov and (with reservations) Sakharov as liberals. Unfortunately, as Amalrik's essay was written early in 1969, some of the major political works which were to appear afterwards, or which had appeared earlier but had escaped his attention, have not been taken into consideration. Because of this Amalrik's description appears, with hindsight, somewhat unbalanced, particularly with regard to the "Christian" ideology—the All-Russian Social-Christian Union remaining a rather isolated and unique phenomenon on the scene of political dissent in the Soviet Union.

The most elaborate discussion of oppositional currents in *samizdat* is found in Roy Medvedev's "A Book on Socialist Democracy", published in 1972.[1] Medvedev's discussion, besides being detailed, has the merit of embracing the whole width of the political spectrum, i.e. including the Communist Party. Within the Party Medvedev distinguishes three currents: neo-Stalinists, conservatives and Party-democrats. The neo-Stalinists, as the name indicates, advocate a rehabilitation of Stalin because they identify themselves to a large extent with the political system embodied in, and exemplified by, the former leader. But apart from the "nostalgia" and the psychological dimension of neo-Stalinism, this trend also has political ideas about the future. In Medvedev's words:

> "It is, however, not so much a positive attitude towards Stalin which is characteristic for the neo-Stalinists, but the desire to reintroduce in the country and in the Party 'firm' leadership and 'strong' government. They want to return to the administrative terror of the Stalin regime, avoiding only its worst excesses. The neo-Stalinists do not fight for extending but for diminishing socialist democracy, for stricter censorship and for a big 'clean-up' in the social sciences, literature and art, for the strengthening of bureaucratic centralism in all areas of public life." [2]

(For some particular remarks about the "Stalinist opposition", see pp. 201-203.)

The majority of Party and government officials, Medvedev believes, belong to the conservative or moderate section, a conglomerate of subgroups which can only be defined by its intermediate position between neo-Stalinists and Party-democrats. The conservative section vacillates between tough reaction and half-hearted reform.

> "The proponents of moderate conservation want to retain the present system in country and Party, steering clear from any rightist or leftist movement. They refuse to face the serious problems emerging in our political and economic life. They are against the modernization of our social system, oppose any comprehensive analysis of our past or present policies and slow down the elaboration of progressive internal and foreign policies. But they are also against the full rehabilitation of Stalin and against the sabotaging of the economic reforms."
>
> . . .
>
> The moderate conservative group consists chiefly of people with a bureaucratic way of thinking, that is to say of badly informed people who are used to relying entirely on the Party apparatus. The decisions they take do not correspond to the demands of real life but only to the requirements of an apparatus which is entirely removed from actual reality.
>
> . . .
>
> The central motive in the policies of the moderate conservatives is the avoidance of any crisis and the maintenance, at least for some time, of the unstable balance which characterizes the top layer of the Party. They make little haste in solving the many economic and political problems, urgent as these may be—many of them, and certainly not the least serious, are simply ignored." [3]

(The passage is strongly reminiscent of Amalrik's description of the mood of the entire present leadership:

"The regime neither wants 'to 'restore Stalinism', nor 'persecute the representatives of the intelligentsia', nor 'render fraternal aid' to those who do not even ask for it. It only wants everything to stay the same, that the authorities continue to be recognized, that the intelligentsia remains silent and that the system is not disturbed by any dangerous or unusual reforms.")

Medvedev's third current within the Party consists of the Party-democrats. This is the group of which he considers himself an adherent and his entire book is devoted to an exposition of the political views of the Party-democrats. We shall return later on (in Ch. 3) to Medvedev's analysis of the Soviet political system; at this moment it may be sufficient to quote Medvedev's definition of the position of the Party-democrats.

"Generally speaking, the representatives of this current advocate the restoration and extension of Leninist norms in the life of the Party and the state. They demand the complete abandonment of the Stalin cult and the liquidation of its consequences on all levels of the Party and society.

Marxism-Leninism, in this view, should remain the foundation of ideology and social sciences. It should, however, be adapted to the changes in the world and the advances of science and technology." [4]

In dealing with non-Marxist (or non-Leninist, since these terms would be almost synonymous to Medvedev) oppositional opinion Medvedev uses the general label "Westernizing". Most of the smaller non-Marxist groups are viewed by him as varieties of the Westernizing current. The use of the terms "Westernizing" (*zapadnichestvo*) and "Westernizer" is curious in itself, both because of its reminiscences of one of the powerful spiritual moods of 19th Century Russia and because of the insights it provides into the psychology of present-day Soviet intellectuals and their strongly ambivalent feelings towards "the West". (In this context one cannot help noting, as an illustration of the intense ideological and political implications of the term "West", that the words for North, South and East are frequently used in the Soviet Union as trade-marks and the like, but "West" seldom or never.)

The Westernizers are characterized by Medvedev as follows:

"For them Stalinism is a logical stage in the development of Marxism-Leninism, a direct continuation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the October Revolution.

. . .

The Westernizers criticize capitalism and private property of means of production, but do not reject certain advantages of controlled capitalism." [5]

Among the extreme Westernizers Medvedev reckons those groups who "justify capitalism and admire its results and ignore or even deny the accomplishments of socialism". As examples Medvedev mentions the "Februarists" and the "Democrats". The latter are identical with the so-called Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union (see pp. 131-134). Very little is known about the former group; from Medvedev's remark that they support the revolution of February 1917 and reject the October Revolution one might infer that their views would be related to those of the Kadets, the pre-revolutionary liberal party. The prevailing mood, however, among the Westernizers, according to Medvedev, is socialist.

Another socialist trend, which should probably not be regarded as Western-oriented (*sit venia verbo*), is identified by Medvedev as ethical socialism. As the name indicates, this trend plays down economic accomplishments and stresses the importance of moral and ethical values. Its political position is less tangible; as its spokesmen Medvedev mentions Ventsov and the authors of the Estonian manifesto (see p. 153 and AS 70, 467). Solzhenitsyn can in some respects (according to Medvedev) be regarded as an adherent of this group. A closely related group, in Medvedev's view, are the Christian socialists among whom Solzhenitsyn may also be counted, as well as Siniavskii and Levitin-Krasnov (see p. 100).

A further group identified by Medvedev are the legalists or constitutionalists who are inclined to stay away from fundamental political issues and concentrate on advocating strict observance of legality in the field of political dissent. The legalists include the various committees and action groups for civil rights.

Finally, Medvedev identifies an anarcho-communist element among the political opposition which seems to consist, however, of nobody but the former general Grigorenko.

Various nationalist non-Russion groups are treated separately by Medvedev; the political issues in this case are widely different from those prevailing in the general opposition. The political configuration on the national scene is triangular: at one corner non-Russian nationalism, at the other two corners, close together but still apart, the regime and Great-Russian chauvinism.

Among Western authors Borys Lewytzkyj, in his pioneering study on the political opposition in the USSR, has been the first to offer a more or less comprehensive description of the various oppositional currents in the Soviet Union.[6] Lewytzkyj distinguishes between seven main groups: the civil rights movement, communists and Marxists, democrats, the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, fascists, Stalinists, nationalists. The civil rights movement is more or less identical with Medvedev's legalists. Under the heading "communists and Marxists" Lewytzkyj discusses seven small and conspiratory groups of communist

dissidents. The most important group among the democrats are the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union; they also include (in Lewytzkyj's description) the Leningrad authors Zorin and Alekseev (see p. 98) and a small group of naval officers, mostly from the Baltic area (see p. 153). The name "fascists" is rather inappropriately given to the authors of a document entitled "A Word to the Nation" (of an anti-democratic and Russian-chauvinist content) and to the circles associated with the journal *Veche* (see p. 51).

From the foregoing survey of attempts to identify various currents of dissent in the Soviet Union one may at least conclude that certain profiles stand out so clearly that they have been seen by every serious observer of the landscape. There is undeniably a sector of the oppositional scene which is occupied by dissident communists, true Marxists, loyal Leninists or whatever they could most properly be styled. It is equally clear that there is a recognizable body of opinion which is decidedly non-Marxist or even anti-Leninist, pro-Western and liberal.

On the basis of such observations we may be able to indicate areas of controversial ideological, political and social issues which evoke different reactions with the various oppositional groups. In other words a superficial study of political *samizdat* materials may yield a compound picture of the ideological, political and social *status quo* of the Soviet Union *and* of the differing patterns of rejection of parts of the *status quo* by different groups.

It is suggested that a survey of political *samizdat* materials will allow the identification of at least the following elements of the *status quo*:

The present political system of the Soviet Union

a. bases itself on a Marxist-Leninist ideology and

b. on an economic system characterized by rigid central planning and comprehensive state ownership of the means of production;

c. regards itself as the embodiment of socialism;

d. is strongly allied with Great-Russian chauvinism;

e. seeks its self-perpetuation through resorting to manipulative and repressive techniques carried over from the Stalin era, without, however, returning to full-scale Stalinist terror.

The identification of these five elements provides us with an instrument to carve up the entire field of political opposition into manageable sectors as different groups direct their criticism against different elements of the system. Basically, of course, this procedure is not really more sophisticated than the simple observations made by Amalrik, Medvedev and Lewytzkyj that they notice the presence of such and such groups. The chief advantage of our method is that the distinction between various oppositional groups is explicitly linked to a set of elements which may be regarded as fundamental aspects of the Soviet socio-political system.

Some of the currents of dissent direct their criticism only against single elements of the system, others against several or all of the elements mentioned above. The one indicated under e., which might be termed low-key Stalinism, is generally criticized by all sections of the *samizdat* opposition. For one group of critics the continuation and revival of certain aspects of the Stalinist system is the main defect of the present political situation. Particularly, this group professes its loyalty to the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the regime; this is, of course, the same current of dissent identified by Amalrik, Medvedev and Lewytzkyj as, respectively, Marxists-Leninists, Party-democrats and communists. Representatives of this group may occasionally attack other aspects of the present system (such as the rigidity and centralism which pervade the economy or the treatment of the non-Russian population) but the central idea in their political thinking is the regime's failure, by clinging to parts of the Stalinist past, to follow genuinely Leninist policies. The political ideas of these dissident Marxists-Leninists will be analysed in more detail in the next chapter.

Official Marxism-Leninism is a political ideology which can be circumscribed with a reasonable amount of precision. Adherence to, or rejection of, this ideology is therefore a suitable criterion in distinguishing among political dissidents. A further breakdown of dissidents who reject Marxism-Leninism may be effected by comparing attitudes towards socialism. This criterion is more difficult to use as the exact meaning of socialism is so much more difficult to establish. Nevertheless, I believe that a small number of dissidents may be taken together who assert that the chief cause of the present troubles of the Soviet Union is the failure to introduce socialism; in this context the present socio-economic system of the Soviet Union is then usually designated as state capitalism. It is this group to which, under the title of "The Socialists", the fourth chapter is devoted.

The majority of political dissidents reject Marxism-Leninism and do not display the strong attachment to socialism as outlined in the preceding paragraph (although many of them favour the retention of certain socialist elements in the national economy). The common element in this group is a strong emphasis on civil rights and democratic procedures and a generally favourable attitude towards Western-style democracy. This group is therefore named "Democrats" and is the subject of Chapter 5.

The section of political dissent which addresses itself principally to the regime's alliance with Great-Russian chauvinism stands out very clearly and is of course largely made up of representatives of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. They are discussed in Chapter 7 (The Nationalists).

The distinguishing elements of the present political system, as spelled out above under the letters a.-e. would allow the identification of further sections of political dissent, particularly those groups which concentrate on criticizing the economic system maintained by the regime and groups

which oppose the regime's reluctance to return to full-scale utilization of Stalinist methods; the former group may conveniently be termed the "technocrats", the latter the "Stalinists". The technocrats, those who disagree with the regime's management of the country's economy, do not emerge as a consistent block amongst the political opposition. The reason for this absence may be partly that a moderate amount of economic criticism can be voiced through official and legitimate channels and partly that fundamental economic criticism is not easily conceivable without simultaneous political criticism. Strong disagreement with the way the country is managed economically is indeed an important aspect of the general critique of the system as voiced by the groups termed "Marxists-Leninists", "socialists" and "democrats".

Neo-Stalinist opposition is located almost entirely within the Communist Party and should therefore not automatically be regarded as part of the political opposition. It will be discussed in a special section in Chapter 7.

The groups which have thus been outlined are graphically represented by Table 2. It should be emphasized that this system is based on distinguishing according to the *main thrust* of the political arguments of the various groups; this does not imply that these groups remain silent about other elements of the present system. It has already been pointed out that the regime's "low-key Stalinism" (with its disregard for human rights) is generally attacked by all political dissidents and that economic criticism is encountered among all the major sectors of dissent. Likewise, the national policies of the regime come under fire in the works of several of the leading political dissidents (themselves Russians).

A comparison between the various systems of distinguishing currents of dissent gives rise to some additional comments.

As has already been remarked, the Marxist-Leninist dissidents constitute a solid group which is identified by almost all observers. "Liberals" or "democrats" are also generally recognized; the democrats as defined in this work embrace most of Lewytzkyj's and Amalrik's democrats and also the All-Russian Social Christian Union (which is discussed separately by Lewytzkyj and mentioned by Amalrik as the only exponent of his "Christian ideology"). Lewytzkyj's fascists are a small and marginal phenomenon which does not justify more than some passing references in connection with the national question. The main difference between the organization of this work and the systems employed by Amalrik, Lewytzkyj and Medvedev is the identification of the socialists as a special group; to some extent this has also been done by Medvedev, but his ethical and Christian socialists do not necessarily come within the socialist category as set out here (which embraces some of Lewytzkyj's democrats, some of Amalrik's liberals and some of Medvedev's Westernizers and socialists).

TABLE 2

The Main Currents of Dissident Opinion

(unbroken lines represent position of regime)



Medvedev's legalists (or constitutionalists), insofar as they do not go beyond advocating the regime's observance of Soviet legislation concerning constitutional rights, are outside the scope of this study as they cannot seriously be regarded as participants in a political opposition. Of course this does not mean that the civil rights movement is not of tremendous moral and political significance in the USSR. It is, however, rather a method of political action employed by various oppositional currents than a political stance itself.

Finally, there is little point in following Medvedev in drawing up a special group of anarchists (exemplified only by Piotr Grigorenko). If any more anarchists were to materialize they could easily be housed with the Marxists-Leninists. (Levitin-Krasnov, who may be regarded as some kind of a Christian anarchist, is perhaps most fittingly to be ranged among the socialists; one has to admit that he does not really fit well into any group, as he has himself indeed proclaimed).

Oppositional organizations

Samizdat literature has supplied a great wealth of information concerning oppositional groups and organizations. This information is usually in the form of reports about trials of members of such groups or in the form of *samizdat* publications emanating from such groups. Very often the latter publications appear as *samizdat* periodicals; one of the most obvious activities for oppositional groups in the Soviet Union is the production of a *samizdat* periodical and, conversely, a periodical is a form of publishing which invites and stimulates the foundation of a more or less permanent and consistent organization. For the sake of convenient reference organizations and periodicals are treated separately in this chapter but the frequent connections between the two should be borne in mind.

In the *samizdat* reports about arrests and trials of dissidents one encounters a great number of cases where several persons together have engaged in *samizdat* and other oppositional activities (public protests, etc.). It would be pointless to include all such cases in this section. I have restricted myself to those instances where there has been evidence that the participants in a group activity intended a somewhat permanent connection among themselves, i.e. co-operation for more than a single activity. Where such evidence was available I have included the organization, even if its activities never got beyond an early stage of preparation.

In the following survey the organizations and groups included have been arranged in accordance with the views explained in the preceding section, i.e. as communists (Marxists-Leninists), socialists, democrats, nationalists; additionally, pre-1966, civil rights and religious groups have

been taken separately. A final category labeled "various" embraces groups which cannot easily be fitted in elsewhere.

Pre-1966 groups

Early post-war organizations

The Chronicle of Current Events No. 23 (January 1972) contains a summary of the first issue of a *samizdat* journal *Obozrenie* (Review) (see also p. 51) which carries an article entitled "From the history of *samizdat*". The Chronicle's summary of the article relates:

> "The early post-war years saw the appearance of the underground anti-Stalinist organizations 'Leninist opposition', 'Leninist group', 'Workers' opposition', which circulated leaflets and proclamations among the population."

I have not found any other references in *samizdat* sources regarding these organizations; judging by the name they must be considered the forerunners of the rich crop of dissident communist groups which were to spring into being during the 'sixties.

Union of Patriots of Russia

This group is mentioned by several *samizdat* authors; it is sometimes called the Krasnopevtsev-Rendel' group after its leading participants, young Moscow University staff members. Other members included four Moscow students, Obushenkov, Seminenko, Cheshkov and Menshikov. They all received sentences of ten years in 1958. The group was apparently Marxist-oriented.[7]

Osipov-Kuznetsov group

Mentioned by Amalrik, this group was tried in secret in 1961.

Union of Communards (Kolokol group)

This organization is somewhat better known because it published a magazine *Kolokol* ("The Bell"—named after Alexander Herzen's first Russian revolutionary journal); one issue of *Kolokol* (No. 4) has become known in the West. The Union of Communards appears to have been formed in 1963 among young communists from Leningrad; most of its members were Leningrad University students who were serving together in an auxiliary police brigade (*druzhina*). Its leaders, Valerii Ronkin and Sergei Khakhaev, received sentences of seven years in 1965 and a few other members were tried in the same year and convicted. There are, however, reports that the passive membership of the group (people taking

part in discussion groups, etc.) was more than 250. One of the leading members, Iu. I. Fedorov, was arrested only in 1969 (and sentenced to six years); presumably the fact that he, with the rank of a police captain, worked as an investigator in the ministry of the interior enabled him to escape arrest for such a long time. As the name and the origin of the Union suggests, its political creed was basically Marxist-Leninist.[8]

Early Ukrainian organizations

These will be discussed below in the general section on Ukrainian organizations.

Communist groups

Ryleev Club

A small group of young Moscow intellectuals, founded on July 13, 1966. They published a journal (only one issue appeared) entitled *Russkoe Slovo* (The Russian Word) and regarded themselves as a "humanitarian society of a social-literary and cultural-historical character"; see further pp. 75-76.

Party of True Communists

A group of six Saratov students, led by Senin (a law student), tried in January 1970 (they received sentences of from three to seven years). The aim of the organization (according to the Chronicle of Current Events No. 12) was "the creative study of Marxist literature from primary sources".[9]

The Marxist Party of a New Type

This group from Riazan' seems to have been connected with the Saratov group (the Party of True Communists); the leader of the Riazan' group, Iu. Budka, was the author of an essay "The Decline of Capital" which reportedly was also in the possession of the Saratov group. Budka and four of the other five members of the Riazan' organization were students at the Riazan' Institute of Radio Engineering. Apart from Budka's essay they had produced several other *samizdat* works: an article in Hebrew "Dero'or" (Trumpets of Freedom) on the individual in society (most of the members of the group were Jewish), an article on the events in Czechoslovakia and a version of "The Decline of Capital" specially written to be intelligible to workers. They were accused of having handed on some of their materials to foreigners (a Czech and a Dutchman) and the large number of witnesses from other Russian towns may indicate the extensive connections of the group. The Chronicle also reports that a number

of people who had read "The Decline of Capital" or who knew about the existence of the group but had not reported it were expelled from the Komsomol or from their institutes. Iu. Budka received seven years, the other members of the group lesser sentences.[10]

Union of Struggle for Political Rights

Three Russian naval officers of the Baltic Fleet were tried in 1970 in connection with this organization. One of them, Gennadii Gavrilov, has been identified as the author of an open letter (under the pseudonym Alekseev) on the political situation in the USSR (see pp. 57 and 67). There are indications that Gavrilov, Kosyrev and Paramonov had connections with dissidents in various parts of the USSR, some of them as far as Baku and Khabarovsk, and even in Poland.[11]

Committee of Struggle for Socialist Democracy

A short news item in the Chronicle No. 15 reports on written appeals signed by this committee which apeared in August 1970. The authors of the appeal argue from Leninist positions against the rehabilitation of Stalin and urge "Let us give all our strength to the building of socialist democracy in our country".

Dzibalov group

The Chronicle No. 26 reported the arrest of seven persons in Leningrad, in March 1971, who had advocated the restoration of true Leninist policies and the building of communism. At the trial in January 1972 four were ruled to be of unsound mind and committed to special psychiatric hospitals for compulsory treatment, the three others received labour camp sentences.

Socialist organizations

Russian Socialist Party

Eruand Lalaiants, a translator and orientalist, was sentenced to three years in a labour camp by a Leningrad court in 1969 for engaging in anti-Soviet propaganda. Lalaiants had written letters and produced various political documents (including a leaflet calling for a general strike in Leningrad) which were signed "Headquarters of the Russian Socialist Party"; Lewytzkyj also mentions a Manifesto of the same party but it remains unclear whether in fact the organization consisted of anybody else outside Lalaiants.[12]

Party of Non-Party Workers Struggling for the Restoration of Socialism

M. Makarenko and V. Rodionov were tried in Moscow in September 1970 on a charge of anti-Soviet propaganda (and other offences); they had circulated a letter addressed to the international conference of communist parties in Budapest in February 1968, which letter was signed "The Party of Non-Party Workers Struggling for the Restoration of Socialism". Apparently no other persons were involved. From his lengthy *samizdat* autobiography (AS 1250), Makarenko emerges as an extremely interesting personality (a short curriculum vitae is supplied by Chronicle No. 16). Born in Rumania, he grew up in a Soviet orphanage, was a philosophy student in Moscow, was charged with building a house with unearned income but was acquitted, became director of a picture gallery in Akademgorodok, the science satellite-town of Novosibirsk, where he founded the club "At the Integral" which organized various literary and cultural events of markedly non-conformist character.[13]

Partisans of socialist democracy

This group is known only from two issues of a review "Notebook of Socialist Democracy" (*Tetrad' sotsialisticheskoi demokratii*), which appeared in November and December 1965 (Nos. 7 and 8). These issues contained articles and other contributions by well-known Russian authors (e.g. Levitin-Krasnov, Evtushenko, Brodskii, Solzhenitsyn) and provided no clues regarding the publishers of the journal.[14]

Union of Independent Youth

This organization was founded on December 16, 1968, in the town of Vladimir by Vladimir Borisov. The Union regarded itself as a legal and independent youth organization and applied for registration with the local executive committee. Its basic aim was declared to be "to promote in every way possible the development of socialist democracy and social progress"; it demanded the effective enforcement of Soviet civil rights legislation and an end to persecution of people for their convictions. The Union published a typewritten information sheet, entitled "Youth" (*Iunost'*), of which at least two issues appeared. The initiator and chairman of the Union, Vladimir Borisov, after some harassment and intimidation by the KGB, was placed in the city psychiatric hospital but released after a month, presumably, according to the Chronicle, on account of the pressure of public opinion in Vladimir. Shortly afterwards Borisov was again arrested, declared to be of unsound mind and confined to a prison psychiatric hospital. Several months later, in May 1970, he hanged himself in the hospital wing of the Butyrka prison in Moscow.[15]

Civic Committee

This Committee is known from two pamphlets, distributed in 1972, and decrying "state capitalism"; the pamphlets called for demonstrations and strikes (AS 1129).

Democratic organizations

All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People

This important organization was set up in 1964 by young staff members of Leningrad University. The organization was liquidated in 1967 and its active members tried and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in 1968. About 30 active members are known by name but several hundreds of people in Leningrad University are reported as having been connected with the organization. Its political ideas are discussed in Chapter 5 (pp. 150-151).

Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union

This is one of the most articulate organizations of the political opposition and forms the subject of the second part of Chapter 5 (see pp. 131 ff.).

Solidarist groups

There are several *samizdat* documents available proving the existence of groups which regard themselves as partisans of the solidarist movement as represented outside the Soviet Union by the NTS (*Narodno-Trudovoi Soiuz*—Popular Labour Union), the largest and most active association of Russian émigrés. It may safely be assumed that in such cases one is dealing with relatively small groups which do not have any organizational unity among themselves inside the USSR. The political ideas of Russian NTS groups are discussed in Chapter 5 (pp. 162-164).

Civil rights groups

The policy adopted by a number of civil rights groups in the USSR has been to avoid making general political statements and to concentrate on exposing individual cases of unlawful oppression of dissidents by the authorities. The defence by reference to Soviet law and the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights is widely resorted to by Soviet dissidents, but for the civil rights groups it is the only action method employed (in combination, to be sure, with an appeal to Soviet and world public opinion, by expressing themselves through public statements and petitions). Many

members of civil rights groups have expressed themselves individually on political issues.

Action Group for the Defence of Human Rights

This group was founded in May 1969 and consisted chiefly of members of the intelligentsia from various parts of the Soviet Union (Altunian, Borisov, Velikanova, Gorbanevskaia, Dzhemilov, Kovalev, Krasin, Lavut, Levitin-Krasnov, Mal'tsev, Pliushch, Podiapol'skii, Khodorovich, Iakir and Iakobson). Most of its members were subjected to severe forms of repression (labour camp, prison-asylum) themselves in 1970 and subsequent years and the group (which was supported by a number of other people, apart from its original founders) seems to have melted away afterwards.[16]

Committee for Human Rights

This group was founded on November 4, 1970, by Sakharov, Chalidze and Tverdokhlebov (all of them scientists of repute). Chalidze in fact left the Committee when he went to the United States (where his passport was taken from him by Soviet diplomats); three other scientists (Shafarevich, Podiapol'skii and Vol'pin) joined. The Committee, partly perhaps because of the social status of its members, has been more successful in remaining active than the Action Group; it may in many ways be regarded as the successor to the latter (illustrated by the membership of Podiapol'skii, formerly a member of the Action Group, who joined the Committee in October 1972).[17]

Moscow Human Rights Committee

Iu. Melnik was arrested in Leningrad in January 1972, together with E. Orlovskii and P. M. Goriachev. Mel'nik was tried in Leningrad in June 1972 and one of the charges included "the creation of a Human Rights Committee in Moscow". He received a sentence of three years; nothing more is known about the organization.[18]

Gor'kii Human Rights Organization

The Chronicle of Current Events (No. 13) reported extensively on the trial of four young graduates of Gor'kii University (S. Ponomarev, Pavlenkov, Kapranov and Zhil'tsov). To the charges of anti-Soviet propaganda (by distributing *samizdat*) the defendants replied that they had only tried to speak out against infringements of legality and constitutional provisions. (Pavlenkov was also accused of having written a theoretical work of anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet content; this work had in fact been written in the investigation prison at the request of the authorities. In it Pavlenkov had explained his economic and social views.) The four defendants received sentences ranging from four to seven years.[19]

Group 1973

On 1 September 1973, four Moscow scientists (Al'brekht, Arkhangel'skii, Korneev and Tverdokhlebov) formed an organization with the purpose of assisting "persons convicted, or subjected to other repression, as a result of their making use of generally acknowledged rights and freedoms" (AS 1486). The Group 1973 regarded itself as a strictly legal and non-political organization, and has openly expressed its sympathy for the ideals of Amnesty International (AS 1487; see also AS 1713, in which Tverdokhlebov requests L. G. Shteinman, the Orel province procurator, to aid the group in drawing up its by-laws. Shteinman had just before this appeared in the case against Gabriel Superfin, one of the principal researchers for Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. In this case Shteinman had asked the court to impose a penalty of 6 years' labour camp plus 3 years of exile. All this is mentioned in Tverdokhlebov' letter, with the suggestion that the state prosecutor could now do something in favour of human rights).

Ukrainian organizations

A special characteristic of oppositional organizations in the Ukraine is that they did not start around 1966 but have been a permanent feature since the end of the Second World War. When the remnants of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurrectionist Army), which had fought both Hitler and Stalin, were annihilated in 1950, the civilian branch of the UPA, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists continued underground and any of its members who were arrested were either shot or received 25-years sentences. Little is known about Ukrainian organizations in the 'fifties but in the next decade, according to Lewytzkyj, more than fifty political trials took place in the Ukraine.[20] Besides the UPA and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists the following groups ought to be mentioned.

Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union

This was a group of intellectuals from L'vov (Lemberg), led by Kandyba and Lukianenko, who intended to found a political party along Marxist-Leninist lines. They were arrested about the end of 1960 and tried in May 1961 (sentences from 11 to 15 years).[21]

Ukrainian National Committee

This group, also from L'vov, is mentioned by Lewytzkyj as consisting mostly of workers. Their trial took place in L'vov in December 1961.[22]

Serbenchuk group

The Chronicle No. 25 reports the release of Rostislav Serbenchuk from Odessa in March 1972, after serving eight years and five months for attempting to found an anti-Soviet organization.

Democratic Union of Socialists

Nikolai Dragosh, the headmaster of a vocational school near Odessa, together with two other teachers and three students, received long camp sentences in 1964 for creating a Democratic Union of Socialists. The sentences were imposed by the Supreme Court of the Moldavian Republic in Kishinev; presumably the group had been active mostly in this republic.[23]

Ukrainian National Front

This organization operated in the area of Ivano-Frankovsk (Western Ukraine). There were about ten members, several of whom had previous convictions for participating in nationalist activities. There are some indications that the group regarded itself as a successor to the early post-war organizations of Ukrainian nationalists. The leading members of the group received sentences of fifteen and twelve years.[24]

Dnepropetrovsk group

A group which signed itself "The creative youth of Dnepropetrovsk" is mentioned by Lewytzkyj.[25] They had apparently wide-spread connections in intellectual circles and scientific institutions of their town of origin. Three prominent figures of the group (Sokul'skii, Kul'chinskii and Savchenko), which criticized the official nationality policies from a Leninist position, were tried and convicted in 1970.

Initiative Committee of Ukrainian Communists

A committee bearing this name sent a message to foreign communist parties in December 1964 (AS 912).[26]

Other nationalist organizations

Baltic Federation

Little is known about this organization except that all or most of its members were Latvians who were arrested in 1962 and received long labour camp sentences.[27]

Estonian National Front

The Chronicle No. 25 summarized the first issue of a *samizdat* journal from Estonia, entitled "Estonian Democrat"; this issue contains the Programme of the Estonian National Front. The Programme demands a

referendum on self-determination for Estonia but otherwise nothing is known about this political organization and its supporters.

Lapp Group

Four Estonian workers (Lapp, Vosu, Paulus and Tamm) received prison sentences in June 1970 for founding an armed organization which, in the words of the verdict, "would have taken up arms against Soviet authority in the event of a conflict between Estonia and the USSR" (Chronicle No. 15).

Movement for the Freedom of Lithuania

Ludvikas Simutis, an inmate of Camp No. 10 in Mordovia, is mentioned as an active member of the Movement for the Freedom of Lithuania. Simutis was arrested in 1955 and sentenced to be shot; his sentence was subsequently commuted to 25 years in a corrective labour camp. The organization he belonged to must therefore have existed during the 'fifties.[28]

Union of Fighters for the Freedom of Lithuania

Petras Paulaitis, a Lithuanian who first fought the Nazis and then the Soviets, received a sentence of 25 years after the war, was amnestied in 1956 and rearrested in 1957 when he had attempted to refound the Union of Fighters for the Freedom of Lithuania among Kaunas students. He received another term of 15 years.[29] The same report in Chronicle No. 24 mentioned Willi Saarte, an Estonian born in 1942, who was sentenced in 1970 for an attempt to form an Estonian party.

Armenian group Shant and Armenian United National Party

Five Armenians were tried in Erevan in February 1970 for founding an illegal group "Shant" (named after an Armenian author) and studying and distributing a document entitled "Programme and Constitution of the United National Party".[30]

Meskheti organizations

The Meskheti, a Turkic speaking people from the southern parts of Georgia, were forcibly deported from their homeland in 1944. During the 'sixties they mounted an extremely determined and well-organized campaign to return to Meskhetia. Among their organizations mentioned in *samizdat* are: a People's Assembly, the Turkic Association for the Defence of National Rights, presided over by a Council of Elders, an Interim Steering Committee for Liberation which was perhaps later on reorganized as the Chief Organizing Committee for Liberation (about the Meskhetians, see further p. 198).[31]

Crimean Tatar organizations

The Crimean Tatars are in a position similar to that of the Meskhetians. One of the organized forms of their campaign for a return to the Crimea is a standing delegation which they maintain in Moscow, in order to press their claims with Soviet authorities.[32]

Religious organizations

Although most religious communities in the USSR are subject to various forms of administrative pressure and harassment, their existence remains unquestionably legal in so far as they can function only after receiving official recognition through registration. They are therefore outside the world of *samizdat*, in which they do not take part. The most important exception is formed by Baptist groups which broke away from the official Baptist church after odious new statutes were imposed on the latter in 1960. The dissenters, known as *initsiativniki* and also as "The Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists", have suffered severe persecution afterwards and many leading Baptist dissenters were imprisoned. Others who remained free set up a Council of Relatives of Baptist Prisoners and this organization has been extremely active in reporting on the fate of prisoners, chiefly by publishing a *samizdat* bulletin appearing several times a year.[33]

Various organizations

Dergunov group

An underground group mentioned by Amalrik, which was liquidated in 1967.

Young Worker

An organization created by B. I. Bykov, a law student and police officer from Alma-Ata; Bykov was arrested and convicted in 1967 (he was sentenced to six years in a labour camp). The same report also mentioned V. I. Mednikov as a member of the "Young Worker" organization; Mednikov too was a police officer and a law graduate. The group had engaged in circulating leaflets.[34]

Organization for the Struggle for Social Justice

Nikolai Bogach, the son of a Cossack and a student at the Agricultural College of Nikolaev (near Odessa) was sentenced in 1969 for attempting to create an "Organization for the Struggle for Social Justice".[35]

Organization for Full and Universal Disarmament and Peace in the Whole World

The necessity for such an organization was argued by the well-known poet and dissident author Iurii Galanskov in his *samizdat* journal *Feniks 1966*, but the plans for such an organization were evidently not realized beyond their initial formulation (AS 538).

Fetisov group

Fetisov, an economist, and three others (all of them architects) were arrested in 1968 and placed in mental hospitals. Shortly before his arrest Fetisov had left the Party in protest against the policy of de-Stalinization. Fetisov and his group were favourably inclined towards Stalinism and totalitarianism in general. About the Fetisov group and other neo-Stalinist tendencies, see p. 201 ff.

Union to Struggle for Freedom

This organization appears to have consisted of two Moscow engineers, Berg and Aidov, who were convicted in 1967 for setting up an illlegal printing press and disseminating *samizdat*.[36]

"Resistance" group

This group is known as the signatory of an appeal disseminated in 1966; it appears to be identical to the 5th December Movement which distributed another leaflet in the same year (the 5th of December is Constitution Day in the USSR; this day has often been used by dissidents for small civil rights demonstrations).[37]

Russian Patriots

The "Message to the Nation", a *samizdat* document of a pronounced Russian-chauvinist and anti-democratic character, was signed by a group calling itself "Russian Patriots"; see further pp. 189-190.

Khanzhenkov group

Sergei Khanzhenkov, a 21-year old Belorussian technician, was charged in 1963 with attempting to create an anti-Soviet organization and sentenced to ten years labour camp for treason (as reported in No. 18 of the Chronicle). In an interview in 1973 (AS 1525) Solzhenitsyn disclosed that Khanzhenkov had attempted to blow up the Minsk jamming station.

Krasnoiarsk group

No. 27 of the Chronicle and *Posev*[38] reported on a group of young people from Krasnoiarsk, one of the most uninhabitable and remote places in the Soviet Union, who had formed a terrorist organization and had set

fire to the police station, the Prokuratura building, residences of Party bosses, etc.). Their motive seems to have been extreme discontent with living conditions for ordinary people. The members of the group were between 14 and 17 years old and were possibly, as suggested by the *Posev* report, children of victims of the Stalin era. They also engaged in disseminating leaflets. At least one of them, Valerii Petrashko, received a sentence of six years in a strict regime labour camp. The group was arrested in 1969.

Samizdat periodicals and journals

The following survey of *samizdat* journals and periodicals runs largely parallel to the preceding list of organizations; the publication of a *samizdat* periodical is a natural starting point for an oppositional organization and existing oppositional groups will often regard the publication of a *samizdat* journal as one of their most natural activities. Some journals, however, are mostly or completely the work of one individual (e.g. *Veche* and "Problems of Society"). The variety of *samizdat* journals is rich. There are religious, literary, political and general journals; some are very short-lived, others have lasted for several years.

General samizdat journals

Kolokol

Organ of the Union of Communards (see p. 38). No. 4 of *Kolokol* (The Bell) is available in the West.[39]

Political Diary

Published since 1964 and circulating probably among higher Party circles (see p. 5). 12 out of at least 72 issues are available (AS 1001-1012).

The Chronicle of Current Events

The Chronicle of Current Events (*Khronika Tekushchikh Sobytii*) is unquestionably the most important *samizdat* journal. Its general political role is more fully discussed on p. 5 and p. 107. The first number appeared on 30 April 1968; subsequent numbers came out more or less regularly every two months until No. 26, dated 5 July 1972. By then the Chronicle had become the target of an intensive KGB campaign, the so-called "case No. 24". A great number of prominent dissidents were interrogated and had their apartments searched. No. 27 of the Chronicle appeared several

months late, on 15 October 1972. Case No. 24 culminated in the trial of Iakir and Krasin in August 1973. Both defendants, who had been under arrest for a long time (Iakir since June 1972, Krasin since September 1972), admitted to having been involved in the production of the Chronicle and expressed their repentance. They received comparatively light sentences. Subsequent *samizdat* documents claimed that the roles of Iakir and Krasin had in fact been minor, at least in connection with the Chronicle.

In May 1974 three new issues of the Chronicle were reported to be circulating in *samizdat*, Nos. 28 (December 1972), 29 (July 1973) and 30 (December 1973). It is not known whether these new issues originate with the same circles which had produced the previous issues of the Chronicle. During the summer of 1974 Nos. 31 and 32 were reported to have appeared.

The Chronicle has been published in the West by the Russian émigré publishing house of *Posev*, in the form of special issues of the monthly review *Posev*. An annotated English translation of Nos. 1-11 has been published by Peter Reddaway ("Uncensored Russia", London 1972). An English translation of Nos. 16-27 has been produced by Amnesty International in London. Nos. 28-31 have been published by Khronika Press, New York, in a single volume (1974).

Problems of Society

A journal produced by the well-known physicist and civil rights advocate Valerii Chalidze. 15 issues appeared. "Problems of Society" contained mostly articles on civil rights questions, many of them taken over from Western publications. Because of its contents and its fully public connection with the name of Chalidze "Problems of Society" was one of the most "legal" of all *samizdat* publications.[40]

The Democrat (AS 1152 and 1175)

This journal which announced itself as "Organ of the Democratic Forces" is connected with the Democratic Movement (see p. 131 ff.). Nos. 5 and 6 are available. A journal of the same name was mentioned in the trial of the Union of Fighters for Political Rights (see p. 40) in 1969 and it is possible that this would refer to earlier issues of the same journal.[41] This hypothesis is made less likely, however, by the fact that the Union's main figure is Gavrilov, undoubtedly a dissident communist (see p. 77), while the Democratic Movement with which the two known issues of "The Democrat" are connected is patently anti-communist.

Free Thought (AS 1180)

A journal which also attaches itself to the Democratic Movement. Only

the first issue is known to have appeared in December 1971. The existence of a second issue is reported in AS 1820.

Review

A journal of which three issues appeared in 1971 and 1972. None of these reached the West; the journal is known only through lengthy summaries supplied by the Chronicle of Current Events.[42]

A Ray of Freedom

This journal (*Luch Svobody*) is occasionally mentioned in *samizdat* sources (e.g. AS 1820).

The Russian Word (AS 521)

The organ of the Ryleev Club (see p. 75); only one issue appeared.

Veche

Named after the old Russian popular assembly, this journal was edited by the writer Vladimir Osipov who produced nine issues until 1974. *Veche* contained articles on philosophical, historical and religious themes and assiduously avoided political questions. Its most distinguishing feature was its excessive Russian nationalism and Slavophilism. In several editorial statements Osipov professed to consider *Veche*'s chief task the continuation of Slavophile and Dostoevskian thought. Like "Problems of Society", *Veche* led a fairly open and legal existence and Osipov was subject to minor forms of harassment only. In 1974 the group of collaborators around Osipov broke up and a rival faction published a tenth issue of Veche (cf. AS 1705, 1706, 1787, 1790-93).

Another example of Osipov's nebulous Russophile patriotism may be found in a short article "Three attitudes towards the motherland" (AS 1147). As early as 1960 Osipov had produced a literary *samizdat* journal called "Boomerang" (cf. Chronicle No. 23).

The Sower (AS 1138, 1139, 1174)

"The Sower" (*Seiatel'*) was a strongly anti-Soviet journal of socialist inspiration, of which Nos. 1 and 2 became known (see further pp. 90-100). Two articles from unknown issues appeared in September 1972 (AS 1174).

Notebook of Socialist Democracy

Published by a group called "Partisans of socialist democracy" (see p. 41). Nos. 7 and 8 (from 1965) reached the West.

Crime and Punishment (AS 490, 1025)

At least seven issues of this journal appeared, of which two reached the

West. This journal will be discussed in the next section (on specific types of political action).

Literary journals

Some of the general *samizdat* journals listed above carried, among other things, contributions of a predominantly literary character (poetry, literary essays, etc.), e.g. *Veche* and "The Russian Word". Among older *samizdat* materials there are several journals which may be regarded as predominantly literary (although they include some other material): *Sintaksis* (Nos. 1-3, 1959-1960), *Feniks 1961* and *Feniks 1966* (AS 25), *Sfinsky* and *Boomerang* (1960).

Religious journals

Leaflet of the Brothers
A Baptist publication (*Bratskii Listok*) of which more than thirty issues dating from 1969 till 1974 have reached the West.[43]

Bulletin of the Evangelical Christian Baptist Council of Prisoners' Relatives
About ten issues from 1971 and 1972 are available.[44]

The Herald of Salvation
About a dozen issues of this Baptist publication, all dating from 1971 and 1972 are available.[45]

Information Bulletin of the Barnaul Baptists (AS 1062, 1063)
Two issues (November and December 1971) of this leaflet from Barnaul, an important Baptist centre in the Soviet Union, are available.

Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church
Nos. 1-9 (1971-1974) available.[46]

Nationalist journals

Liberty and Fatherland
The journal of the Ukrainian National Front (see p. 45). Fifteen issues are said to have appeared between 1964 and 1966.[47]

Ukrainian Herald (AS 994-999)
The Ukrainian counterpart of the "Chronicle of Current Events"; the six issues of the "Herald" which are available (1970-1972) reported on dissent in the Ukraine.

Estonian Democrat
Organ of the Estonian National Front (see p. 45) and known only from the summary provided by No. 25 of the Chronicle.

Re Patria
A collection of documents concerning the position of the Volga Germans. The first issue appeared in January 1974 (AS 1776).

In the Name of the Motherland
An Armenian journal of which 343 copies had been prepared by seven Armenians tried in February 1969 in Erevan; no other particulars are available.[48]

Crimean Tatar Information Bulletin
With regard to numbers, the Crimean Tatar Information Bulletin was one of the most successful *samizdat* periodicals, as more than one hundred issues are known to have appeared (No. 101 is summarized in Chronicle No. 18); about a dozen are available in the West[49]. About the Crimean Tatar movement for a return to their homeland on the Crimea, see p. 47 and p. 196 ff.

Jewish journals

Exodus (AS 420, 426, 600, 601)
Four issues of this journal (*Iskhod*) appeared in 1970 and 1971; the journal was sub-titled "a collection of documents on the Jewish question in the USSR".

Herald of the Exodus (AS 1390, 1085, 1391)
Nos. 1-3 of this journal appeared in 1971 and 1972; the Herald contained mostly documentary material on Jewish emigration and may therefore be regarded as the continuation of *Iskhod*.

Iton
Two issues appeared. The journal was connected with the group of Leningrad Jews who hi-jacked an aircraft in 1970 (cf. Chronicle Nos. 17 and 19).

White Book of the Exodus (AS 1125, 1673)

Two issues, containing a large number of documents concerning Soviet Jewry, are known, dating from April and June 1972.

Specific types of political activity

The discussion of the various political currents in the following chapters will also direct itself to the tactical views of these currents—the translation of a general political perception of the present situation into practical acts. As will be seen, most oppositional groups believe that such practical political activities are in fact limited to a few modest and unobtrusive means of disseminating one's political ideas. Apart from such activities there is a small but significant sector of the *samizdat* movement which is not bound up with any specific political current nor concerned with *individual* acts of illegal behaviour on the part of officials. What we have in mind may be indicated by the following examples.

No. 5 of the journal "Democrat" carried an editorial announcement of this content:

> "The Editors address themselves to all dissidents with the request to collect information concerning the personal data (family name, name, patronymic, official position, official and home address, academic degree, career) and the criminal activities of psychiatrists who have collaborated in sending healthy persons to hospitals on account of the latter's political or social activities, and also data concerning doctors engaged in 'treatment' of political prisoners, i.e. transforming people into invalids.
>
> These materials are required for the 'Commission to investigate the anti-human activities of psychiatrists collaborating with the KGB'."

Whether or not prompted by this appeal, No. 27 of the Chronicle contained a list of data concerning the staff of the Leningrad Special Psychiatric Hospital, providing the KGB rank, medical position and other particulars of 12 leading members of the hospital staff.

Other activities which may be placed in the same category are the compilation of lists of prisoners and labour camps. The Baptists have been specially active in this regard in providing full information on imprisoned co-religionists (e.g. AS 1177). An important *samizdat* document attempting to provide a comprehensive survey of the whereabouts and fates of political prisoners in Mordovia and Vladimir appeared in 1970—"Register of people convicted in the nineteen-sixties" (a great number of corrective labour camps is located in the eastern part of the autonomous republic of Mordovia in the east of European Russia and most political prisoners in recent years have been sent to the Mordovian camps; the ancient town of Vladimir is the site of the prison which is normally used for incarcerating political prisoners).[51] A greatly expanded version of this Register was republished in No. 18 of the Chronicle.

There is even a *samizdat* journal, "Crime and Punishment", which is specially devoted to the systematic collection and publication of data concerning KGB personnel and criminal activities in which they are alleged to have engaged. Two issues of this journal are available in the West, but at least seven are known to have appeared.[52]

Another example is an anonymous *samizdat* document (AS 1101) which discusses the role played by Professor Snezhnevskii, the director of the Institute of Psychiatry of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in the use of psychiatry against political dissidents.

Although the number of documents which have been referred to here is small, their long-term importance should not be underrated. Of course the registration of, and protest against, individual acts of repression remains an important and comparatively useful method of agitation for the *samizdat* movement. The publication of generalized data concerning the repressive system of the Soviet government, however, provides more solid underpinnings for a comprehensive critique of that government's policies; additionally, knowledge of the existence of such publications may serve in the future as a brake on arbitrary practices of the secret police.

Chapter 3

THE MARXISTS-LENINISTS

Sources

A considerable part of the *samizdat* material is written from a basically loyal, i.e. Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. Certainly a large number of comparatively short documents (letters, protests, etc.) does not seem to question the canonized political ideology, but rather states its case by employing officially acceptable arguments. The number of documents which provide a more or less comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the Soviet political system from an explicitly Marxist-Leninist point of view is small. The so-called Varga Testament represents the first important attempt in this direction. It was probably written in 1964 and attributed to the famous economist, academician E. S. Varga (who died in 1964).[1] The Varga Testament was followed in 1966 by an article "Culture and Man", published by the Ryleev Club in Moscow. "Culture and Man" was the lead article in a periodical entitled *Russkoe Slovo* and was stated to contain the basis of the activities of the Ryleev Club.[2] Next, in 1968, a Soviet naval officer, Alekseev (his real name later on turned out to be Gavrilov), addressed an open letter of some length to the citizens of the Soviet Union, in which he discussed the chief ailments of the Soviet political system and the means to cure them.[3] An article by an anonymous Soviet journalist "Ideological disorder and searching for new ideas" (*Ideinyi razbrod, ideinye iskaniia*) was probably written early in 1969.[4] "Truth about the Present Day" (*Pravda o sovremennosti*) dated from about the same time[5]; it was falsely attributed at first to Roy Medvedev, the author of the most elaborate Marxist-Leninist analysis of Soviet society, *Kniga o sotsialisticheskoi demokratii* ("A Book on Socialist Democracy", written between November 1970 and April 1971).[6] The author of "Truth about the Present Day" will be referred to as Pseudo-Medvedev. A long essay "The Leninist Test", written by Il'ia Glumov, became known around the end of 1972, although it appeared to have been written in 1970.[7]

These seven articles and books form the basis of the discussion of oppositional Marxist-Leninist views on Soviet society and politics. After an exposé of common themes the contents of these six documents will be

analysed individually. The chapter is rounded off by a few general remarks and conclusions.

There are a few *samizdat* documents which may be classified as Marxist-Leninist in their political viewpoint, but which contain so little in the nature of an articulate analysis of the Soviet political system that inclusion in this chapter did not seem to be worthwhile. An example of this category is a long essay "To the old generation", written by a certain G.V. in 1970.[8] In this article there are a few faint allusions to Stalinism, bureaucracy and ideological rigidity; its main point, however, is that in order to save socialism, an ideological cease-fire with capitalism should be worked out. This conclusion is reached after lengthy theoretical arguments about the essence of socialism, the future of society, etc., such as Russians have excelled in for many years.

Another example is Valentin Komarov's "September 1969", an article chiefly devoted to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in September 1968.[9] (The title of this article is explained by the parallel between the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and the outbreak of the Second World War one year later and, on the other hand, the situation in 1968.) Komarov (a pseudonym) showed himself strongly opposed to the present Soviet regime, advocating at the same time the introduction of real socialism, on the basis of the Soviet Constitution. His views may well be summarized by the following quotation:

> "The example of Czechoslovakia proved that the genuine implementation of democratic freedoms in no way threatens socialism. This example has refuted the massive lie that the freedom for everybody to express his standpoint and his views would inevitably lead to the loss of socialist achievements and to the restauration of capitalism. It may be said that the success of the Czechoslovak experiment —the building of a genuinely democratic socialism—would be incomparably more dangerous to our leaders than the failure of the new course. Because such a precedent would serve as an attractive example which would throw doubt on the exclusiveness and inevitability of the road-to-socialism-under-armed-escort [*podkonvoinyi put' k sotsializmu*] , the exclusiveness and inevitability of our blood-stained model of it."

Similar views are held by many prominent dissidents who have been active mostly as *ad hoc* protesters, such as Grigorenko and Iakhimovich (who wrote a short protest against the invasion of Czechoslovakia entitled "Leninism - yes, Stalinism - no!")[10].

The common element

If the Marxist-Leninist current within political dissent in the Soviet Union is defined by its acceptance of, and loyalty to, the teaching and writings of Marx and Lenin, its analysis of the shortcomings of the Soviet political system and the means of correcting them may be summarized in the following way. The October Revolution put an end to the abomination of Tsarist Russia with its mixture of capitalist-imperialist, feudal and semi-colonial features. The dictatorship of the proletariat introduced by the Revolution created the basis for a socialist society. However, after the death of Lenin and with the advent of Stalin things somehow went wrong. Stalin's reign was accompanied by the rise of a bureaucracy subservient to him, which continued to remain in power after his death. The abolition of the worst outrages of Stalin's regime has not changed sufficiently the basic elements of political reality. The result of this has been that the state of affairs as regards political and individual freedom and the economy of the country is highly unsatisfactory. A return to Lenin and a creative development of his ideas should show the way towards the organization of an authentically socialist society. Providing an outline for such a society, however, proves to be easier than indicating exactly what steps to take towards its realization.

Evaluation of the October Revolution

For Soviet Marxists-Leninists who are critical of the shortcomings of their present political system, the natural starting point in thinking about this system is the October Revolution of 1917. This was the moment of Lenin, the man whose personality provides legitimacy to their views. Any analysis of what is wrong at present will have to explain where and how it began to go wrong after 1917. A positive appraisal of 1917 implies a condemnation of Tsarist Russia. However, only a few of the authors under discussion offer a—rather cursory—treatment of this problem. Medvedev refers to Tsarist Russia as "poor and miserable" and Pseudo-Medvedev characterizes pre-revolutionary Russia as "feudal and early capitalist". The latter thought is developed in more detail by Varga who emphasizes the utter failure of the "old, reactionary, police and landowners' state", especially after its military defeat in the First World War. Accordingly, the pathos of the October Revolution was not based on socialist ideas (unintelligible to the preasants and most of the workers), but on hatred of the old regime. An unresolved paradox (registered only by Pseudo-Medvedev) exists between the alleged misery of workers in Tsarist Russia and officially published and undisputed data (both pre- and post-revolution) which show

that the living standard of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) workers was higher in 1913 than in the late 'sixties.

If a negative appraisal of pre-revolutionary society (and a positive appraisal of Lenin) is a common denominator of dissident Marxist-Leninist views, a similar statement about their evaluation of the October Revolution cannot be made so confidently. Apart from agreeing that the Revolution's great merit was in putting an end to the Tsarist regime, this small group of comparatively orthodox critics shows surprisingly divergent views on what the October Revolution really amounted to. It is perhaps safe to assume that the authors who do not pronounce themselves on the meaning of the Revolution have either not thought about it very deeply or are willing to accept, and go along with, the official adulation of the "Great October Revolution". This category embraces the authors of the Ryleev Club Manifesto ("Culture and Man"), Alekseev-Gavrilov (who otherwise is highly critical) and, curiously enough, Medvedev; the latter's analysis is by far the lengthiest and in many ways the most thorough, it deals extensively with the bureaucratization and other developments which can be traced to the Stalin era, but almost completely neglects to pay attention to the Revolution itself and the relation between the ideas and policies of Lenin and his successor Stalin.

A very favourable, but rather more personal view of the October Revolution is given by the author of "Ideological disorder and searching for new ideas": in the October Revolution the Russian people overcame its deep-rooted feelings of insufficiency and acquired a new self-respect. At the same time, the incredible sufferings and hardship accompanying and following the Revolution added a flavour of (very ancient) messianism to this self-esteem—only a unique and chosen people would be able to perform such heroic feats and make such sacrifices.

A much more critical judgment on the Revolution is rendered by Varga. He stresses the strong peasant element in the forces fighting for the Revolution. This element was not interested in socialism, and was even anti-socialist and bourgeois. It was originally meant by Lenin to be the revolutionary class in a first revolution which would overthrow the Russian landowners; in that case the emerging class of small farmers would be needed to defend the achievements of such a revolution against the hostile interests of the industrial proletariat. In support of this thesis Varga refers to Lenin's "The agrarian programme of the social democrats in a first Russian revolution" of 1907. Faced with a new and entirely unexpected situation in 1917, Lenin (always according to Varga) made the necessary adaptations in his theories and carried out the revolution with the help of the peasants and the industrial proletariat together. A third force, which was to become powerful in the Party later on, consisted of the "classless" (*deklassirovannye*) elements, propertyless and embittered

people from various social classes and groups, who acquired crucial importance in the Party cadres.

> "The Russian 'bourgeois world' was 'internally unfinished' and, naturally, it began to break through the 'socialist' world as this was permitted by the principles of 'socialist' production and social life. A return to this world is, of course, impossible, but deeply hidden in the soul of the Soviet people it shows itself again and creates deep internal obstacles to the successful development of a new society."

A related but more simplified view is held by Pseudo-Medvedev, who argues that the revolution of 1917 was a bourgeois revolution, in many respects similar to the French Revolution. It did not lead and could not lead to socialism. Destroying the leftovers of feudalism and early capitalism, it brought Russia in one move to the state bureaucratic phase of capitalism.

In all these debates the key figure, of course, is Lenin. The group of authors discussed in this chapter have been defined by their allegiance to his person. It does not necessarily follow that all of Lenin's views are accepted unconditionally and uncritically, but on the other hand the authors do not question Lenin's moral authority and position as a demigod, which is attributed to him by Party ideology (the "sacred name"—*sviashchennoe imia*; "Lenin has lived, Lenin is alive, Lenin will live forever"). There is some occasional criticism of Lenin's views in Medvedev's book, but it is above all Varga who formulates a fundamental objection against Lenin's role in one particular phase in Soviet history. Lenin, according to Varga, was partly responsible for the bureaucratization of the Soviet regime, which was the chief pre-condition for the rise of Stalin and Stalinism, by giving precedence to the Party over the proletariat and to the state bureaucracy over the trade unions.

The rise of Stalin and his system

The dissident Marxists-Leninists agree that bureaucratization, i.e. the ascent to power of a small group of persons occupying key positions in Party and government, has been the main cause of the present troubles of Soviet society and is linked most intimately with Stalin and the almost absolute control which the latter gradually acquired after the death of Lenin. The bureaucracy concept, as employed by Soviet dissidents, needs clarification on two points. Firstly, one has to bear in mind that the Soviet system of government involves not only control by the Party-state of the traditional areas of government activity, but also of the entire economy right down to the most simple daily tasks and indeed of almost all areas

of public activities, such as education, science, the arts and entertainment. Secondly, the Soviet bureucracy is a highly hierarchical system with almost unlimited power and privileges enjoyed by very few at the top of the pyramid and gradually diminishing power and privileges, and increasing dependence, at lower levels.

Identification of bureaucratization as the chief source of all evil is legitimized and justified by reference to Lenin's well-known words that bureaucracy is the main enemy.

Three factors are mentioned as the possible causes of the bureaucratization process: Stalin's personal role, the penetration of "wrong" elements into the Party and the government and "objective" economic factors, in particular the industrialization and collectivization campaigns of the 'twenties. Most of the authors acknowledge a connection between these three factors. Varga decries Stalin's despotism and the excesses accompanying it, but believes that, with hindsight, drastic action was justified—there was real opposition to Stalin and anything but a crash programme of industrial reconstruction would have left the country at the mercy of the Hitler regime. The need for one-man-leadership (*edinonachalie*) is also recognized by Alekseev-Gavrilov, who adds that this "progressive" idea, however, enabled all kinds of egotists, opportunists and scoundrels to work their way into the Party-government apparatus. This, according to him, has been the chief cause of the corruption of the Party and of the entire Soviet society.

A point stressed by Varga and shared by other Marxist-Leninist dissidents is that Stalin's personality and role are not the only or even the chief source of the evil which befell Soviet society. In the view of Varga the bureaucratization process must be traced to a wrong choice, made during Lenin's lifetime (and for which Lenin is also responsible), when a system favouring Party-bureaucracy links was preferred to a system favouring Party-trade unions links. Ultimately (according to Varga) it was the deficient and bourgeois character of the October Revolution which pushed the responsible politicians of the time along a path which was essentially anti-socialist.

A similar but less sophisticated argument is developed by Pseudo-Medvedev, who believes that a slow and gradual programme of collectivization was favoured by Lenin and that it was the speed and brutality of the programme as carried out by Stalin in 1930 which resulted in an inevitable transfer of power from the proletariat to the anti-popular bureaucrats.

There is remarkable ambiguity among this group of people, who are after all critics of the present political situation, in their evaluation of Stalin. They do indeed condemn his disregard for civil rights, his cruelty and the regime of terror instituted by him, but ascribe a positive value to

his personal and autocratic type of rule and the full-scale mobilization of the country connected with this. They even find some justification for his reprisals and purges.

> "Although this [industrialization] required an enormous waste of human resources and an overcoming of material and organizational difficulties, although subsequently, especially during the second five-year plan, the new heavy industry was built largely by what was essentially the slave labour of hundreds and thousands and even millions of innocent people who were slandered, arrested and sent to concentration camps, nevertheless the realization of Stalin's five-year plans had, on a national scale, a decidedly progressive meaning." (Varga)

The author of "Ideological disorder and the search for new ideas" shows himself an advocate of intellectual freedom and civil rights in the Western sense, while at the same time he is unable to conceal his enthusiasm for Stalin's economic and military achievements. The most negative about Stalin among the Marxists-Leninists is Roy Medvedev, who totally rejects the idea that the Stalinist system was in itself of some positive and progressive value and that only its excesses should be condemned. These excesses, he argues, were essential to Stalin's rule; "Stalinist terror was a parasitic growth on the body of Soviet society and the Soviet state". Strict centralism and other elements of "tough" control were certainly required, and had been introduced in Lenin's lifetime already, but, it is implied, they did not at all necessitate the methods of Stalin.[11]

Analysis of the present situation: bureaucracy and the survival of Stalinism

In most of the oppositional political writings of Soviet Marxists-Leninists the emphasis is on a diagnosis of the present ills of Soviet society, rather than on an historical analysis of what caused these ills or on the construction of a plan for remedying them. The focal point of all criticism seems to be the role of a special group of people in Soviet society, a group frequently referred to as the bureaucracy. Other complaints concern the lack of freedom and the poor state of civil rights, the absence of democracy in most spheres of life, the political, social and material inequality, the spiritual poverty of the society, the unsatisfactory performance of the national economy and agriculture in particular and, finally, the non-occurrence of certain fundamental changes in the outside world as they had been prophesied by Marxist ideology and the political leadership, such as the world revolution and the acquisition of economic world supremacy and superiority by the Soviet Union. In the words of Pseudo-Medvedev:

"The classics of Marxism state that socialism will grant the broadest possible democracy, as this was unknown under capitalism. But instead of a broadening of democracy we observe its narrowing to a degree that is unprecedented and the liquidation of all freedoms, even the bourgeois ones.

Marxism teaches that socialism will bring the liquidation of the bureaucratic apparatus of the state (Lenin in 'State and Revolution'), but we observe in fact the strengthening and broadening of this all-powerful apparatus.

According to Marx, socialism will result in a labour productivity which was unheard of under capitalism. However, labour productivity in the USA is 2.5 times higher than in the USSR . . .

Finally, Marxism teaches that socialism signifies the transition to social equality, but in fact the summit of the Party-state apparatus wallows in luxury like regular millionaires, while the material conditions of the popular masses are kept at a low level."

Of all these complaints, only those concerning the outside world are not obviously linked with the existence of the new bureaucratic ruling class, because the absence of any signs of a world revolution in the Marxist sense and the enduring and growing economic superiority of the United States and Western Europe are external developments. In the view of Soviet critics adhering to the Marxist-Leninist creed it might indeed be attractive to blame the shortcomings of the regime for these developments, for this would allow them to preserve intact their faith in the Marxist ideology. However, most of them appear to be too honest and intelligent to indulge in such irrealism, although they shy away from the conclusion that if the mistakes of the Soviet leadership are not the cause (or at least not the prime cause) of the absence of the world revolution and the economic vigour and stability of the West, then there might be something wrong with the Marxist scenario for world history. So it is that several of the authors discussed in this chapter seem to hover between a rejection of the old faith and an unwillingness to abandon it. It is certainly no coincidence that the three longest and most elaborate analyses (those by Varga, Glumov, and Roy Medvedev) begin their indictment of the Soviet political and social system, not with charges concerning the lack of freedom or the inequality in Soviet society, but with the acknowledgement of Western stability and superiority. (Medvedev and Glumov emphasize the economic inferiority of the Soviet Union, while Varga begins his essay by stating that no industrially developed country has experienced a proletarian revolution since 1917 and that there are no signs that any such revolution is going to take place in the near future.) The absence of proletarian revolutions in industrial societies is made the more painful by the occasional occurrence of such revolutions in poor and backward countries.

For the Marxists-Leninists the dilemma posed by the continuing vigour of Western capitalism remains and must remain unsolved (although it can be softened somewhat by pointing to increasing elements of socialization in the West). For them, apparently, the dilemma is a source of anguish and dissatisfaction forcing them to reflect on their own political system.

If most of the ills of that system are traced to the emergence of a new bureaucratic class, it must be understood that the Soviet bureaucracy, in the eyes of its critics, is of a very special type. First of all, it has the usual characteristics of a bureaucracy, often in excessive measure; in the words of Medvedev:

"In a more restricted sense, the term 'bureaucratism' covers only a system which is essentially characterized by the fact that the top is not checked by the basis, i.e. a system of authoritarian control. Any initiative from below is ignored and repressed and power is exercized only downwards. The inevitable accompanying symptoms of this system are disregard for human beings, administrative delay, red-tape and excessive respect for formalities. Decisions and real actions are not any longer essential, but only the reports one has to make about them.

Bureaucratism is linked to the absence of precision and to blind obedience to an often divided authority. The bureaucratic official, an essential element of the system, has no thought for the people, for the masses, where he came from, but only for his own career, his position, his material advantages and remunerations. Neither does he occupy himself with public affairs, but he only wants to hold on to his leading position, his privileges, his power over his subordinates and his good standing with his superiors." [12]

Medvedev's description, however, does not yet make quite clear what Soviet dissidents mean by bureaucracy when discussing the present regime in the Soviet Union. It can be argued that such a definition can only be made more complete and comprehensive by including the elements which were listed before as being closely connected with the existence of a bureaucratic class. To compress it all into one formula, one could summarize the argument by saying that there is a hierarchically organized group of people in the Soviet Union, which possesses almost all political power, which uses this power in its own interest, suppressing democracy and individual freedom in order to hold on to this power, usurping manifold material and social privileges; the subservience of the resources of the country to the interests and whims of this class has a crippling effect on the economy, while the entire complex of policies, privileges and procedures which the bureaucracy has built up around itself pushes the

morale of the nation towards apathy, nihilism and crass materialism.

The Soviet bureaucracy, as a privileged ruling class, should not be identified automatically with the Communist Party. Rank and file Party members may have no part at all in the benefits available to members of the bureaucracy, while non-Party members in prominent positions in the economy, science and the arts (although they may not be very numerous) must be counted among the *privilegentsiia* (as the bureaucratic elite is sometimes called in the Soviet Union). By and large, however, the hierarchical structure of the Party may be said to reflect the equally hierarchical structure of the bureaucracy.

The critics agree that the present bureaucratic complex can directly be traced to the era of Stalin—it is easily established that most of the older members of the present power nucleus (still in the majority) have made their mark as underlings of Stalin. According to Varga, the man Stalin died but the spiritual climate created by him lives on. Medvedev, more optimistically, states that most of the Stalinist excesses belong to the past "although some things have survived".[13]

This view is somewhat modified in another chapter of his book where he declares:

> "It would certainly be wrong to explain the emergence of bureaucratism in the economy exclusively by the personal mistakes of Stalin or Khrushchev. There were also objective conditions . . . The lack of means and capital [in the early period of Soviet power] and the short terms dictated by history required strict centralization of the economy and the application of far-reaching administrative measures."[14]

This statement implies that bureaucracy is regarded by Medvedev as somehow inherently connected with the Soviet system as it came into being under Lenin's leadership.

The author of "Ideological disorder" believes that after Khrushchev's demise there has been a conscious attempt to return to Stalinism and that full-scale rehabilitation of Stalin is prevented only by the political risks involved, which no member of the Politburo can afford to run.

Although a hierarchical element is inherent in any bureaucratic system, it is claimed to be especially strong in the Soviet Union. In the Soviet Union, it is argued, the bureaucracy is not so much a "fourth power" as in countries with a strong civil service tradition, it is not even a ruling class (in the sense that there would be a considerable degree of equality between its members), but rather an organization serving a small group; within the organization power, status and privileges are attributed according to usefulness to the summit. In the words of the author of "Ideological disorder":

> ". . . people occupy a position on the hierarchical ladder depending on their being needed by the top of the hierarchical pyramid, and also depending on how well they serve the top. Every individual is, so to say, launched into an orbit, where henceforward his whole life is passed. It is very difficult to pass from one orbit into another and (however paradoxical this may appear) it is equally difficult to pass from a lower into a higher orbit as vice versa."

In Medvedev's chapter on bureaucratism the hierarchical element (the internal inequality among the bureaucracy) is not stressed so strongly, although he frequently distinguishes between higher and lower bureaucracy. Also, he disagrees with views tending to define the Soviet bureaucracy as a closed group of privileged individuals (a new hereditary nobility).

> "The *nomenklatura* is not a legal basis of our society which can be compared with hereditary nobility in the feudal period or with capitalist private property. The cadres belonging to the *nomenklatura* do not own the means of production or their offices. They are therefore not to be regarded as classes in the strict Marxist sense of the term. One should not overestimate the powers of the higher echelons of the apparatus; their position is less stable than that of the clergy or the noblemen in feudal society or of the bourgeoisie in capitalist society."[15]

Medvedev does not quite clearly identify the power summit, but by rejecting the idea that the *nomenklatura* forms a stable and homogeneous class he implicitly recognizes a hierarchical structure within the bureaucracy. (*Nomenklatura* is usually defined in Soviet sources as a list of functions, appointment to which has to be confirmed by specific Party or government agencies. The *nomenklatura* of a province, for instance, will embrace such positions as managers of major enterprises, town and district Party and government officials, police chiefs, etc.; a position which is on the *nomenklatura* of a province can be filled only by a person who has been approved by the provincial Party-government authorities.)[16]

However, the question is not really whether the bureaucracy is a "new class" or not, but rather to what extent it is. Medvedev perhaps is too legalistic in asserting that the composition of the *nomenklatura* is too much subject to continual change for it to be regarded as a stable bureaucratic class, and in stressing the differences between *nomenklatura* and bureaucracy. In fact, *nomenklatura* and hierarchy do not exclude each other. On the contrary, the hierarchical structure is strengthened by the fact that there are *nomenklatury* at various levels. Also, the fact that *nomenklatura* position is not inheritable as nobility is and can be taken away, actually reinforces the official's dependence and thereby the

bureaucratic hierarchy.

The emergence of the Soviet bureaucracy under Stalin was accompanied quite naturally by the unfolding of a richly graduated system of privileges. These privileges may be in the form of cash (higher salaries, bonuses and even special secret payments) or, even more important in a socio-economic system as that of the Soviets, in the form of preferential treatment in the allocation of food, housing, luxury goods, recreational facilities, etc. The increasing inequality introduced by this system in a society which is allegedly on its way from socialism to communism provokes bitter complaints in the writings of Soviet dissenters. (See also the special section on equality, p. 204.)

Of course, the existence of a system of privileges increases the vested interest of the *privilegentsiia* in the maintenance of the *status quo* and in particular in holding on to the political powers that may help to protect the position of privilege. According to the Marxists-Leninists among the critics of the Soviet regime, it is the fear of losing an advantageous position and the exercise of power accordingly—in one's own interest—that creates a perfect breeding ground for that variety of undemocratic practices and repressive measures of which the regime is accused. Leaving aside the system of privileges itself (which in some instances may also be of doubtful legality), official activities which appear to be in violation of Soviet law itself are considered to be the most offensive: practices negating constitutional freedoms (imposition of censorship, prosecution for dissenting opinions), disregard of rules of criminal procedure (concerning arrest, searches, seizure, pre-trial detention, etc.), the use of prison-asylums against political dissidents, illegal dismissal from a job, threats by the police, etc.

The same critics assert that it is the same narrow-minded orientation on the interests and self-preservation of a small caste which is responsible for the unsatisfactory state and the permanent lagging of the country's economy. Not unexpectedly the Marxists-Leninists are more inclined to put the blame for the failure of the economy not on the system itself but on the people administering it. One should add, however, that some modest proposals for reforming the system are also heard (mainly about decentralizing and even desocializing certain minor sectors of the economy). A more fundamentally critical position is occupied by Pseudo-Medvedev who believes that the socio-economic system of the Soviet Union is not essentially different from those prevailing in advanced Western countries all of which are characterized by him as state capitalism and bureaucratic monopolism. (This view follows from this theory that the October Revolution was mainly a bourgeois revolution, which did not introduce socialism.)

It is also the bureaucratic system with its privileges and repressions and its built-in mechanism of self-preservation which is considered responsible

for the moral apathy and indifferentism which has the country in its grip. The ideological poverty of Soviet society is castigated by several authors.

> "In this way, as 'Soviet' society has long ago become centralized-bureaucratic in its socio-political life, it has long ago become authoritarian in its ideological and moral relations. The majority of its conscious citizens, loyal to the prevailing system, adhere to a 'Marxist-Leninist' philosophy [*mirovozzrenie*]; their attitudes [*mirosozertsanie*] are bureaucratic, their psychology [*mirooshchushchenie*] is philistine [*obyvatel'skii*]." (Varga, AS 166)

The bureaucratization of life leads to alienation, crime and drunkenness, according to Pseudo-Medvedev; Varga even points specifically to inequality as a cause of crime (what people cannot acquire legally they will take). The Ryleev Club Manifesto (undoubtedly the most ethereal expression of dissent among the Marxists-Leninists) also registers the moral crisis of Soviet society, but seems to invert the causal relationship: it declares that the root of all evil is ignorance (*nevezhestvo*); therefore a cultural revolution is necessary.

Finally, it may not be superfluous to repeat once more that, although the catalogues of ills presented by the Marxist-Leninists critics are very similar, their views on the causes of the present situation differ strongly according to their perception of the October Revolution: it is rejected as bourgeois by Pseudo-Medvedev and criticized as partly bourgeois by Varga, while Medvedev argues that the fact that Russia never had any serious and lasting experience with bourgeois democracy (which he rejects only in part) has had a negative effect on the development of socialist democracy in the Soviet Union.

Strategy and tactics

Optimism about the future of society is of the essence of orthodox Marxism; "the shining future of communism" lies ahead and, to make it better, inexorable laws of historical development will inevitably lead to its realization. Not surprisingly, all Marxist-Leninist critics of the present regime of the Soviet Union concern themselves with the future of the Soviet polity. Indeed, several of them (notably Pseudo-Medvedev, Alekseev-Gavrilov and Roy Medvedev) devote the greater part of their study to descriptions of a more or less ideal state of Soviet society and the way to go about realizing this, rather than to analyzing the insufficiencies and wrongs of the present and their roots in the past.

The various pronouncements concerning the future of Soviet society may generally be said to concern three different levels of time and

generalization: the ultimately desirable state of a completely communist society (long-term views), the economic, political, social and legal measures which should be taken in order to bring about this society (middle-term proposals) and areas suitable for immediate activities (short-term suggestions).

Long-term views are inevitably less clearly defined. Logically they should determine, in combination with an analysis of the present situation, short- and middle-term proposals (because the latter would embody the ways and means by which the present could be transformed into the desired future). In fact the relationship between long-term goals (the ultimately desirable society) and short- and middle-term proposals is probably less unilaterally causal as logic would dictate. One might advance the hypothesis that short- and middle-term proposals are often not so much to be considered as the rational translations of long-term goals into activities with a shorter time perspective, but rather as more or less incidental reactions against perceived shortcomings and frustrations of the past and the present. In terms of the Soviet scene this means that the desire for democratic freedoms, for a multi-party system, for abolition of excessive privileges, etc., are prompted more by the abuses of Stalin and his successors than by the thought that such reforms would promote the realization of communism. The function of long-term goals, in this hypothesis, would rather be to serve as a yardstick in evaluating the ideological legitimacy of short- and middle-term proposals.

Understandably, there is a large degree of agreement among Marxists-Leninists about the ultimate goal of the reforms proposed by them. The vaguest as always is the Ryleev Club Manifesto, although it injects a curiously nationalist element into the conception of a future society; it mentions the "radiant mission to fight for truth and light, to fight for the transformation and rebirth of Russia [*Rus'*], to make it enlightened, prospering, happy and worthy to take the first place in a future free socialist world community!" This quotation may already indicate that the Manifesto, quite apart from its nationalist accent, stresses ethical values, rather than political organization of society, as essential for the desirable future.

> "One has to be brave and courageous; it is shameful for a man to be a coward, a hypocrite and a traitor! It is shameful for a woman to be a coward, a careerist or a fraud; such a woman is unworthy to be a wife and a mother!"

To some extent this ethical element is present in all discussions of the communist society of the future. It is clearly noticeable, for instance, in Alekseev-Gavrilov's essay, in which the desirable development ("the progressive evolution of socialist society") is seen more as a continuous

process of improvement than as a movement towards an ideal (and static) state of affairs. The idea of striving towards the realization of ethical values is of course more compatible with the idea of a continuous and never ending process than with he thought of a finite activity which stops when the goal is reached. The strong emphasis on the ethical character of the ultimate goal is reflected in Alekseev-Gavrilov's call for a struggle which should "lead the socialist society to the victory of Reason, Justice and Humanism and to the flourishing of Intellectual Freedom in our country".

The authors are more articulate about the kind of society they envisage as desirable for the Soviet Union. For Roy Medvedev this is what he calls socialist democracy. In his book "On Socialist Democracy" he describes in considerable detail the reforms he considers necessary to establish a socialist democracy in the USSR. One gets the impression that this socialist democracy can be seen as the sum total of the reforms advocated by Medvedev. This impression is confirmed by the author himself where he declares that socialist democracy it at the same time a goal and the means to realize it. The apparent illogicity of the statement bears out the hypothesis advanced before, about the actual relationship between long-term and short-term goals.

For the author of "Ideological disorder" the ideal seems to be embodied in the "socialism with a human face" which in his view was beginning to be realized in Dubcek's Czechoslovakia. The essay is too short to allow more detailed conclusions. In this respect it should be noted that its author is by no means the only one who is strongly preoccupied with the Czechoslovak issue. Almost any piece of oppositional literature written after the 1968 invasion demonstrates the devastating effect of this military action on the morale of the Soviet intelligentsia, whose feelings from that moment on range from disillusion to indignation.

In looking for the ideal socialist society Pseudo-Medvedev and Varga turn to the past. Pseudo-Medvedev believes to have found it in the Paris Commune. The ideals and practices of the Paris Commune should be followed in enterprises, in the administration, the army and the police, because bureaucratism is the disease of Soviet society and the Commune is the exact opposite of bureaucracy. Varga goes back to the tenth Party Congress in 1921 when, according to him, a party-bureaucratic organization model was preferred to a model which he terms centralized-democratic or party-trade union. The latter model was at the basis of the 1919 Party Programme and even, on paper, of the present Programme. It could have succeeded in educating the Russian masses for democracy, for (in the view of Varga) the absence of a democratic tradition is one of the most serious drawbacks in the political mentality of the country.

Of all the authors discussed in this chapter Varga is the most pessimistic

about the future. He too declares himself to be an adherent of socialist democratism (which appears to be synonymous to communism), but states that first the distortions of socialist democracy (which are so characteristic of the present situation in the Soviet Union) have to be done away with, before there can be any talk of communism within twenty or even a hundred years. As long as this does not happen there will only be a parody of communism. Varga, however does not indicate how the distortions of socialist democracy should be eradicated or by whom and in fact seems to see little likelihood of their going in the foreseeable future.

Of the other authors, Medvedev, Alekseev-Gavrilov and Pseudo-Medvedev are most explicit about their middle-term proposals (the kind of measures that ought to be taken with a view to bringing closer the triumph of communism). As has been explained before, for Medvedev these measures coincide with their own purpose: socialist democracy is the end and the means to realize this end. The most important means discussed by Medvedev are: putting an end to Great Russian chauvinism and russification policies (because these can only lead to equally undesirable nationalist resurgences among the smaller nations); stimulation of genuine democracy in the Party, including the possibility of a variety of tendencies and groups within the Party; toleration of political and social currents outside the Party, even if this would lead to the foundation of other political parties; transforming the Supreme Soviet and lower level soviets into real bodies of political decision-making, in particular by a vast increase in the time set aside for sessions (at present only a few days in the year) and by reforming the operation of the electoral system (allowing a choice of candidates and abolishing wide-spread fraudulent practices in the electoral committees); ensuring genuine independence of the judiciary; repealing unconstitutional laws (such as the present version of arts. 70 and 190-1 of the Criminal Code); abolishing unlawful practices (esp. in the field of criminal procedure and the use of prison-asylums in cases of political dissent); guaranteeing freedom of speech and freedom of the press, abolition of censorship; recognition of the right to information; abolition of restrictions on the freedom to choose a place of residence and to travel inside and outside the Soviet Union; cancellation of unlawful or unreasonable privileges; putting an end to excessive inequality of incomes; and extensive reforms in the management of the economy. In this respect Medvedev believes that a system of centralized planning should be maintained for large enterprises, although the enterprises themselves ought to receive greater independence and the workers should be given (through the trade unions) some real influence in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprises. "Numerous arguments may be presented", he declares (without substantiating this claim), "for the superiority of a centralized planned economy".[17] In small and medium size enterprises workers' control along

Yugoslav lines should be tried out. Very small enterprises should be run as cooperatives, with cooperative ownership of the means of production. Private enterprise of single individuals or of families should be encouraged, and not discouraged by taxation (as is the case at this moment).

The desirability of a multi-party system is emphasized in particular in an early heterodox Marxist document, Volgin's article "On the multi-party system", which appeared in 1965 in No. 4 of The Bell (*Kolokol*), a *samizdat* periodical which designated itself as "the organ of the Union of Communards" (see also p. 38).[18] Volgin points out that capitalist countries can afford to have multi-party systems because power remains in the hands of the capitalists anyway. He adds that history has proved that one-party systems inevitably develop into dictatorships.

> ". . . the one-party system led inevitably to the factual liquidation of fundamental democratic freedoms and permitted mass repressions, violations of legality, innumerable closed trials resulting in sentences based on denunciations and confessions obtained under torture. The one-party system was in fact able to transform the country into one huge concentration camp.
>
> . . .
>
> "The arguments in favour of a one-party system cannot withstand any criticism and contradict the Marxist view of a socialist society."

The introduction of an opposition party is also supported by Glumov, as a necessary instrument in promoting openness and dynamism. Glumov's other proposals are: putting an end to Stalinism, especially through wide-spread publicity concerning the crimes of the Stalinist system, a return to "Soviet democracy in the Leninist sense" and an objective reappraisal of the socio-political situation of Soviet society. This would mean, according to Glumov, the admission that the Soviet Union is not any further advanced on the road to socialism than the developed capitalist countries.

For Pseudo-Medvedev the Paris Commune remains the determining factor in making proposals for political and economic reforms. His political proposals do not go much further than advocating the introduction of radical democracy in all spheres of public life (including even the army and the police). He is more explicit about economic reforms. Some system of centralized planning should be retained, but enterprises should be handed over to workers' collectives. In this way differences in power and status would disappear (and thereby the bureaucratic syndrome), everybody's interest in prosperity would be stimulated and a system of competition between the cooperatives (of which the entire economy would then consist) would lead to a healthy market economy (which would promote a better distribution of goods and increased efficiency).

Alekseev-Gavrilov on the other hand is very brief in his economic

proposals (he advocates the right to strike and, generally, a bigger say for the workers) and devotes most of his attention to political reforms. These are quite close to the suggestions made by Medvedev. Among his more specific proposals are the institution of a Supreme Constitutional Court to deal with all violations of the Constitution and the foundation of an institute of sociology and information to be attached to the Supreme Soviet, in order to provide a permanent flow of information about public opinion in the country. The Communist Party should change its function and concentrate more on generating new ideas than on being a vehicle of political power.

Most of the Marxist-Leninist dissidents are aware of the gap separating the formulation of political proposals and their implementation in the prevailing political climate in the Soviet Union (this awareness, incidentally, has for centuries characterized the Russian intellectual). In such a situation the question of "what is to be done?" (*chto delat'*) becomes unusually acute, or in other words, it comes down to short-term activities. It may be considered indicative of the climate of oppression that most suggestions do not really go beyond advocating the dissemination of oppositional views, primarily by word of mouth. The author of "Ideological disorder" offers a specific variation on this theme by stating that the only hope for an improvement of the present situation lies in a rapprochement between the intelligentsia and the people and that this must be brought about mainly by an effort on the part of the intelligentsia to let their ideas penetrate among the masses. In a somewhat similar vein the Ryleev Club Manifesto insists on "free discussions, comradely talks, a deep and comprehensive study of Russian as well as foreign culture". The rather lame advice to study is also made by Pseudo-Medvedev: "the most important task is the tireless study and intelligent dissemination of Marxist ideology in its pristine revolutionary purity". Some of his equanimity may be explained by his belief that the laws of history lead inexorably to the fall of the Soviet bureaucracy ("You cannot stop the inexorable course of history, neither with lies, nor with tanks. You cannot avoid the economic crisis with prisons or censorship.").

The same Marxist-inspired belief that one is cooperating with the forces of history and with inevitable developments is professed by Medvedev, who is, however, more articulate about the kind of cooperation history needs. A political struggle against neo-Stalinism, bureaucracy and dogmatism is necessary, he argues, but this struggle must remain strictly within the bounds of the Soviet Constitution. For Medvedev constitutionalism assumes almost the shape of a political ideology.

> "We use the term 'constitutional' in particular because many of our laws and rules with legal force contradict the Constitution of the USSR."[19]

It follows that the struggle against the regime's illegalities and abuses must be waged by lawful means, in particular through oral and written protest. On the other hand official Marxist ideology has become sterile and obsolete and must be replaced by new ideas which provide answers to the problems of today. This, according to Medvedev, is a slow and painstaking process.

Alekseev-Gavrilov suggests activities along similar lines. Progressive Party members should be supported; unlawful actions of the authorities should be published, if necessary in *samizdat*; Czechoslovak communist literature (from before the invasion) should be disseminated; one should protest and even demonstrate against censorship and other unconstitutional practices. Finally, if all this fails to bring about the desired reforms a new political party should be founded.

The individual dissidents and their works

The Ryleev Club Manifesto (AS 521)

The Ryleev Club was founded on July 13, 1966, by the poets Evgenii Kushev and Vladimir Voskresenskii. It took it name from one of the participants in the Decembrist Rising of 1825, Kondrat Ryleev, and announced itself as a humanitarian society of a social-literary and cultural-historical character. It based its activities on a poem "The Citizen" by Ryleev and the article "Culture and Man" printed in the first and only issue of the club's journal *Russkoe Slovo* (The Russian Word). Its motto was "culture, truth, honour". Apart from Ryleev's poem, the manifesto "Culture and Man" and a short announcement concerning the founding of the club, the journal carried (among other things) poems by Voskresenskii and Kushev and a (somewhat naive) article about Montesquieu by S. Artamonov.

The Manifesto occupies an isolated place among the documents discussed in this chapter. Its style is highly literary, its tone emotional and heroic, almost exalted. Its main argument is that Russia needs a cultural revolution, that people must seek Truth, that the ideals of the great Russian writers, thinkers, poets and reformers must be brought to life again. It has been included in this chapter because, albeit in passing only, it professes loyalty to Lenin and the October Revolution. Kushev and Voskresenskii were presumably the authors of this piece, which is as charming as it is adolescent. Kushev is the grandson of a Cheka official and the son of an actor. He is also the god-son of the well-known religious author Levitin-Krasnov (cf. p. 100). Born in 1946, he had already taken part in the *samizdat* publication of "Notebook of socialist democracy" (see

p. 51) at the age of 18. On January 22, 1967, he participated in a demonstration on Pushkin Square against the arrest of Ginzburg and Galanskov, together with Bukovskii, Delone, Khaustov and others.[20] For his part in the demonstration Kushev received an 8-months sentence of corrective labour. In 1971 a collection of his poems was published in the West under the title of *Ogryzkom karandasha* (With the stub of a pencil).[21] Voskresenskii is also a young Moscow poet; he had previously published poetry in the *samizdat* journal *Sfinsky*. A *samizdat* collection of his poetry entitled "For my friends" was circulating in Moscow in 1971. Voskresenskii died (committed suicide) in January 1970.[22]

Ideological disorder and searching for new ideas (AS 763)

This essay is not a *samizdat* document strictly speaking, since it was handed directly by the author, a Soviet journalist, to a visiting foreign journalist for publication abroad.[23] The essay is written in the form of an explanation to a friend from abroad, of the situation prevailing in the Soviet Union and the attitude assumed by an honest Soviet intellectual. The Leitmotiv of the essay is Russia's relationship to the West. Russia had always admired the West, but also feared and rejected it. Russia's feelings of insufficiency were overcome by the Revolution and the heroic creation of a modern industrial state which emerged victoriously and as a new world leader from the Second World War. It was only afterwards that the Russian intellectual began to realize that Russia's triumph had been bought at the cost of human dignity. Soviet treatment of Czechoslovakia demonstrated conclusively that the regime had no intention of repudiating the Stalinist past. The author proclaims his solidarity with Solzhenitsyn and with those people who demonstrate against repressions. The masses must gradually be made aware of the intolerability of neo-Stalinism. This will be the only method of bringing to life Babel's "International of honest people".

"Ideological disorder" must have been written during the latter half of 1968 or the first half of 1969.

Pseudo-Medvedev's "Truth about the present day"

This essay was published originally under the name of R. Medvedev, but the editors of *Posev* subsequently announced that Roy Medvedev, in a letter to *Posev*, had denied his authorship. The article had circulated in *samizdat* before coming to the West; the author displays considerable interest in the economic consequences of the Soviet political system;

otherwise little is known about him or his work. It must have been written during the last quarter of 1968. The economic shortcomings of the Soviet economy seem to have prompted the author to enquire further into the fundamental flaws of the system. He has no doubts in pointing to bureaucratism as the chief culprit. Bureaucratism could triumph because the Revolution was basically a bourgeois revolution. The Paris Commune is the exact opposite of bureaucracy, and therefore the reforms proposed by him are all inspired by the Commune.

The open letter to the citizens of the Soviet Union by Gennadii Alekseev (AS 80)

This document, which is also known by its final words "Russia waits for new people!", is signed "Gennadii Alekseev, communist" and dated Tallin, September 22, 1968. The letter contains occasional references to military questions and the author was eventually identified as Gennadii Gavrilov, an officer of the Baltic Fleet, born in 1939. Shortly before the letter began to circulate in *samizdat*, another *samizdat* document, entitled "To hope or to act?" and signed by "Numerous representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonian SSR", had appeared. This document was itself an answer to Sakharov's famous treatise on intellectual freedom (see further pp. 96-97). Although "To hope or to act?" is not mentioned by name in Gavrilov's open letter, it is quite possible that it prompted him to put forward his own views. In the introductory paragraph of his letter he states that it is the result of a critical analysis of the various points of view, proposals and statements of communists and some other representatives of the intelligentsia, alarmed by the existing situation in the Soviet Union.

Gavrilov was arrested in May 1969, together with two other naval officers, Kosyrev and Paramonov. They were accused of founding a "Union to Struggle for Political Rights". After an investigation which lasted for a year (which may indicate the alarm of the authorities and the KGB) they were tried by the military tribunal in Leningrad. Alekseev-Gavrilov received a six years' term in a strict regime labour camp. He was sent to camp No. 17 of the Dubrovlag complex in Mordovia. In 1972 he was transported back to the Lefortovo prison in Moscow, apparently for investigation.[24]

Gavrilov's analysis of the origins of the sickness of the Soviet political system is perhaps somewhat flat and superficial, but this is counterbalanced by the rich variety and detailed character of his proposals for reform.

The Varga Testament (AS 166)

This document, entitled "Russia's road of transition to socialism and its results", was first published in the *samizdat* journal *Feniks 1966* (of which Iurii Galanskov was the central figure). *Feniks* supplied it with a foreword which tentatively attributed the essay to E. Varga, a prominent Soviet economist, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who died in 1964. It was probably written during 1964. The Varga Testament is the oldest, the longest and one of the most thorough analyses from an orthodox Marxist-Leninist point of view.

The cornerstone of Varga's argument is that the Revolution was half-socialist, half-bourgeois. The spiritual world of the bourgeois still predominates in the Soviet Union. Lenin's role in the emergence of bureaucratism is discussed critically. Varga's views on the future of Soviet society are characterized by scepticism as to the "progressive" forces of Soviet society and pessimistic resignation. The essay is obviously the work of an intelligent, mature and deeply disillusioned man.

Medvedev's "A Book on Socialist Democracy"

Roy Medvedev has been internationally known, with his twin-brother Zhores, as one of the foremost oppositional intellectuals in the Soviet Union. He was born in 1925, trained as an educationalist, and had several other major works published before in the West.[25] He was excluded from the Party in 1969 on account of his oppositional activities. Medvedev's book does not offer a systematic analysis and a theoretical frame of study of the present political situation in the USSR, although these may be said to be implied in his treatment of the main political themes. He insists on his allegiance to the Soviet state, the Party and Marxism-Leninism and this is the basis from which he advances his proposals for reform of all the major institutions of the Soviet political system. These proposals, concerning the national question, political opposition, the Communist Party, governmental agencies, civil liberties and the economic organization of society form the backbone of his book. In more recent years there is a noticeable shift in his political opinions, especially with regard to Lenin (see p. 182).

Il'ia Glumov's "The Leninist Test" (AS 1198)

"The Leninist Test" is a relatively long article by an otherwise unknown author who lives up to his pseudonym—the mocker. Glumov's essay is

full of sarcastic asides and catching phrases. When he writes about radio-jamming he remarks: "It would seem that especially the capitalists would jam Moscow broadcasts; theirs is the rotting system after all." And about the difficulty in obtaining foreign newspapers, even communist ones: "No sooner does anything interesting happen in the world, but the Morning Star disappears from the Soviet sky." Ordinary young people, he writes, may be recruited to work on the virgin lands, in Siberia or the Arctic, but the children of the Party bureaucracy take on even more difficult and responsible jobs.

> "They go much further than Kazakhstan or Siberia. Ordinary young people cannot even imagine how difficult it is to work in the very lair of the enemy, in the trading agencies and diplomatic posts of the Soviet Union in capitalist countries. . . . How inexpressibly painful it is to watch every minute the suffering of one's brother-workers, groaning under the yoke of capitalist slavery, or every day to put the dollars in your pocket, the symbol of the exploitation of the peoples!"

However, Glumov is somewhat disappointing and bland when he becomes serious. Stalin's worst crime, he asserts, is the destruction of Lenin's party. Of his reform proposals the most interesting and audacious is the introduction of an opposition party, which in his eyes is the only way to guarantee the necessary amount of criticism and openness.

Concluding remarks

It will be seen that the actual desiderata formulated by the Marxists-Leninists are to a considerable degree similar to those put forward by adherents of other political currents. What sets them apart as a special group is not so much different political wishes but rather a political creed and a concomitant psychology. A very important consequence of this is that the Marxist-Leninist dissidents are all inclined to couch their observations in traditional Marxist terminology and interpret them accordingly. One of the most glaring instances is their universal and automatic belief in the *zakonomernost'* (evolution according to immutable laws of nature) of historical developments. A closely related idea is that certain things just cannot happen because they are ruled out by the Marxist scenario for world history. Several Marxist-Leninist authors aver that there is no need to be afraid that the reforms advocated by them will lead to the revival of capitalism in the Soviet Union, because such a thing is objectively impossible. Views on the outside world are often expressed in empty stereotypes and fatuous platitudes. Ignorance of the realities inside and

outside Soviet frontiers occasionally assumes grotesque proportions. According to the author of "Ideological disorder", Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War, thankful for its liberation, welcomed its new teacher (i.e. Stalin). Varga talks about the "desperate resistance of the entire old system [against the Revolution], supported by the intervention of 14 states". Participation of workers in enterprise management can only be an illusion in the West, writes Medvedev (note that it *is* not an illusion, it *can only be* an illusion).[26]. Elsewhere in his book he declares:

> It happens that Western countries, regardless of capitalist group interests, introduce changes which maintain the viability of the capitalist system and *temporarily* [italics added, F.] alleviate its contradictions." [27]

The same fusion of wish and statement of fact occurs where Medvedev proclaims: "The development of production of a capitalist nature is impossible and undesirable".[28]

Perhaps the most serious aspect of the verbal intoxication with such terms as "progressive meaning", "objective inevitability" and the like, is the failure of the Marxists-Leninists to appreciate fully the absolute inhumanity of Stalinist rule and the absolute necessity for its utter and total rejection. Among the authors discussed in this chapter only Roy Medvedev is quite unequivocal about this.

Another element of irrealism encountered among Marxist-Leninist dissidents is their dream of pure and pristine Leninism, which was unfortunately interrupted by the Stalinist nightmare. Perhaps it is significant that in this extreme and simplified form the dream is only for the politically simple—in our survey the Ryleev Club. Presumably there is a half-conscious awareness that somehow the succession and the success of Stalin was not purely accidental. Varga is undoubtedly the most audacious in putting the blame for Stalinism in part on Lenin and the Revolution itself. The prevailing mood, however, of the "loyal dissidents" remains that the Revolution was a "positive" phenomenon and that in some way a connection must be found between the ideals of Lenin's Revolution and the present. There is apparently no clear insight into the relation between Lenin's concept of the leading role of a single well-organized and disciplined party and the emergence of the bureaucratic syndrome (which is viewed as the basic illness of the present political system).

When (probably sometime during 1965) the Institute of Marxism-Leninism discussed the draft of the third volume of the official History of the CPSU, a young communist historian, Leonid Petrovskii (son and grandson of important Soviet officials), commented on the draft, which covered the early periods of the history of the Soviet Communist Party, in the following words:

> "We all have to be grateful to the editors that finally Lenin does not come out as politically blind. He was not surrounded by spies and traitors. Lenin did not surround himself with that kind of people when he led the party through three Russian revolutions and a civil war." (AS 466)

If that is so, the dissident Leninists still have a number of questions to answer. How did Leninism pass into Stalinism? Will a return to Leninism imply that everything will be done over again including perhaps a return to Stalinism?

Chapter 4

THE SOCIALISTS

The "socialists" as an intermediate group

The small group tentatively called socialists forms an intermediate category between the also not very numerous but well-defined Marxists-Leninists and the large and variegated group of Soviet citizens whose rejection of the official ideology includes the refusal to call themselves Marxists or socialists. Indeed the allegiance to socialism and the willingness to label themselves accordingly must be considered one of the chief characteristics of the group under discussion in this chapter. From the intermediate nature of the group it follows that it displays some of the attitudes of, and holds some views in common with, the Marxists-Leninists. One could mention, for instance, the evaluation of the bureaucratic elite and the dissatisfaction with the economic performance of the Soviet Union. With the socialists, however, these common elements are integrated in a more fundamentally critical attitude towards the regime. It can readily be admitted that the borderline between socialists and Marxists-Leninists is not sharp. The gradual transition from Marxist-Leninist views to socialist views is demonstrated by certain documents, which appear to be close to the borderline (e.g. the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum, see below) and also by the biographies of certain dissidents who have moved from Marxist-Leninist to socialist positions (and sometimes even further). With regard to the latter it should be emphasized once more that the designation "socialists" is applied here to the authors of specific documents, not to these authors in general. For instance, Sakharov as the author of "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" may be regarded as a socialist, although his views have changed appreciably in the following years.

The socialists (in the sense this term is used here) probably do not perceive of themselves as a group which is significantly distinct from the Marxist-Leninist dissenters discussed in the previous chapter. Sakharov, at the time of writing "Thoughts on Progress", seemed to regard himself as an "unorthodox Marxist". The few times Lenin is mentioned in socialist documents this is done in a fairly positive vein. On the other hand the socialists dissociate themselves clearly from what they regard as liberals.

With all these reservations there still is enough justification for identifying the socialists as a separate group. There is, first of all, their self-appraisal as socialists, which implies a much looser connection with the official ideology than is displayed by the Marxists-Leninists, but which also sets them apart from the liberal-democratic, nationalist and other currents within the political opposition. Along with this more or less psychological element, socialist documents possess a certain coherence in their specific emphasis on themes such as the danger of a new world war, the concern for the environment and their aversion of state capitalism.

The principal documents designated as "socialist" in this chapter are the afore-mentioned work by Sakharov (Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom)[1], an essay "Thoughts on the liberal campaign of 1968" written by A. Mikhailov (a pseudonym)[2], "Time does not wait" (a long essay by S. Zorin and N. Alekseev)[3], an open letter to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgornyi (A gradual democratization is necessary) by Sakharov, R. Medvedev and Turchin[4], and two issues of "The Sower—A Social-Democratic Agitation Bulletin"[5]. Sakharov's Thoughts is the earliest of these documents (dated June 1968); the most recent is the second issue of The Sower, published probably around the end of 1971.

After a short discussion of the socialist views on the historical developments which led to the present situation in the USSR, the main part of this chapter will be devoted to the socialist analysis of the shortcomings of the political and socio-economic system of the Soviet Union. This will be followed by a short exposé of the suggestions for change made in socialist documents, with regard to strategy as well as tactics. Then the individual documents which form the basis of this chapter will be examined in more detail. The chapter concludes with a few general observations and a section on Levitin-Krasnov.

The historical roots of the present situation

A comprehensive analysis of developments since the October Revolution is lacking in the socialist documents. On this point there is a remarkable difference from the Marxists-Leninists. In view of the comparatively small number of sources on either side this difference could be attributed to chance; it is more likely, however, that the main responsibility for the absence of such an analysis lies elsewhere. For the Marxists-Leninists the legitimacy of their political ideology is derived from the Revolution and the role of Lenin. Therefore it becomes imperative for them to find out where, in the chain of events leading to the present situation (which they

reject to a large extent), the rot set in. This forces them to trace the roots of the political organization of the Soviet Union of today to some specific moment in Soviet history between the present and the October Revolution. These considerations lose their urgency with the socialists whose political creed is not based, or at least not exclusively, on Marx and Lenin. As a consequence of this, the historical watershed between the reigns of Lenin and Stalin which is so pivotal for the polical ideas of the Marxists-Leninists is not so strongly emphasized in the writings of the socialists.

The brief analysis of the historical developments after the Revolution provided by The Sower represents an exception to this. According to this source the system of private capitalism was replaced in 1917 not by socialism, but by a system of administrative state capitalism (*administrativnyi goskapitalizm*). The first, bolshevik, phase of state capitalism lasted about ten years and was "undisputably progressive". Private ownership of means of production was relegated to a very secondary position, central planning of the economy was introduced, the political leadership consisted of fairly civilized (*kul'turnye*) people, politics were flexible and there was a considerable amount of intellectual freedom and diversity of information. These things (with the exception of the socialization of the means of production and the central planning system) were abolished in the second, Stalinist, phase, the old bolshevik guard was annihilated and this in fact constituted a complete turnabout (*perevorot*). However, the antithesis between the two phases is not as strong as it usually is made out to be in the writings of the Marxists-Leninists, because the first phase is still considered by The Sower as "administrative state capitalism" (and not socialism), albeit of a benign and "progressive" kind. (There is a parallel here with the ideas of Pseudo-Medvedev, see p. 61, and, to a lesser extent, with those of Varga, see p. 60).

If the relationship between the regimes of Lenin and Stalin, and in particular the question of whether the origins of the latter were somehow contained in the inherent shortcomings of the former, is not very well worked out in the socialist documents, there is no doubt on the other hand that Stalinism or rather the continuation of Stalinist traditions is seen as the most serious disease of the Soviet body politic. As pointed out in the preceding paragraph Stalinism is totally rejected by The Sower. The Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin memorandum regards the Stalinist traditions simply as "the source of our difficulties". (Incidentically, in the same sentence the Memorandum declares that the socialist system is contrary to the anti-democratic Stalinist system and is not to be seen as the source of these difficulties. This might imply a rather more positive attitude towards the Revolution and Lenin that the silence which generally prevails on this point among the socialist writers. Not too much weight should, however, be attached to these few words, because the Memorandum is addressed to

the political leadership and the authors will presumably have made an effort to make their text as palatable as possible for the addressee, without belying their own views.)

Zorin and Alekseev start off promisingly by disputing the argument of those who believe that the excesses of Stalinism, deplorable as they might be by themselves, were an inevitable concomitant of the enormous progress made by the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin. To these views they object that the history of the Soviet Union should not be conceived of as a linear process of overcoming difficulties on the road towards an always brighter future. Are the Stalinist atrocities just to be attributed to chance (*sluchainost'*), they ask. The question implies a negative answer and this would mean, if *sluchainost'* is taken in the sense it normally has in Soviet philosophy and academic parlance, that Stalinism was somehow a necessary (*neobkhodimyi*) phenomenon in the history of Soviet society. This, in a way, is precisely what the imaginary opponents of Zorin and Alekseev say. The difference then seems to be that while one party reaches a positive total appraisal of developments since the October Revolution (admitting the "unpleasantness" of Stalinism but taking this into the bargain), Zorin and Alekseev appear to condemn the entire evolutionary process initiated by the Revolution because of the Stalinist excesses, which in their eyes are inevitably entailed in this process. The argument about the systemic (or structural) character of Stalinism is not carried through, but one may presume that this is what Zorin and Alekseev have in mind, because they continue by pointing to the manifold negative effects of Stalinism and the survival of Stalinist traditions, both in the Soviet Union and in China. "It is by chance", they ask, "that the application of our methods in China have led to ruination and stagnation of the economy?"

In Sakharov's Thoughts the condemnation of Stalinism assumes a dimension of timelessness because it is included in a general critique of racism, nationalism, militarism and dictatorship. Although Sakharov identifies the chief elements of Stalinism and directs specific accusations against them, no attempt is made to connect Stalinism with the socio-political system introduced by the October Revolution. Sakharov merely refers to a "fundamental monograph by R. Medvedev" (undoubtedly "Let History Judge") which contains a "searching analysis of the origins and manifestations of Stalinism" and with which he appears to agree.

Analysis of the present situation

In the preceding section it has been explained why the socialist members of the political opposition in the Soviet Union pay less attention to the historical roots of the present ills of Soviet society than the Marxists-

Leninists. It is not surprising that the socialists, by virtue of their freer and less dogmatic attitude towards the realities of Soviet life, surpass the Marxists-Leninists in the richness of their criticism and the broadness of their views concerning these present ills.

Certainly, the "bureaucratic syndrome" (as discussed in the chapter on the Marxists-Leninists) figures prominently also in the writings of the socialists. The monopolistic power of a centralized administrative apparatus is the basic fault of our system, declares The Sower. But this charge is made more specific by combining it with the reproach of state capitalism. An essentially similar position is occupied by Zorin and Alekseev who regard the leading role of the Party *and* state ownership of the means of production as the "basic features of our system". In the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin letter it is not completely clear (again because of the peculiar form of the document as a letter to Brezhnev, Kosygin and Podgornyi) what the authors regard as the central or most important fault of the Soviet political system, but from the sequence of their suggestions for improvement (which is headed by a call for careful but comprehensive democratization) one might infer that they have the dominant position of a small bureaucratic elite in mind.

The socialists, one may presume, concur with the Marxists-Leninists in criticizing the privileged position and the monopolistic power of the bureaucratic elite, but a very specific and distinct slant is added to their criticism by including the complaint about state ownership of the means of production (state capitalism). This complaint is certainly not made by the Marxists-Leninists; it is of course only the undogmatic stand taken by the socialists which allows them to reject state capitalism. Another difference concerning the attitude towards the position of the bureaucratic *verkhushka* (top) is that this point is very central for the Marxists-Leninists, who trace almost all the faults and shortcomings of the Soviet political and social system to it, while for the socialists the point is highly important but not so central; to them, it seems, there are other aspects of the system which are objectionable or unsatisfactory but which are not traceable directly to the existence of the bureaucratic elite.

The socialists are not as explicit as the Marxists-Leninists in regarding the existence of this elite as a direct continuation of the Stalinist regime (this is in accordance with their generally weaker historical orientation). However, at least one source (The Sower) states that it considers the present order "from an objective social viewpoint" as the direct continuation of Stalinism.

> "And although the new order is much better than the Stalinist one from the human point of view, it is the latter's direct continuation from an objective social point of view and it is certainly not a return to the wide horizons of bolshevism."

The socialist analysis of the bureaucratic elite contains the same elements as the one offered by the Marxists-Leninists. The country is in fact ruled by an administrative class organized according to strictly hierarchical principles (The Sower). The members of this class (equated to the *nomenklatura* by Zorin and Alekseev) form a closed group, and are only interested in their own careers. All political and economic power is in the hands of this class and more specifically of its own top levels (because of its internal hierarchy). Political oppression and the absence of the freedom of information are the natural results of this. The *nomenklatura* (lists of officials which can only be appointed with Party approval; see also p. 67) having made its own interests the supreme political guideline, controls the distribution of wealth in Soviet society and is its own supervisor. This has of course led to great inequality, not only in incomes, but also in privileges (which in Soviet conditions is certainly no less important).

Up to this point the socialist diagnosis of the bureaucratic syndrome coincides with the Marxist-Leninist one. A somewhat different picture, however, emerges when one looks at the elaboration of some of the aforementioned elements by the socialists. They put more emphasis on the bureaucratic elite being a class, because they view it as a closed group of people who in fact own the means of production. In a characteristic statement by Zorin and Alekseev this is expressed as follows: „. . . the *nomenklatura* appears as a form of ownership. It is essentially a state-monopolistic trust, in which position and rank are equal to a block of shares." This statement makes very clear what the socialists mean when they argue that the exclusive power position of a privileged bureaucracy is intimately interwoven with the prevailing economic system—state capitalism (state ownership of the means of production).

A second specific point elaborated by the socialists is the position of the intelligentsia. Because the bureaucracy is regarded as a class, class antagonism develops between intelligentsia and bureaucracy. The intelligentsia, as a new class is in vital need of intellectual freedom without which it cannot perform its functions in an industrially advanced society at the threshold of the second industrial revolution. Although the more enlightened elements among the bureaucracy are aware of this, the bureaucracy as a whole is unable to renounce some of its privileges and grant the necessary amount of freedom.

> "This lack of correspondence between the regime and the [present] situation, this contradiction between the social organization and the forces of production, leads to increased class antagonism between the administrative class and the intelligentsia. The administrative class is afraid of a broad application of the scientific principle. Its own absolute power, its own privileges are based on the oppression of intellectual freedom, on keeping the population stupid through propaganda and on depriving it of the right to information." (The Sower)

This class antagonism between intelligentsia and bureaucracy is also related to the third point put forward by the socialists in connection with the position of the bureaucratic elite: because of its preoccupation by its own interests the bureaucratic elite becomes increasingly unable to provide adequate leadership. Although the development of Soviet society requires more freedom, and in particular less rigidity in the management of the economy, the regime is almost unable to grant this because of the sacrifices this would ask from the members of the political elite. Also, the heavy ideological constraint on the free flow of information has damaged the level of informedness of the leaders themselves and makes it difficult for them to react adequately to new developments and challenges.

> "As a result of the restrictions on the freedom of information, it is not only difficult to place a check on the leaders and popular initiative is undermined, but also the leaders at intermediate levels are deprived of powers and information and are being turned into passive executives and civil servants. The leaders at the top level receive information which is too incomplete and bland and are also deprived of the possibility of making effective use of their powers." (Sakharov-Turchin-Medvedev)

The same general idea is expressed somewhat differently by The Sower:

> "The hierarchical system, in the person of its highest representatives, would undoubtedly desire the scientific rationalization of the entire life of society, but is itself in fact the main obstacle to such a rationalization by virtue of its own basic principle: the omnipotence of an incompetent, uncontrolled hierarchy, not responsible to society. And this fact, of course, it does not want to accept."

In this context the socialists mention the unsatisfactory state of the economy and in particular of labour productivity. The point is made most markedly by Mikhailov who blames "unscientific" management, an idea which tallies with the ideal of scientific socialism advocated by most of the socialists. Dissatisfaction with the economy, however, does not have the same psychological importance for the socialists as it has for the Marxists-Leninists for whom the superiority of the system and behind this the purity of the ideology is at stake. The socialists seem much more willing to admit the merits of other economic systems, in particular of capitalism. This willingness is most noticeable in Sakharov's Thoughts which squarely states that there are no grounds to believe that the capitalist production

method leads productive forces into a dead-end. (In this respect one should add that Sakharov's observations concerning the failures of the Soviet economy are not connected by him with the existence of a ruling elite. In an apparent effort to avoid the controversial and dangerous subject of the role of the bureaucracy within the Soviet political system, he merely says that "some of the stupidities in our development were not the organic consequence of the socialist road, but were some kind of tragic coincidence, a serious but not inevitable disease".)

In Sakharov's Thoughts on Progress the tendency to describe other negative aspects of Soviet society as relatively independent of the phenomenon of the bureaucratic elite is most obvious. Sakharov's perspective is predominantly internationalist and the problems of the Soviet Union are seen by him as manifestations of global problems rather than as consequences of internal developments. Some of the problems mentioned by him in this framework are: the dangers to the environment, the dangers of war and nationalism, increasing spiritual and intellectual poverty of the general population and the danger of mass manipulation.

The environment issue is also brought up in the pages of The Sower and by Zorin and Alekseev. The Sower connects this issue with the administrative inadequacy of the bureaucracy; not in the way that the pollution danger would have been caused completely by the typical incompetence of the Soviet bureaucracy, but that the structural flaws of it prevent an effective solution of the problem. Zorin and Alekseev, in a passing reference to deforestation, indeed seem to put the blame for this and accompanying phenomena (erosion, etc.) on the government itself. Sakharov, in accordance with the uncontroversial profile of his essay, discusses the consequences and dangers of thermal, biological, chemical and radio-active pollution in a general way without any specific reference to the USSR.

He follows a similar approach with regard to the danger of nuclear war (which he discusses as a general problem of international relations) and of nationalism (which is just mentioned without any reference to the Soviet Union). On these points Zorin and Alekseev are most detailed. They argue that the primary objectives of the power elite are the maintenance of internal power and the extension of its power abroad. For this purpose the Soviet Union engages in enormous spending on armaments, although there are no serious external threats to its security. Soviet military expenditure, however, will very soon no longer be able to keep up with the U.S.A., because of the incompetent handling of the Soviet economy. The Soviet government is aware of this and this increases the temptation to engage in military adventures in the near future. With regard to this the official encouragement of chauvinism and militaristic jingoism is significant and dangerous. (One cannot help observing that even the critics of the Soviet

regime are not quite immune to the omnipresent and bombastic military propaganda. Zorin and Alekseev, referring to ultra-Stalinist tendencies to let the Soviet Army continue its westward advance in 1945, add: "Indeed, our army, matured in many years of war, would easily have wiped away the Allied troops . . .". And even such a sober and mature critic as Sakharov remarks: "As history proves, our people and its armed forces are one and invincible in the defence of the motherland and its great social and cultural achievements.")

Under the general heading "threats to intellectual freedom" Sakharov discusses not only the problem of censorship in the USSR but also the emergence of mass culture in which the meaning of human life is lost, and which will inevitably be accompanied by a manipulation of the convictions, behaviour and desires of the masses. He refers in general terms to the increasing use of means which tranquillize or stimulate—narcotics in the widest sense of the term. The same point, but with specific reference to the Soviet Union is taken up by The Sower. Soviet society has lost its old ideals and has received nothing in their place. This explains the general disillusionment and emptiness, which in turn lead to alcoholism and crime. This loss of faith is ascribed by The Sower, in a formula phrased in curious Marxist terminology, to the non-correspondence of the productive forces and the production relations. What is meant is that the rigid administrative-bureaucratic system cannot cope any longer with new developments; Soviet society must be comprehensively rationalized and humanized.

The problem of alcoholism, drugs and the growing crime rate is also raised in the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin letter. It is not connected there with the moral crisis, but only, superficially, with the insufficient level of education. It can safely be assumed that the authors were thinking of the moral bankruptcy of the official ideology, because both Sakharov and Medvedev have uttered such thoughts in other works.

It has already been explained that the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum, being an open letter addressed to the Party leadership, is very careful not to offend the deeply respected comrades to whom it is addressed. Its more fundamental criticism can be reconstructed if one looks at the picture drawn at the end of the memorandum, of what would happen when the advice of the authors to democratize Soviet society were not followed: the Soviet Union would fall behind even more in the economic competition with the capitalist world and become a second-grade provincial power; further economic difficulties would arise; the antagonism between the party-government apparatus and the intelligentsia would increase; rightist and leftist coups would become possible; nationalism would flare up in the Union republics. Obviously, the ideas of the authors fit in very well with the general socialist diagnosis of the disease of the Soviet political system.

Strategy and tactics of the socialist opposition

The socialists' plans for the future can be divided, as those of the Marxists-Leninists, into long-, middle- and short-term plans. Long-term plans then would envisage the kind of society that the other plans should endeavour to create, middle-term plans would identify the chief strategic goals and short-term plans would indicate the areas suitable for immediate action.

The most comprehensive view of the society of the future is offered by The Sower which devotes a special chapter of its first issue to it. This chapter is entitled significantly "Scientific-democratic socialism". Indeed the idea of scientific management and control of society is very conspicuous in the perspective of the socialists. Not only The Sower but also the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin letter and the essay by Mikhailov attach great importance to the scientific character of the governing process advocated by them. Scientific socialism implies the use of scientific methods in government and, as a consequence of this, a special role of scientific personnel and of the intelligentsia in general in the governing process.

In the opinion of The Sower, the bureaucratic apparatus which at present possesses exclusive control of executive and legislative powers will always be inclined to use these powers for its own purposes and is thereby unable to provide flexible and competent leadership in an advanced industrial society. It believes that it will be necessary to give decisive legislative powers to an independent body of experts, specialists and scientists. Executive powers may be left to a bureaucratic apparatus which will have to remain centralized, but in order to prevent the re-emergence of a bureaucratic elite income differentials should be decreased considerably. The democratic element should be represented by a democratically elected body which should have the right to supervise, check and receive full information. This idea of a division of powers at the top level is also applied to lower levels where, according to the suggestions of The Sower, enterprises should receive a large amount of independence and "production democracy" should be introduced within the enterprises. There should be no return to private property, although at some other point The Sower is not quite so strict (where it advocates an economic reform "right up to a careful introduction of elements of the New Economic Policy—small-scale private property in agriculture and household services—retaining a decisive influence for the centre").

The Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin letter to the Party leadership connects the ideas of scientific management and of democracy. It argues that a large measure of democratization of Soviet public life is made necessary by technical and economic progress and by scientific methods of control which require freedom of information, openness (*glasnost'*) and competitiveness (*sorevnovatel'nost*). Technical and economic progress and scientific methods of control (or of government—*upravlenie*) are both an aim and a fact for the authors of the letter. What they mean is that the present economic and scientific progress cannot go on if Soviet society is not made more democratic and free. Otherwise, the letter does not appear to envisage a perspective of the future other than that offered by the official ideology itself. It states that democratization should promote the protection and strengthening of the Soviet socialist system, of the socialist economy, of "our social and cultural achievements" and of socialist ideology. All this should be realized under the leadership of the Communist Party and the leading role of the Party in the economic, political and cultural life of Soviet society should be retained and even increased.

Sakharov personally, in his Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, expresses his preference for socialism which he believes to be superior from a moral-ethical point of view. His ideals for the future, however, are dominated by global considerations. The unprecedented dangers of thermo-nuclear war, of pollution and of totalitarianism which threaten the existence of mankind and human civilization itself call for a world-wide solution. Socialism has inspired many progressive reforms in capitalist societies; it is time now for a large-scale convergence of the two systems. Sakharov hopes that in the capitalist world certain socialist ideas will be implemented (e.g. a down-grading of private property) and advocates democratization and economic reforms for the socialist world. (Democratization, in accordance with oppositional terminology in the Soviet Union, refers principally to an increased implementation and observation of political and civil liberties.)

In some of the socialist works one notices a strong emphasis on the intelligentsia; The Sower elaborates on the class antagonism between the intelligentsia and the bureaucratic elite, while Sakharov attaches great importance to the awareness of common interests between the intelligentsia and the workers. It seems that among the socialists, more so than among the Marxists-Leninists, there is a tendency to see the intelligentsia as the carrier of progress and indeed to cast the intelligentsia in the role of the revolutionary class which will carry out the second industrial revolution.

The Sower even expresses its lack of confidence in a basically civilized and democratic attitude of the mass of the population (a fear which is shared by a number of other dissident authors, notably Amalrik; see p. 211).

> "It is to be feared that when an ideological vacuum will occur (after the discrediting of first religion and then the official ideology),

it will be precisely those fascist-obscurantist [*lit. chernosotennye*: of the Black Hundreds, 19th Century reactionary terrorist organizations] programmes which will provide a shape for dissatisfaction striving to assert itself. It is to be feared that when the questions 'Who is guilty?' and 'What is to be done?' are in fact asked, the general and spontaneous answer from large groups will be: 'Beat the Yids, the communists and the professors!' "

A point which the socialists do have in common with the Marxists-Leninists is the disillusionment and frustration over the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia. The Dubcek experiment, most notably for Sakharov and Zorin and Alekseev, represented a reference point for their own hopes and aspirations for reforms in Soviet society.

The most negative among the socialists in their appreciation of Soviet society are, unquestionably, Zorin and Alekseev, and logically the alternative proposed by them is most strikingly different. They summarize their plans in the term "political democracy". A basic condition for this, according to them, is the abolition of state ownership in its present form which is tantamount to ownership by the ruling elite. State ownership should be replaced by ownership by the entire people (*obshchenarodnaia*) or by collectivities of workers. This should be accompanied by the introduction of the full panoply of civil liberties and the abolition of bureaucratic control over the army, the police, the security forces and the courts. They defend themselves against the charge that their political democracy is nothing but bourgeois democracy. These things (and in particular a multi-party system), they say, are essential to any kind of democracy.

The introduction of a multi-party system is foreseen but not strongly advocated by Sakharov and The Sower. There is a noticeable element of hesitation about the desirability of a multi-party system, which one feels is based on the thought that there is only one truth (and therefore only one party can be right). The Sower declares that a party is a private and temporary instrument in a political struggle, and that is all, but that for the present another party besides the Communist Party is desirable because such a party would be able to formulate alternatives. A similar stand is taken by Sakharov.

The abolition of state ownership and the introduction of a multi-party system has taken us into the subject of the middle-term plans. These represent quite naturally the translation of the ultimately desired society into a small number of strategic targets.

On this issue there is (inevitably) a strong parallel between Sakharov's Thoughts and the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum. The latter ends with a list of fifteen recommendations for reforms to be carried out

within four or five years by the Party leadership. These reforms are either aimed generally at democratizing the Soviet regime or at removing its most oppressive aspects (amnesty for political prisoners, rehabilitation of nations deported by Stalin, abolition of censorship, independence of the judiciary, etc.). A similar but shorter list is contained in Sakharov's essay; this list also includes recommendations in favour of economic reforms and of decreasing international tension. One of the main tasks of the Soviet regime, according to Sakharov, should be to make socialism internationally (and also internally) more attractive. Another point stressed by Sakharov is the necessity to complete the process of de-Stalinization which was begun by Khrushchev but never fully seen through.

One of the specific suggestions of the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum is the foundation of a public opinion research institute (the same suggestion was made by Alekseev-Gavrilov, see p. 74). The idea seems related to The Sower's more extreme plan of entrusting legislation to a body of experts and scientists who would base their policy decisions on scientific data, and in general to the cardinal function attributed by the socialists to the scientific handling of society's problems and to the people who are to do this—the scientists and intellectuals.

A much different approach in identifying middle-term objectives is taken by The Sower. The Sower does not address itself at all to the regime, advising them what reforms to introduce; instead it chooses a much more oppositional course by aiming primarily at the creation of an effective instrument of political power. Only this, it believes, will allow realistic dealings with, and influence on, the regime. Such an instrument can only be a political party, although no great importance is attached to the designation "party". In the present conditions there can be no question (for security reasons) of the organisation of a party in the traditional sense, with registered members, a headquarters, officials, etc. Such a procedure would be suicidal. What is essential is the elaboration of a comprehensive vision and a programme based on it. The ideas contained therein could be disseminated informally and inconspicuously among one's friends and acquaintances and no tangible organization would be required. In fact the opposition would be more of a movement than a party.

The immediate tactical consequences of such an approach are clear. The Sower proposes, after the construction of something like a political ideology and a concordant political programme, to engage in propaganda and agitation in order to create an atmosphere of wide-spread dissatisfaction. It prefers these methods to the collection and exposing of individual injustices committed by the authorities. It is generally opposed to the more public forms of political action, such as demonstration and the collection of signatures (which it calls with some depreciation *demonstranstvo* and *podpisanstvo*). In this context it engages in a debate with

the "liberals" whom, in a special chapter "The Insufficiency of the Liberals", it accuses of inconsistency and irresponsibility. The liberals, who protest against individual acts of the authorities, have failed to proffer a real alternative, it argues. It is irresponsible to believe that liberalization by itself is a solution of the political problem. The liberal attempts to formulate solutions (Sakharov's Thoughts is mentioned as an example) are half-hearted and vague. Conspicuous activities such as demonstrations should be engaged in only at specific moments when they can serve as the manifestation and condensation point of widely held feelings of anger and frustration. In this light the entire activity of the oppositional movement advocated by The Sower is perceived as the almost invisible and imperceptible action of ideas which then, as the moment has come, are expected to provide a vast resonance to an event insignificant in itself. The most practical method of carrying on this activity is by utilizing *samizdat* channels, preferably anonymously.

Even more critical of the liberals is Mikhailov, whose pamphlet is entirely devoted to a critique of liberal policies. His despisal of the liberals, who are regarded by him as romantics and hysterics, is as great as his rejection of the Soviet system: "Inasmuch as the liberals spoke out openly . . . they were attempting to look to the law for support, which is patently pointless in our state". Mikhailov believes that a national and world-wide disaster is approaching and that the Soviet regime will not survive for long. His prescription is somewhat disappointing; one should work out a concept explaining modern society and its workings, based on democratic socialism. One should refrain from activities that get one arrested. The best way of spreading new ideas is, anonymously, through *samizdat*.

Almost no tactical suggestions or ideas are to be found in the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum and in Sakharov's Thoughts; this can be explained of course by their character. Both documents are very much of a public nature, addressing themselves exclusively or predominantly to the leaders of the Soviet Union; therefore any suggestions concerning oppositional tactics would be pointless and counterproductive.

The individual dissidents and their works

Sakharov's Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (AS 200)

Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov is one of the foremost physicists of the Soviet Union. He became a full member of the USSR Academy of Sciences (a position of enormous prestige in the Soviet Union) at the age

of 32. He occupies a unique place in the political opposition of his country, both because of his academic status as well as on account of his personal conduct. His status as a Soviet academician and a scholar of international renown has allowed him to speak out freely against illegal oppression of political dissent. His position and the dignified and restrained tone of his protest have, until now made it impossible for the authorities to take drastic action against him. As he is the only one of the internationally known dissidents who has not been subject to searches, arrest and imprisonment, he seems to be left in the position of the last public defender of the political dissidents in the Soviet Union. (On Sakharov, see also the special section on pp. 217-222.)

Of the various socialist documents his is the only one written before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This may explain the somewhat naive idealism of his essay. In an interview in December 1972 he declared:

"When I wrote this book I was a little idealistic. Remember that Czechoslovakia had not yet been invaded. I wrote from what you call a position of abstraction. Now I know many more things and am a much more disappointed man. I called myself a socialist then, but now I have modified my beliefs. . . . I would no longer label myself a socialist. I am not a Marxist-Leninist, a communist. I would call myself a liberal."[6]

The Sakharov Memorandum (as it is usually called) is one of the most widely read documents of the Soviet political opposition, inside as well as outside the USSR. This is evidenced by the comparatively large number of reactions which have appeared in the West and, in *samizdat*, in the Soviet Union.[7] Also, according to *samizdat* reports concerning searches, it is one of the most frequently confiscated books in the Soviet Union.

The Memorandum (written in June 1968) is addressed to the Soviet leaders, to the citizens of the USSR and to all people of good will. Its main theme is the global character of the dangers of war, hunger, pollution, threats to intellectual freedom, racism, nationalism and dictatorship. The solution it suggests is the convergence of the capitalist and socialist systems and in this context Sakharov advocates for the Soviet Union a definitive end to all vestiges of Stalinism, the introduction of various democratic reforms and considerable changes in the economic system.

A. Mikhailov's Thoughts on the liberal campaign of 1968

This article has only become known in a detailed resumé in No. 17 of the "Chronicle of Current Events". The name Mikhailov is said to be a pseudonym and nothing else is known about the author. The article makes it clear that Mikhailov is an adherent of democratic socialism with a similar predilection for "scientific" government and a "scientific" approach to

social problems as displayed by The Sower. Apart from this, his article is directed chiefly against the liberals who are attacked by him in very strong words (see above p. 96). Not only have the liberals (according to Mikhailov) failed to understand the basic problem of Soviet society (which is the conflict between the production forces and the production relations), but in fact their advocacy of freedom of speech expresses only their own class interests. They ignore the man in the street with his needs and sufferings. They play useless spiritual games.

These rather debatable positions were attacked and criticized in the same issue of Chronicle by A. Strikh (see p. 159).

Mikhailov's essay was probably written in 1969.

Zorin and Alekseev: Time does not wait (AS 368)

This essay, which has as a sub-title "Our country finds itself at a turning-point in history", is dated 1969 and signed by S. Zorin, teacher, and N. Alekseev, engineer. It is also known as the Leningrad Programme (the authors being from that city). Unlike the Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum and Sakharov's Thoughts, it is explicitly negative in its evaluation of the Soviet regime. It does not address itself to the Party leadership but to the population at large. In its analysis of the bureaucratic syndrome it stresses the aspect of monopolistic state capitalism as the basic source of the ills of the Soviet system. It takes the view that the bureaucratic ruling class had maneuvered itself into an almost irreversible course which will lead to international adventures, internal stagnation, and possibly war and self-destruction. Only the introduction of a political democracy can help the country out of this impasse. In the short run the only practical thing to do is to continue the activities of open civic protest, combined with daily agitation in order to create a climate which does not tolerate political repression and political adventures.

It is only in passing that the essay declares itself opposed to bourgeois democracy and in favour of socialism and collective ownership of the means of production. This allows us to classify the document as socialist.

The Sakharov-Medvedev-Turchin Memorandum (AS 360)

This document, entitled "A gradual democratization is necessary" is dated March 19, 1970, signed by A. D. Sakharov, V. F. Turchin and R. A. Medvedev, and addressed to Brezhnev (as Secretary General of the Communist Party), Kosygin (as Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and Podgornyi (as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium). Turchin is a

physicist and author of a *samizdat* work "The inertia of fear" (unknown in the West and of an open letter "You are afraid of the truth" to the editor of *Literaturnaia Gazeta*.[8] (With regard to Sakharov and Medvedev, see p. 97 and p. 78.) As has been pointed out before, one can assume that the authors of the Memorandum have felt restricted by the fact that their letter was addressed not to the general public of the Soviet Union or to oppositionally inclined readers, but to the governing elite itself. As it says in the letter: "We have tried to be positive and constructive, so that it would be acceptable to the party-government leadership of our country, we have tried to explain certain misunderstandings and unfounded fears." Another somewhat unsatisfactory aspect of the letter is that it unquestionably represents a compromise between the differing views of the autors. It is at least quite certain that there is a considerable margin of disagreement between Sakharov and Medvedev (who has accused Sakharov of "westernizing"). However, in view of the proclivity of the Soviet opposition to engage in mutual ideological hair-splitting, any evidence of a common platform should be welcomed. It is easy enough to identify certain favourite ideas of the individual authors. Concern for peaceful international relations is a typical Sakharov theme, while the paragraphs about the unsatisfactory state of the Soviet economy have probably been inspired by Medvedev. The main points of the letter have been discussed already. They could be summarized as follows: internal and international considerations necessitate a fundamental democratization of public life in the USSR—freedom of speech, of information, abolition of political oppression, etc. These measures should be taken for the good of Soviet society and under the leadership of the Communist Party. The democratization process should be comprehensive, but administered in careful doses.

The Sower (AS 1138, 1139, 1174)

Two issues of this periodical appeared, the first in September 1971, subtitled "A social-democratic agitation bulletin", the second undated (but probably "published" around the end of 1971) and without the sub-title.

Two articles from an unknown issue (or unknown issues) of The Sower appeared in *samizdat* in September 1972 (AS 1174: "Love for mankind" and "The evil eye"). Although The Sower (*Seiatel'*) is formally a periodical, each issue contains only a single item, a lengthy political essay, and the two issues are intimately connected in their ideas and terminology and were probably written by the same person. The first issue offers an analysis of the present political system of the Soviet Union, the exposition of an alternative (scientific-democratic socialism) and some thoughts concerning a practical programme to realize its political objectives. The second issue

is quite possibly an answer to objections raised against the first. It devotes much attention to the need to engage in political action, to the possible effect of such action and to the ethical aspect of political opposition.

Some of the ideas of The Sower (in particular the entrusting of legislative powers to a council of scientists) may appear utterly naive to a Western observer and the criticism levelled against the liberal opposition may be a little unfair, but still The Sower is remarkably moderate (compared to, for instance, A. Mikhailov) and often displays a refreshing amount of common sense combined with a mature and sober attitude of civic responsibility.

Anatolii Levitin-Krasnov [9]

A quite unique place among the socialists is occupied by Anatolii Levitin (who writes under the pen-name of Krasnov). He was born in Baku in 1915, the son of a baptized Jewish justice of the peace. He received a religious upbringing and has remained, almost passionately, devoted to the orthodox faith. This has not prevented him from expressing himself in the sharpest tones on the conduct of Russian Church leaders; in the orthodox community he is often regarded as a dissenter and an eccentric. Politically, Levitin-Krasnov considers himself to be a socialist, but also his socialism has its ideosyncracies. In his autobiography he writes:

> "What I liked best about socialism was the idea of the disappearance of the state, its complete destruction, the idea of the equality and brotherhood of all peoples." [10]

In another article he goes into more detail and expounds more fully his political ideas. He believes that

> "... socialism is basically a reasonable, healthy and equitable system, which will in future embrace the entire world." [11]

During the period of socialist democracy the functions of the Soviet state will be the protection of the borders of the USSR, the management of the country's economy and the prevention of crime.

> "I firmly believe that in such conditions a mighty religious-social movement will take shape, which will realize a moral renewal of the people. ... And only this movement will be able to make a state system superfluous.
>
> When the lowly instincts, which are characteristic of the overwhelming majority of the people, will be suppressed, when man will become the master of his passions and not their unwilling plaything, then and then only will the state become unnecessary."

According to Levitin-Krasnov, a Christian is the exact opposite of a Marxist, but Marxism is a phase which both society and the individual must pass through.

> "Marxism is the philosophy of an important stage in human history, the stage of the class struggle. With the disappearance of classes Marxism will have outlived itself. Christianity will never outlive itself."

Levitin's religiously inspired anarchism may not be very helpful in developing a viable political ideology, but one may recognize with admiration the courage and integrity demonstrated in his tremendous contributions in numerous instances to the human rights struggle in the Soviet Union.*

Concluding remarks

The socialists can also be said to suffer from the same terminological disease diagnosed in the case of the Marxists-Leninists. There is still the propensity to offer the most threadbare stereotypes as serious explanations for social and political phenomena, such as the statement by The Sower that crime and alcoholism are caused by a discordance between production forces and production relations, or the idea that the birth of a social-democratic party is dictated by "objective social laws". However, it appears that with the socialists these terms represent rather a verbal survival of the past than the embodiment of a deep belief in Marxism.

The greater freedom from dogmatism also allows the socialists a more relaxed appreciation of the West. A more sophisticated attitude in this respect is especially noticeable in Sakharov's Thoughts. There still are some old misapprehensions, as when The Sower declares that private property is dying in the West.

A final common element among the socialists (although this feeling is encountered among the Marxists-Leninists too) is their revulsion against Mao's China. In particular Sakharov, otherwise the gentlest and most balanced in their company, reserves his strongest invective for this purpose ("The idiocy of the personality cult has assumed monstrous and grotesque-tragicomical forms in China, where many features of Stalinism and Hitlerism have been reduced to the absurd."). (See also pp. 222-227).

* After this book had gone to press, Levitin published a long essay, entitled "The World out of Joint" (*Zemlia dybom*), in which he systematically set out his views on the current spiritual, political, social and economic situation in the Soviet Union, together with his proposals for reforms (AS 1876). Shortly after writing this essay he left the Soviet Union.

Chapter 5

THE DEMOCRATS AND RELATED GROUPS

Introduction

As the two previous chapters have tended to demonstrate, two groups of documents can be identified with comparative ease among the writings of political dissenters in the Soviet Union. The authors of these documents, in accordance with their own views of themselves, have been designated as Marxists-Leninists and as socialists respectively. Of these two groups the Marxists-Leninists are the most clear-cut, while the socialists are rather to be regarded as an intermediate category between Marxists-Leninists and other currents of the political opposition. The Marxist-Leninist group may be defined by their allegiance to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, implying a positive attitude towards the October Revolution and in particular towards Lenin's historical role; their criticism of the present political system of the Soviet Union rests upon an historical analysis of developments inside Soviet society which puts the blame for the faults of the present system on the incompleteness of the Revolution and/or on the nefarious influence of Stalin and Stalinism. The cure proposed by the Marxists-Leninists is inspired consequently by the desire to go back to the pure ideals of Marxism and the Revolution. The position of the socialists reflects a degree of sympathy with the ideals of the Revolution and sometimes even with Lenin, but generally speaking their relationship to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism is much looser and cooler. On the other hand they are usually eager to dissociate themselves from capitalism in its modern Western form (as this is perceived by them) and this suggests the term "socialists" as an apt description for this latter group, the more so as they would normally describe themselves as such.

Apart from the Marxists-Leninists and the socialists, a few other specific categories can be singled out among the authors of oppositional political literature in the Soviet Union. The most notable of these are the various groups of nationalists—advocates of the cause of national and ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union, and their natural counterpart, the Great Russian nationalists, and also the small but significant group of "ultras" —supporters of hard-line Stalinism. The nationalists (including the Great Russian chauvinists) deserve some special treatment because they address

themselves to one specific aspect (albeit a very essential one) of the Soviet political system; once the issue of nationalism and national self-determination has been dealt with, the nationalists disintegrate as an identifiable category of political dissenters and disperse across the board of political dissent. In other words nationalism as an issue in political opposition in the Soviet Union cuts across the other dominant issues concerning the organisation of the political system and economic management: there are Marxist, socialist, liberal, religious and reactionary nationalists. The Stalinists may claim some attention as a psychologically and politically interesting phenomenon, but they are totally unimportant numerically (see p. 201).

This leaves us with the question of how to deal with the residual group of political dissenters, those authors which cannot be categorized as Marxists-Leninists, socialists, nationalists or Stalinists. The first thing that can be said about this group is that it is more numerous than all the other groups taken together. This in itself might suggest the convenience of some further sub-division. A preliminary survey of the documents included in the residual group would show up a number of instances of religiously inspired political opposition. This would lead one to follow the categorization put forward by Amalrik in his well-known essay "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?", where he distinguishes between supporters of "genuine Marxism-Leninism", of a "Christian ideology" and of a "liberal ideology". (In this case the socialists, who have been described as an intermediate group, could be placed in the category of the liberals or of the Marxists-Leninists, or distributed among the three categories of Amalrik according to the dominant political themes in their ideology.)

However, a closer look at the religious element in political opposition in the Soviet Union will demonstrate (and this cannot be a great surprise to any politically literate Western observer) that religious (in fact Christian) convictions may lead to considerably diverse political views. Religious inspiration does not appear to be a suitable criterion therefore in further distinguishing currents among the political opposition of the Soviet Union.

The difficulty in finding such criteria prompts the question: Would it be the case that the residual group (i.e. the political opposition minus Marxists-Leninists, socialists, nationalists and Stalinists) presents a comparatively homogenous collection of persons and, if so, what is the common element? The answer, in a way, is already implied in the previous definition of the Marxists-Leninists and socialists as oppositional groups. The residual oppositional group rejects Marxism-Leninism and does not regard itself as socialist. It concurs, not unexpectedly, with the Marxist-Leninist and socialist opposition in their criticism of the monopolistic power position of the bureaucratic elite and in their advocacy of civil rights and

democratic procedures; it also concurs with the socialists in their criticism of the prevailing system of economic management. In both instances the criticism is taken further and made more comprehensive by the residual group. It seems therefore that this group is most suitably designated as "democrats". This name, because of its more general meaning, is preferred to "liberals" which presents itself as the only reasonable alternative. Another argument for the designation "democrats" is that an apparently important and central current in this residual group of the political opposition referred to itself as the Democratic Movement.

One should point out, however, that the name Democratic Movement is sometimes used to refer indiscriminately to the entire political opposition (including Marxists-Leninists) in so far as they advocate the introduction (or restoration) of democracy and civil rights. Also, the Democratic Movement and related circles have sometimes been attacked by more leftist dissenters for their "capitalist" or "liberal" views and in this context the critics have referred to the Movement as "neo-Kadet" (the Kadet Party were the constitutional democrats or liberals from before the Revolution) or "liberal" and denied it the right to call itself democrat. Nevertheless, for the reasons advanced above and for convenience's sake the name "democrats" will be used in this chapter to refer to the political opposition in the Soviet Union which cannot be classified as Marxist-Leninist, socialist or nationalist (or Stalinist).

The democrats in this sense, it has already been mentioned, are in the majority among the participants of the political opposition in the Soviet Union. It is not easy to evaluate this phenomenon properly. If one were to conclude that the democrats were the dominant group among the most intelligent and politically conscious section of the Soviet population one would lose sight of an important element of perspective. It is safe to presume that the urge for Soviet citizens to express their political views in *samizdat* or through similar channels is inversely related to their allegiance to, or their satisfaction with, the dominant official political ideology. This would mean that no matter what the absolute numerical strength of the political opposition is, one can always expect a relative preponderance of the more extreme and fundamental criticism of the regime. Indeed, some of the democrats make the point that their views are shared by only insignificant circles from among the Soviet intelligentsia.

On the other hand it would be too facile to discard the comparatively large number of oppositional documents of democrat origin as altogether irrelevant. This view is supported by statements from circles which are not entirely well disposed towards the democratic movement. Medvedev, for instance, who must undoubtedly be regarded as a loyal Marxist-Leninist, writing on this subject, refers to "westernizers" (*zapadniki*), but

it is obvious that this category is approximately identical with "democrats".

> "Among the many ideological currents outside the Party the westernizing one is most important and, in so far as one is able to analyze its growth rate, it is growing fast.
>
> There are many reasons for this fast increase. First, there are more people all the time who turn away from dogmatism, bureaucratism and conservatism in their Stalinist, but also more moderate, forms. The hostility of our intelligentsia against bureaucratic forms of socialism and against the distorted interpretation of Marxism-Leninism will the easier turn itself into sympathy for westernizing trends [*zapadnichestvo*], as the propaganda exerts itself to prove that only bureaucratic socialism is truly scientific socialism. This is also maintained by Western propaganda.
>
> Furthermore, the Soviet intelligentsia has shown itself to be greatly impressed by the enormous scientific and technological advances made during recent years in Western countries." [1]

For Medvedev the views of the westernizers or democrats appear as gross distortions and exaggerations. The outside observer, however, cannot escape the impression that the views of the democrats represent the natural continuation and consequence of the views of the Marxists-Leninists and the socialists. What is put forward partially and fragmentarily by the Marxist-Leninists or the socialists is often stated boldly and with greater consistency by the democrats. The same point can also be approached from the angle of individual biography, insteads of conceptual and logical consistency. From some of the democrats it is well documented, from others it is known, and from most of them it can be assumed, that they traversed in their individual development the various phases of loyal adherent of the official ideology, heterodox Marxist-Leninist and socialist, to reach their present position of supporter of the ideals of democracy and civil rights, ideals which perhaps have never taken root in the reality of Russian political life but which on the other hand cannot be said to be altogether alien to Russian public opinion and political culture. If there is some validity in these considerations then the numerical preponderance of documents written by democrats in the entire fund of political *samizdat* may not be purely a matter of perspective as explained earlier. The larger number of documents of democrat origin may then also be attributed to a collective process of development of ideas and personalities. In the light of the data available one may advance the hypothesis that Soviet citizens who are independent and politically conscious thinkers have a good chance of ending up, after some period of time, in the camp of the democrats. If this is true, then not only the greater number of documents

of democrat origin is explained (although this explanation does not exclude the operation of other causes), but also the socialists *and* the Marxists-Leninists acquire the position of intermediate groups, composed of an ever-changing population of political migrants and transients. Heterodox Marxism-Leninism and, to a lesser degree probably, also socialism are then a kind of ideological limbo which former believers of the official ideology have to traverse before reaching the more or less permanent destination of the political creed of the democrats.

These considerations, together with the large enough number of documents by democrat authors, prompt and justify a short historical discussion of the evolution of political thought among the democrats. Among the Marxists-Leninists and the socialists the documents are too small in number and too isolated among themselves to allow such a treatment. If it is difficult to distinguish groups, factions and currents among the democrats, they and their documents can be presented in a more systematic manner by the introduction of the element of time. If one looks at documents of democrat provenance as they appear since 1966 one will observe how certain documents and sources have served as a kind of condensation point for further discussions. In this respect one might mention the so-called Sakharov Memorandum (Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom) which has become widely known in the Soviet Union and (although it has been classified as "socialist" in the previous chapter) has provided an important starting-point for political discussions in democrat circles, not in the least because Sakharov has subsequently modified his views and has been drawn closer to the mainstream of democrat political thought. Another, very different, but no less central role in the development of the thinking of the political opposition has been played by the "Chronicle of Current Events". For an extensive and penetrating analysis of this role the reader may be referred to Reddaway's introduction to his edition of the first eleven issues of Chronicle (see also p. 47). Suffice it to say that the Chronicle has by and large abstained from enunciating an articulate political creed of its own, restricting itself to a general allegiance to the cause of human rights and in particular the right to freedom of opinion and information. This has permitted the Chronicle to function as the main clearing-house for information concerning the fates of individual dissenters, but also for information concerning the development of the *samizdat* press and for political discussions which otherwise might not have reached the vast audience commanded by the Chronicle. In this way the Chronicle has been of inestimable value in providing unity and coherence to the political opposition. The Chronicle, one might say, broke the enchanted circle which until then had condemned every Soviet dissident to be a voice crying in the desert.

A more recent and powerful cohesive factor in the democrat current of the Soviet opposition has been the emergence of the Democratic Movement, this time not as a name given by outsiders to an amorphous socio-political trend, but as a consciously assumed designation of a more or less institutionalized oppositional centre.

In the following section the historical evolution of the political thought of the democrats will be traced in some more detail. Further sections will, in accordance with the pattern followed in the chapters on the Marxists-Leninists and the socialists, deal with the principal themes in the political ideology of the democrats, their ideas about the future of the society and the political system of the Soviet Union and the strategies and tactics to be applied in this respect, and with a survey of the most important documents and their authors.

A final introductory observation should be that the borderline between views classified as socialist and views held by democrats is of necessity unclear. Some of the authors ranked among the democrats (e.g. Talantov) display a sympathetic attitude towards socialism and, more generally, it can be said that the majority of the democrats are in favour of some form of mixed economic management—some of the sectors of the economy being in private hands, others in the hands of collectivities or the state. (To this one might object that the economic systems of America and in particular Western Europe are not normally considered socialist, although public utilities, public transport and a considerable number of other vitally important branches of the economy are in the hands of the state. This, however, is apparently not very well known in the Soviet Union—Sakharov being a notable exception—and even oppositional authors seem to be inclined to regard such phenomena as typically socialist.) As the retention of state control over some of the sectors of the economy (in particular heavy industry and public utilities) is favoured by most of the democrats and such a thing is considered "socialist" by them, it follows that their attitude towards socialism has to be at least partially positive. On the other side of the line, in the camp of the socialists, there are those who display a bitterly anti-regime attitude and who strongly reject the official Marxist ideology, but who still declare themselves to be adherents of socialism (Zorin and Alekseev being the most obvious examples of this political type). The wavering of the borderline between socialists and democrats is perhaps best illustrated by the personality and views of Sakharov who, in different periods of his life, can be regarded as a socialist and as a non-socialist democrat.

The unfolding of a political discussion

Surveying the available political literature in *samizdat* one easily observes its intimate connection with the development of the general movement of political, national and religious protest in the Soviet Union after the initiation of the de-Stalinization campaign in 1956. In all respects the trial of Siniavskii and Daniel in February 1966 is the starting-point of a *continuous process* of opposition, protest and dissent. There are oppositional political essays from before 1966, just as there are dissident literary works (Dr. Zhivago, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich) from that period, but they are like lone rocks in the ocean. After 1966 one can see patterns and trends; the rocks become strings of islands, whole archipelagos.

The first important document of which the authors can be ranged among the democrats is the Statutes of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (ASCULP).[2] The Statutes were probably drafted in 1964 or 1965. Not only do they reject totally the Soviet system and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, but they also offer a comprehensive alternative in advocating the christianizing of culture and the political and economic system. The lack of realism and the occasional immaturity and extremism of the ASCULP Statutes, caused no doubt by the spiritual isolation of its drafters, is representative of an earlier generation of political essays. Political activities, whether in the form of oppositional writings of or organizations, were of a strongly isolated character before 1966. They usually became known only after the participants had been arrested; they flared up and were extinguished without any apparent result. They seem to be unconnected with preceding and subsequent instances of political dissent. The ASCULP case is typical in this respect, but it may also be regarded as a suitable starting-point for a review of "democrat" opposition because, although it originated and was conceived in isolation, it did play a role in later political discussions and has unquestionably been a significant factor in shaping the political ideology of the democrats.

Another document which is characteristic of the somewhat amorphous state of political awareness in the early 'sixties is a long "Message from the USSR to the West", written by a certain "X" (*Iks*) and published in 1965 in *Novyi Zhurnal* (A Russian literary review appearing in the USA).[3] *Iks* describes in detail the extremely repressive character of the Soviet political system as it is experienced by the ordinary citizen and paints a shocking picture of the permanent state of catastrophe which seems to prevail in the industry of, and trade in, consumer goods, but he comes nowhere near the formulation of political alternatives.

In the "Message of the USSR to the West" an additional element is

added by the author who stresses that the communists have not only destroyed, but in fact perverted the traditional Christian values.

The year 1966 brings not only the Siniavskii-Daniel trial, but also the real beginning of a consistent stream (a trickle at first) of democrat political writings. Of course this is no coincidence. It is by now well established from various sources, including information supplied by *samizdat* authors, that the post-Stalin thaw at first primarily affected the cultural scene (and of course the penitentiary system as the most oppressive aspect of Stalinist terror). While both the intelligentsia and the regime were trying to find their way among, and come to terms with, the newly created conditions of some limited cultural freedom, rigid control of all political activities was maintained by the authorities as before, and the reaction of the intelligentsia (being occupied in experimenting with its new cultural possibilities) was one of political apathy and indifferentism. It was only after some time, when both regime and intelligentsia became aware of the relationship between cultural and political freedom and when consequently the limits of cultural freedom became more visible and more confined, that there was a revival of political interest and a shift towards political opposition. The punishing of Siniavskii and Daniel was therefore not a casual occurrence which unexpectedly ignited a chain-process of political protest, but the result of the regime's decision that enough was enough and a conscious attempt on its part to inaugurate a partial return to Stalinism. It would seem now, however, in retrospect, that the regime's reaction was too late and that, instead of stemming the rising tide of political discontent, it mainly hastened and stimulated the awakening and maturing of opopsitional political thought. This view is abundantly confirmed and documented by the *samizdat* literature of subsequent years. Before 1966 the cold engine of political protest spluttered occasionally, but in 1966 it came to life and it has kept on running ever since.

In another, closely related, way 1966 was also a turning-point. From that time on the "democrat" mainstream of political dissent displays an increasing degree of coherence. Its authors look at themselves more and more as participants in a movement. In the beginning, of course, there is a preponderance of comprehensive expositions of political ideologies elaborated in isolation by individual authors. But even in these cases there is still an awareness of contributing to a discussion and an intellectual process. Some of the principal examples of such contributions are the essays bij Zniakov (A Notebook)[4] and Talantov (Soviet Society)[5] of 1966 and 1968 respectively, and also by Ruslanov (Youth in Russian History)[6], Smirnov (The Individual and Society)[7] and Altaev (The Dual Consciousness of the Intelligentsia and Pseudo-Culture)[8], all of 1969. In a sense Sakharov's "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" (1968; discussed in the previous chapter) and Amalrik's "Will the Soviet

Union Survive Until 1984?" (April-June 1969) may also be included in this category.

The shift in emphasis from culture to politics, and the emergence of a political debate, were neatly demonstrated by a series of short articles dating from 1966 and published in the émigré journal *Posev*.[9] The series is the result of a debate among Moscow University students on the question of whether an (underground) literary-cultural or a political journal was at that moment required.

A sharp increase in politically motivated *samizdat* documents could be observed in the beginning of 1968. This increase was demonstrably connected with the trial of Ginzburg and Galanskov. The beginning of a continuous protest movement can be traced to the Siniavskii-Daniel trial; with the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial the movement widened its scope, gained momentum, and hit a pace which it would maintain for several years. In April 1968 the first issue of the Chronicle of Current Events appeared. Until October 1972 the 27 issues of the Chronicle would continue to appear more or less regularly every two months. The Chronicle has played a remarkable and unique role in the political debate in the Soviet Union by refraining to a very large extent from taking part in the debate itself and instead serving as a source of factual information and, even more importantly, by supplying summaries of available *samizdat* literature and thereby facilitating and stimulating the debate.

In June 1968 Sakharov published his essay on "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" (discussed as a "socialist" document in the previous chapter). Apart from its international significance, Sakharov's essay is a landmark in the shaping of the democrat political creed in the Soviet Union itself. It has apparently become very widely known inside the USSR and has influenced all future major contributions to the discussion among the political opposition. Among the most important reactions sparked off by Sakharov's essay was the statement "To Hope or to Act?", issued later on in 1968 by "numerous representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonian SSR".[10] Other major political writings which referred to and discussed Sakharov's views include Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?"[11], Medvedev's book "On Socialist Democracy", various publications emanating from the Democratic Movement of the USSR and others. Subsequent statements by Sakharov (e.g. a Memorandum to Brezhnev of March 5, 1971, a postscript to this Memorandum dated July 1972[12], and an interview with Mr. Jay Axelbank of *Newsweek*) tended to show that his position has shifted closer to the mainstream of the democrat opposition.

Amalrik's "1984" represented a highly enlightened and penetrating analysis of the external and internal political situation of the Soviet Union, but it did not seem to occupy such a central and authoritative place in

oppositional opinion in the Soviet Union as Sakharov's essay. This may perhaps be explained by Amalrik's predominantly pessimistic outlook and the audacity and apparent unpopularity of some of his views, criticized by, among other people, Piotr Iakir in an open letter published in the Chronicle (No. 13).[14]

The intellectual and political process which started after the trial of Siniavskii and Daniel in 1966 and which had already been referred to loosely as the "democratic movement" by various authors (e.g. Amalrik) reached a new stage with the appearance of the Democratic Movement in October 1969, when the Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union was published.[15] The origins of, and the people behind, the Programme and the Movement are not precisely known. After its Programme the Democratic Movement published a short document entitled "Basic Tactics" in the first half of 1970[16] and addressed a Memorandum to the USSR Supreme Soviet (dated December 5, 1970)[17], containing a restatement of the main points of the Programme. In the following years a journal named *Demokrat* and subtitled "organ of the democratic forces" was circulated in *samizdat*; to date two issues have reached the West, No. 5 (autumn 1971) and an issue from the beginning of 1972 (probably No. 6)[18]. Another *samizdat* journal, "Free Thought" (*Svobodnaia mysl'*), dated December 20, 1971, appeared under the imprint of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union.[19] The various statements made by the Movement, the Programme in particular, have elicited widespread reactions in the *samizdat* press. The more Marxist inclined among the opposition frequently reproached the Democratic Movement its "liberal" or "neo-Kadet" orientation. Others (notably the Chronicle) criticize the Movement for its lack of political realism; it must indeed be conceded that the Programme provided a detailed outline for a desirable political structure of the Soviet Union, but failed to indicate how its political plans could be realized. The Programme was signed by "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic Area", but has nevertheless been accused by Ukrainian critics of "Great-Russian chauvinism".

It is undeniable that, notwithstanding the criticism levelled against it from various sides, the Democratic Movement occupied a central place in the political debate among Soviet dissidents. This position was strengthened by the Movement's practice of making available space in its publications for its critics. The standing of the Movement was illustrated by the fact that several authors of *samizdat* essays expressly testified to their allegiance to the Movement by signing themselves as "democrat".

The basic merit of the Democratic Movement was that it creatively summarized in a comprehensive political vision the manifold suggestions and desiderata formulated in numerous previous *samizdat* documents. This creative act, one might say, was symbolized by the assumption of the

name "Democratic Movement"; many *samizdat* authors had written about the emergence of a democratic movement in the Soviet Union, until at last certain persons rose up and proclaimed "we are the Democratic Movement".

On the other hand, the Democratic Movement was not an organization consisting of a specific number of formal members, possessing a high degree of organizational coherence. This was made quite explicit in point 5 of the Basic Tactics:

> "Every independently organized group of democrats, not connected with the general movement, [but] fighting for the realization of the Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, has the right to consider itself a participant of the general movement."

The lack of organizational coordination flowing from this principle has effectively protected adherents of the movement against KGB repression, but has hampered at the same time the manoeuvrability and efficiency of the movement as a whole. This latter aspect is illustrated by the almost simultaneous publication of two journals (*Demokrat* and "Free Thought"), each purporting to be the official organ of the movement.

Official Soviet channels have at one time attempted to spread the rumour that the Programme of the Democratic Movement together with the Basic Tactics were a hoax, produced by Russian émigré circles and smuggled into the Soviet Union. The author of the Programme was said to be a certain Garanin, connected with the NTS (the most active Russian émigré organization). The source of this rumour is a TASS release about the trial of Iakir and Krasin, from 28 August 1973. This rumour (or another version, according to which the Programme would have been a fabrication of the KGB itself) has occasionally been given credit by members of the Soviet dissident movement in private conversations.

Both versions, however, must be regarded as improbable. It would stretch credulity to far to assume that the KGB would go to the trouble of preparing an anti-Soviet political essay of the length of the Programme and distributing this in *samizdat* form. The TASS version is contained only in the press release (and in newspaper reports based on it; e.g. *Izvestiia* of August 30, 1973) of the Iakir-Krasin trial; official Soviet publications have not returned to it afterwards. Also *samizdat* literature provided no corroboration; in fact the only worthwhile report of the trial would rather point in the opposite direction. The trial was almost completely *in camera*, but Levitin-Krasnov, who had been called as a witness, has written a seven-page verbatim report from memory (AS 1492) of the part of the trial he was able to attend. This report indicated that Iakir and Krasin had no NTS connections whatsoever and in fact displayed a highly

hostile attitude towards this organization. The accusation of NTS links had been quite common in trials of dissidents and since it was Iakir who is supposed to have stated that the Programme of the Democratic Movement was an NTS fabrication[20], the most likely solution of the riddle concerning the origin of the rumour is that it was made up by Iakir in an attempt to remove himself as far as possible from both the NTS and the Democratic Movement. Apparently, the accusation of connections with the NTS and with the Democratic Movement was thrown in for good measure, together with charges of participation in the so-called Initiative Group for Human Rights (which were correct and also well-documented in *samizdat* reports) and in the Chronicle of Current Events (which were only partly true; cf. p. 50) and of contacts with foreign human rights activists (which were also true).

The suspicions of connections between the NTS and the Democratic Movement were not only unproven; they lacked any serious grounds. There were important programmatic differences between the NTS and the Democratic Movement and the NTS and NTS-oriented publications in the West have not devoted any special attention to the Democratic Movement (such as they have to underground publications from the Soviet Union which expressed ideas close to those of the NTS). Furthermore, the appearance of the Memorandum of the Democrats (dated 5 December 1970) and of several issues of the journal *Demokrat*, documents which explicitly related themselves to the Programme, made the entire hypothesis of the fabrication of the Programme untenable. Finally, the authenticity of the Programme was obliquely confirmed by a number of *samizdat* documents which criticized or supported certain points of the Programme (and thereby implied that they accepted it as a genuine *samizdat* publication). (In this context it may be interesting to add that a statement issued by the Democratic Movement and included in No. 6 of *Demokrat* rejected accusations made in *samizdat* sources that the Programme had been put together by Russian nationalists, and contrary accusations that the Programme had been written exclusively by non-Russians.)

With the appearance of the Democratic Movement the political opposition in the Soviet Union reached a new level of maturity. Its initial period (as has been explained before) was marked by the predominance of individual and comparatively isolated studies of the political situation of Soviet society; these studies, in an effort to explain this situation, were of necessity strongly retrospective. With the growth of the number and the extent of dissemination of *samizdat* documents, a real political debate began to be observable. After some time, as a result of this debate, more or less clearly defined political views took shape. The mainstream of political opposition seemed to belong to the democrats of various hues, while the Marxist-Leninists and socialists could be regarded as intermediate

groups between the democrats and the carriers of the official political ideology (the bureaucratic elite). The religious element in the views of the Democratic Movement was clearly noticeable and for a considerable section of the democrats it could even be said that their political ideas were religiously inspired. Another identifiable current among the democrats was formed by the nationalists, because for them the issue of national freedom to some extent overshadowed all others. (As has been pointed out before, there were also Marxist-Leninist and socialist nationalists.)

By 1972 the position of the opposition in the Soviet Union seemed to be that the analysis of the past and present of the country's political structure had resulted in the crystallization of several comprehensive political visions. The next logical step would be to concentrate on elaborating practical policies for realizing these visions, and to reach maximum agreement among the various oppositional currents on measures for implementing such policies. There were indeed indications that such talks were beginning to be under way; however, these developments proved largely abortive as a result of the new wave of repressions. The period following is discussed separately in Chapter 6: Confrontation and Repression.

The democrats' evaluation of the political system of the Soviet Union

The comparative smallness of the number of Marxist-Leninist and socialist documents imposed an approach which to a large extent disregarded the time element. The Marxist-Leninist and socialist appreciation of the political situation in the Soviet Union has therefore been described without reference to any historical evolution in the views of the adherents of these political creeds. This approach is unnecessary and even undesirable in studying comparable views held by the democrats, because (as has been explained in the preceding section) the time element is a most significant factor in classifying their political views. For this reason the most convenient way of presenting these views is to summarize the discussions among the democrats according to the main themes developed, leading up to the publication of the Programme of the Democratic Movement in October 1969. From that moment on the discussions were centred around the Programme's analysis of the political system of the Soviet Union. The present section consequently falls into two main portions, the first one (analogous to the parallel sections in the preceding chapters on the Marxist-Leninists and the socialists) devoted to an analysis of the main common themes developed by democrat authors (before October 1969), the second one dealing with the political ideology enunciated by the

Democratic Movement and the criticism to which this ideology has been subject.

The debate preceding the appearance of the Democratic Programme

An inventory of the pre-Programme writings of democrat authors shows the predominance of certain groups of themes. Most central among these and most extensively discussed is the socio-political evaluation of present-day Soviet society and political structure. Many authors, however, try to achieve a deeper understanding of this society by penetrating into its moral and ethical preconceptions. Others pay special attention to the economic consequences of the political system and the official ideology. Finally, there is considerable interest among the democrats in the international position of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the socio-political evaluation of the present, the moral-religious issue, the economic aspect and the international dimension are closely interwoven.

Socio-political evaluation of the present

Among the Democrats there is, understandably, little of the soul-searching about the past, so characteristic of the Marxists-Leninists. The democrats, defined by their broad rejection of the political elite and its official ideology, are not forced to go back to the Revolution and painfully retrace the steps of Soviet society in order to find out where revolutionary innocence and purity were lost, and why. Even such an historically oriented author as Andrei Amalrik, himself an historian, mentions the October Revolution only in passing. The only democrat author offering an explicit theory concerning the Revolution is Ruslanov in his work "Youth in Russian History". The October Revolution, according to Ruslanov, was fed by two currents, to some extent running against each other: one, internationalist, "communist" and alien to Russian tradition; the other, nationalist, "bolshevik", populist and rooted in Russian history and culture. The second current soon prevailed and Ruslanov regards the communist regime established by the October Revolution as the victorious representative of ancient and despotic Muscovy against the modernizing and internationalist attitude of St. Petersburg. For him the epitome of the ideas of the Russian community and of serfdom, reduced *ad absurdum*, is the *kolkhoz*.

> "... Soviet Russia accepted the inheritance of Moscovian Russia and therefore its people have much more in common in their spiritual attitudes and their historical traditions with the Russia of Ancient Moscow than with Petrine Russia, because, as we stated before, October was not a revolution but a reaction (like Pugachev's rising), attempting to turn Russia back to a pre-Petrine situation."

The general attitude of the democrats vis-à-vis the October Revolution is on the whole free from the emotional attachment displayed by other groups; they regard it as just another historical event. Their judgment is perhaps best summarized in a statement by Talantov: "... the October Revolution, in final analysis, replaced one ruling class by another, more brutal and power-hungry."[21]

A similar standpoint is occupied by the democrats in their appreciation of Marxist ideology (of which a particular evaluation of the October Revolution is of course a part). Marxism-Leninism is rejected by them, but again usually only in passing or implicitly. There are no declarations of allegiance or sympathy for Marxism-Leninism among the writings of the democrats, but rather than contending with a hostile ideology, the available documents tend to suggest that it is simply regarded as irrelevant to Russia's present problems. Already in the 1966 controversy over the preferability of a literary review or a political journal, one of the participants in the debate remarked: "... in recent times oppositional Marxist-Leninist ideas are more and more losing their popularity ..."[22]; the underground issue of *Posev* No. 1 which appeared in Moscow in the same year declared: "... the people of Mendeleev and Lobachevskii can themselves put their household on its feet, without the moss-covered theories of Marxes and Engelses ..."[23]

The personal role and personality of Lenin, so crucial in any evaluation of the October Revolution and the Soviet regime, receives the same casual treatment. There is none of the love for Lenin as professed by even oppositional Marxists-Leninists, nor the sympathy still displayed by the socialists, but neither is the holy name of Ilich under serious attack. There is some criticism of the veritable Lenin cult in which the official media indulged after the posthumous fall of Stalin and some of the uncensored literary works (notably by Siniavskii and Daniel) poke mild fun at Lenin, but generally speaking the democrats pay little attention to him and the cult of his name. This might also be caused in part by unwillingness or hesitation to offend popular feelings; the official veneration for Lenin has been communicated to the masses for quite a number of years now, with great intensity and incessantly. There can be little doubt that in the diffuse and confused political views of the average Soviet citizen Lenin represents an important point of security, stability and identification. If this is the case, one can, however, argue from the point of view of the democrats that Soviet society is even more in need of de-Leninization than of de-Stalinization. Such an awareness is occasionally displayed, for instance in

a letter from a Moscow correspondent (dating probably from 1968), who writes: "... that there is no freedom even inside the party,—for that nobody else should be blamed but Lenin and because of Lenin and 'his cause' which 'did not die' the appearance of a new Stalin is still possible today." [24]

Discussing the years following the de-Stalinization campaign, Ruslanov writes:

> "It became all the time more clear to thinking people that the Stalin cult had been generated by the system itself and that nothing else could have happened in [a situation of] uncontrolled dictatorship. Moreover, a totalitarian doctrine will also create a totalitarian system.
>
> However, in those years it was still difficult to reach a final conclusion. Most people were still wearing the blinkers of a Marxist philosophy which made them, admitting the ruinousness of the existing system, look for a solution in a return to 'Leninist norms'. The aura of Lenin was still brilliant for most Soviet intellectuals. Used to the cult of one person—Stalin—, people turned to another person—Lenin—in their struggle against Stalin. As is well-known, spiritual maximalism is very much a part of the Russian character." [25]

An interesting consequence of the democrats' total rejection of Stalin and Stalinism is the remarkable amount of attention accorded to Khrushchev, who is generally praised for having taken the first and decisive step in discrediting Stalin. On the other hand he is criticized for not carrying through the de-Stalinization campaign to its logical and desirable end, the complete demolition and destruction of the Stalinist system. Most of the democrat authors discussing Khrushchev's failure in this respect ascribe it to the moral and political duplicity of his position as a representative *par excellence* of the bureaucratic elite. Khrushchev's policies envisaged de-Stalinization only for the ruling class, but a Stalinist regime for the people.[26] On the other hand, the partial and ambiguous character assumed by the anti-Stalin campaign caused irreparable damage to the authority and trustworthiness of the new leaders. For the democrats the Khrushchev administration represented the last opportunity for the Soviet regime to find its way out of a general political, ideological and moral impasse, but with hindsight most democrats would admit that Khrushchev, being connected too closely himself with Stalinism and being too much dependent on the bureaucratic elite which was the basis of his political power, never had a chance.

Before 1969 the democrats' attitude towards socialism is quite inarticulate and among the authors regarded as democrats there is probably little awareness of being distinct from those categorized as socialists in this

work. For the Russian intelligentsia socialism is associated chiefly with social ownership of means of production, as opposed to private ownership under capitalism. Capitalism being almost synonymous with exploitation and imperialism ("the highest stage of capitalism" in the words of Lenin), socialism is almost automatically and unquestioningly accepted as something good and beneficial. This attitude is well illustrated by Talantov's efforts to reconcile his orthodox Christian viewpoints with an acceptance of socialism; "... a sensible socialist reconstruction of society", he argues, "is not necessarily connected with a materialist (atheist) world view. In Marxism socialist theory and materialism are artificially connected. Many eminent socialists were believers." [27] For proper balance one should add that Talantov's judgment of the Soviet system *qua* socialist experiment is negative: "The socialist reconstruction of the society leads only to the replacement of one ruling class by another."

Only after the publication of the Programme of the Democratic Movement with its moderately positive appreciation of capitalism is the verbal taboo protecting the term "socialism" broken and the democrats' criticism of socialism becomes more overt and explicit.

If the democrats pay less attention to the historical genesis of the present political system, their description of this system is not essentially different from those offered by the Marxist-Leninists and the socialists. Under the guise of the dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party has appropriated unlimited power and has become the ruling class in Soviet society.[28] The Party itself is organized along strictly hierarchical lines[29], which implies that the real power is in the hands of the top of the pyramid. The leading Party bureaucracy has assigned itself manifold political and economic privileges[30] and has in fact become an almost hereditary upper class.[31] According to Talantov, children of leading Party members will normally become Party members too and be given the opportunity to compete for prominent Party positions; at the same time membership of the Party elite is not lost, as a rule, through incompetence or poor performance but only through "bad" behaviour. This would justify the name of "hereditary class". The privileged position of the bureaucracy is shored up socio-politically by the *nomenklatura* system: any position of some importance in Soviet society can be filled only after approval of the candidate by competent Party authorities; economically the position of the elite is guaranteed by the exclusive control over all state and social property, which the *nomenklatura* system attributes to it. This allows the democrats to describe the Soviet system as "supermonopolistic" [32] or "state-monopolistic" capitalism[33].

> "... the social system of the USSR may conditionally be defined as *supermonopolistic capitalism*. We regard it as capitalism only be-

cause it has retained private ownership of the means and instruments of production and (in close connection with this) the private character of the appropriation of the products of public labour. The circumstance that private property in this case belongs to a single centre, which holds in its hands the fullness of economic and political power (and this is what we call a supermonopoly) does in fact make this system much more similar to ancient oriental despotism (which was also some kind of supermonopoly) than to capitalism in the classic (Marxist) sense of the word." (Zniakov)

The present political system is seen essentially as a continuation of the Stalinist order, only without some of the worst excesses. In the Estonian reply to Sakharov ("To hope or to act?") it is stressed that the social and psychological climate which permitted the rise of Stalin has not changed very much and that there are no institutional obstacles in the socio-political system which would prevent the emergence of a new Stalin.

> "The following should be stressed here: do we not accuse the demoniacal personality and his faithful 'cadres' of too much! Society itself as a whole is directly responsible for these occurrences! Was it not this society which provoked all the excesses of the personality cult by its inertia, its indifference, its slavishness, its ignorance and, ultimately, by its plain cruelty? There can be no idols without idolaters. And, what is more, if a new 'Stalin' were to appear, everything would be repeated right from the beginning. We have both the moral-psychological make-up and the immediate social basis for this."[34]

Although this view appears to be shared by many democrats, a point made by Ruslanov would somewhat modify the position. Ruslanov, it seems, would not deny the possibility of a return to full Stalinism, but he argues that the present situation of partial de-Stalinization is intrinsically unstable. He adduces three reasons for this argument: the existence of a very large contingent of former political prisoners in the USSR, the need to follow a different foreign policy; and the break-up of the former unity among communist states.

In discussing the internal political situation of the country, the democrats pay much attention to the importance of class factors. Perhaps the most powerful and decisive divide in the psychology of the Soviet opposition is between the people, the masses of the population, the *narod* and all other groups—the political elite, the intelligentsia, the specialists, etc. This divide which was strongly and often painfully felt in the nineteenth century, where it was the dominant theme in Russian social history, appears to have survived intact the turmoil and upheavals of more than fifty years

of communist rule. It would be difficult to point to one oppositional author who would not consider himself a member of the intelligentsia and look upon the *narod* as something outside himself. The general attitude of democrat authors with regard to the popular masses is at least one of guarded reticence and often also of annoyance and non-comprehension even down to despisal. The workers are not interested in anything but their own material well-being, declares one correspondent.[35] Our people are extremely naive and ignorant in all philosophical, ideological and political questions, writes another.[36] One of the most penetrating analyses is offered by Amalrik who believes that the population, robbed of its faith and its former religious and spiritual values and brutalized by a long period of tyranny and extreme hardship, has become coarse and shallow. He forecasts that if the breakdown of the present regime were to unleash the amorphous forces of popular dissatisfaction, the horrors of the October Revolution and the Civil War would look like idyllic pictures.[37] His pessimism about the possible role and potentialities of the popular masses is evidently shared by many democrats. These apprehensions have even led some authors to exclaim that the entire oppositional movement is just a playtoy of the intelligentsia in which the population at large is not interested and has no stake.[38]

There are indications, however, that the spiritual dichotomy between *narod* and intelligentsia as it is experienced by the latter (and possibly by the former as well), strong as it still may be, is gradually being overcome. One could point to several factors which might facilitate such a process. The political opposition has many natural connections with other oppositional currents, in particular of nationalist and religious character, which command a much broader popular base. The political opposition is itself aware of the necessity to establish contacts with other layers of the population. There is some modest working class element among the active opposition (Amalrik mentions the number of 6%). Occasionally, talented persons of working class background may be maneuvered by circumstances in such a situation that the contradictions and fallacies of the Soviet political system become manifest to them. The most conspicuous representative of this group is Anatolii Marchenko, a young construction worker sent to a labour camp on the flimsiest grounds for an insignificant offence, who escaped from the camp and was arrested in an attempt to cross the Iranian border. For this he received a six year sentence, the attempt to cross the border being considered as treason. Although his political education consisted largely of reading the collected works of Lenin (the only work in this field available in the camp library), augmented by political talks of prison officers, his autobiographical "My Testimony" is an incisive indictment of the Soviet penitentiary system and indeed of the entire political system.[39]

The most potent single factor in overcoming the (to some extent self-imposed) spiritual isolation of the intelligentsia is probably the emergence of a new intermediate class, which could serve as a connecting link and a transmission belt between the *narod* and the intelligentsia. Zniakov believes that the backbone of such a class is formed by higher personnel in industry, business and agriculture.

> "A certain section of the ruling class, by its, of course purely potential, relative independence from the supermonopoly, moves closer to the intelligent upper stratum of the exploited class of producers (particularly to its top layer) and this creates the objective conditions for a possible formation in our society, on the basis of these two groups, of a new class which may be described as a middle class.
>
> . . .
>
> "In a situation of an inevitable and ever-growing aggravation of the economic contradictions within the system of supermonopolistic capitalism, the middle class will gradually become conscious of its objective aspirations and interests and will more and more transform itself from a class 'in itself' into a class 'for itself'." [40]

In the 1966 discussion concerning the establishment of a political journal or a literary review one of the chief themes of the debate was the political interest and possible political and social role of the "technical intelligentsia".[41] The Estonian reply to Sakharov ("To Hope or to Act?", AS 70) was signed significantly by "numerous representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonian SSR". What is intriguing about this document is that the authors designate themselves as technical intelligentsia *and* that it is bitterly anti-Soviet. However, there are few other indications which would lead to the belief that the technical intelligentsia is to a large extent not only disaffected but also of a positively anti-Soviet disposition. Among the known active opponents of the regime representatives of the pure intelligentsia (writers, university and school teachers, artists, etc.) predominate; there are smaller numbers of others who could be regarded as members of the technical intelligentsia, but often enough they turn out to be *intelligenty* in disguise (typically: the kolkhoz chairman Iakhimovich is a language teacher by training).

Whatever the exact contours of the technical intelligentsia as a class and whatever its political mood may be, there is a growing understanding among the democrats that this class is both their natural ally and their only reliable link with the masses of the population. On the other hand the technical intelligentsia (which would also embrace elements from the lower echelons of the Party bureaucracy) is also being exposed to enticements offered by the Party itself. Of course the Party continues to recruit

its new personnel from the young generation in its own ranks and from the technical intelligentsia; among the latter group there will always be persons who are willing to transfer their loyalty to the Party in exchange for a position of great power and privilege. But even apart from this relatively small category the entire technical intelligentsia is continually being bribed by the Party into providing a modicum of support, because the technical intelligentsia is itself in a privileged position in relation to the general population and because the position of an individual within the technical intelligentsia is not only related to his technical performance but also to his political loyalty and activities. This aspect of the position of the new middle class is most extensively discussed in Zniakov's "Note-Book".

Most of the writings of the democrats demonstrate an intense feeling of political crisis; this feeling is occasionally accompanied by a somewhat sanguine appraisal of the political strength of the democrats themselves. Chistov, one of the participants in the *Posev* discussion, writes: "The oppositional mood, in one way or another, has now [1966] become almost universal. Everybody is in the opposition, from the professor to the worker." [42] And somewhat further in the same latter he states that Marxist-Leninist ideas have lost their popularity and have been replaced by anti-communist ideas.

Certainly Chistov's image of a democratic opposition supported by the majority of the Soviet population is grossly exaggerated and not shared by most other democrats. The political crisis, however, is very real to many democrats. The principal elements of this crisis, as identified by democrat sources, are: the loss of dynamism and initiative on the part of the regime —the political leadership is often described as utterly conservative and unimaginative; the concomitant ideological alienation of very extensive sectors of the population; the endemic economic crisis, in particular in agriculture and the production of consumer goods, which the regime seems to be unable to solve; the political instability and uncertainty caused by the present power configuration—nobody can forecast whether the Soviet Union in ten years time will still be ruled by roughly the same set of people, will have returned to some kind of neo-Stalinist dictatorship, will have changed into a military dictatorship, or will exist at all as a unitary state. This theme is discussed at length in Amalrik's celebrated "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?"; in various ways the same points were made in the essays of Ruslanov and Zniakov and in the statement from the Estonian technical intelligentsia. In one sense or another the idea of a general crisis forms the psychological background of almost all democrat writings, because it is the awareness of this crisis which prompts the authors to speak out and concern themselves with it. It is also this awareness which naturally leads them to a consideration of the possible deeper roots of this crisis.

The moral-religious issue

The object of this small section is not to provide a thumb-nail sketch of the moral and religious foundations of the Russian revolution and the social and political system inaugurated by it, but rather to register and document summarily an important aspect of the political thought of the democrat opposition. The importance of this aspect has perhaps been somewhat overlooked; overtly religious themes struck by *samizdat* authors quite naturally tend to attract the special interest of church circles and religious writers in the West and this may lead other students of dissent in the Soviet Union to direct their attention to other questions. More specifically, Amalrik's "1984" distinguished three main ideological currents among the opposition, tentatively designated as "genuine Marxism-Leninism", "Russian Christianity" and "liberalism". Amalrik's treatment of the matter (in particular his identification of the Christian ideology with the world of Russian orthodoxy and the fact that the only example of an adherent of the "Christian political ideology" which he gave was Ogurtsov, the leader of ASCULP), whether intended or not, created the impression that the "Christian political ideology" was a somewhat marginal and peripheral phenomenon and the average Western reader will be inclined to side consciously or unconsciously with the liberal political ideology (if he is not a Marxist himself).

However, an unprejudiced survey of the available documents would show that the situation is different and more complicated. The majority of sources which can be regarded as "democrat" and which discuss the political situation in the Soviet Union in some breadth touch upon the religious dimension of this situation and express themselves favourably with regard to religion, albeit often in a very general sense without specific reference to the orthodox church. Of course in any discussion of matters religious by Russian authors the Russian orthodox church looms large and some democrat authors derive their political inspiration to a large extent from traditional orthodox spirituality and are closely linked emotionally to specifically Russian types of Christian thinking. This strain is indeed quite conspicuous in the ASCULP circles, who regard the famous orthodox philosophers from the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of this century, people like Soloviev, Berdiaev and Khomiakov, as their spiritual ancestors. An author like Altaev can, with some reservations, be placed in the same category; indeed the entire school of thought which takes its inspiration from these philosophers is dominant in the Messenger of the Russian Christian Student Movement (*Vestnik RSKhD*), the Paris-based journal which published Altaev's essay.

By the majority of democrat authors the moral-religious question is discussed in a more general way. The gist of the argument is usually that

the communist regime has destroyed the traditional Christian values as the dominant value system of the society, without essentially providing a viable alternative (Amalrik, the Estonian statement, *Iks*, the ASCULP report).

> "In this way I detest communism much more than any other form of dictatorship. Why? Because the communists have taken the purest, the holiest ideals of humanity and made a mockery of them. Concepts such as freedom, brotherhood, peace, happiness, always provided a sanctuary, a religion and hope for mankind. And look what the communists did, they took these concepts and turned them into dung.
>
> What does the typical Soviet communist of our time look like? He is a heavy or even fat civil servant who calls himself 'chosen by the people' and almost every day he gets himself up on all kinds of platforms and rostrums in order to speak from there about peace, brotherhood, friendship, freedom, truth, selflessness and self-denial. He receives a big financial reward for these speeches and for that money, as soon as he gets down from the rostrum, he starts his work which is entirely directed towards the preparation of war, the destruction of friendship and brotherhood among the nations, the mocking of conscience and truth, and repulsive money-grubbing and selfishness." (*Iks*, AS 537)

This development has resulted in a moral vacuum, aggravated by the intense atomization of Soviet society brought about mainly by Stalinist terror. The vacuum has at first been filled by moral nihilism and crass materialism. In the slightly more relaxed climate after 1956 (Khrushchev's secret speech on the personality cult) these feelings could manifest themselves in their most favourable form as political apathy and cultural individualism and the latter feelings provided the principal components of the cultural revival (Amalrik refers to the "cultural opposition") of the 'fifties and early 'sixties. But cultural opposition in combination with political apathy and moral indifference is obviously not a very stable or logically consistent frame of mind and a new spiritual climate was soon breaking through. Many democrat authors are almost passionately concerned with "the creation of new moral values"; most of them seem to be of the opinion that the unmasking of Marxism-Leninism as a pseudo-religious faith necessitates the construction or discovery of something else to believe in. The anonymous critic who is our chief source for the history and programme of the ASCULP takes this organization to task precisely for its failure to elaborate a sufficiently powerful alternative for Marxism-Leninism and the entire mood of the democrats in the period following the cultural opposition is summarized when he exclaims: "The negation of an idea is not itself an idea."[43]

It is in this context, and not so much as a reversal to Russian tradition, that the alternative of Christianity reappears. Some of the democrats observe this phenomenon and register it with a certain amount of approval or sympathy. One of the participants in the *Posev* debate (in 1966) remarks: "The interest in religion has enormously increased."[44] Even more detached is Amalrik's view. Others believe that a return to Christianity is the answer to the prevailing moral incertitude of the moment. This stand is taken by the underground issue of *Posev* No. 1 which circulated in Moscow in 1966, by Talantov, by Smirnov and possibly also by Galanskov. The most extreme example again of this tendency is the ASCULP Programme which advocates the Christianization of politics, culture and the economy.

The depth of this process of conversion is probably not easily overestimated. The author reporting on the ASCULP Programme informs us that almost all of the 29 members of the organization grew up in "orthodox" communist families.[45] The Russian émigré press has also published some quite remarkable histories of young communists turned Christians.[46] The most penetrating but by no means the most accessible treatment of the entire phenomenon by a *samizdat* author is probably Altaev's essay on "The Double Consciousness of the Intelligentsia and Pseudo-Culture"[47]. In this essay Altaev discusses the various blandishments to which the Russian intelligentsia has succumbed since 1909: the Revolution, the transformation of society, socialism, the moral escape offered by the war, the thaw after the death of Stalin and now technocracy and education (*soblazn tekhnokraticheskii ili prosvetikel'skii*). He warns that technological advances and better education will not make the Soviet Union a morally better country:

> "This technocratic infatuation, the last in a row, finally proves . . . that the intelligentsia is still far from a real insight. The intelligentsia sees only one thing at this moment: that the success of the technocratic idea is possible and that the Party and the authorities themselves go, as it were, to meet it, accepting the plans for reform. The authorities also, so it would seem, fell into the trap of the most recent utopia. Both already see in a rosy cloud how the state will work like a well-functioning mechanism where arbitrariness and 'voluntarism' are excluded. The intelligentsia only refuses to see that Evil is not necessarily dressed in the dirty rags of anarchy. It may also manifest itself in the brilliant shape of the well-organized fascist Reich. It will not fall by itself when order is introduced in the working of a gigantic bureaucratic apparatus. It does not become more human by the introduction of computers. On the contrary, it will be able to enslave its subjects more accurately and unfeelingly, it will subjugate other nations more perfectly, it will even better be able to hold the world in terror. Evil never falls by itself. It may assume the most sophisticated and subtle forms, become civilized and make any concessions which are required. But it will never lose its identity, it will not allow itself to pass the border-line where it becomes human. It seems that the events in Czechoslovakia have proved this rather clearly. One should not faintheartedly and lazily abandon to fate the cause of one's own salvation. One should not hope to conquer Evil through purely external and technical means. One should not entrust everything to the brakes. One should not seriously count on convergence."

Altaev's views have evoked strong criticism from other *samizdat* authors. In an anonymous document "An attempt to understand the point of Altaev's article" (AS 1131) he is reproached for the absolutism of his reasoning and the lack of realism in his proposals. Similar criticism is levelled against Altaev in an article by L. Ibragimov (a Crimean Tatar) in AS 1358.

Essentially the same reproach as made by Altaev is expressed in the Estonian reply to Sakharov's Memorandum where it says:

> "He places his hopes by far too much on scientific-technical means, on economic measures . . . he sees causes and selects means which are external and material and disregards the internal and spiritual . . ."

These words were written in response to Sakharov's first main *samizdat* work and in all fairness one should add that in his more recent works Sakharov is strongly concerned with the moral aspect of political dissent. In a reaction to Medvedev's criticism of his attitude vis-à-vis political détente, Sakharov wrote (in November 1973, AS 1505):

> "The Medvedevs, in their pragmatism, have ranged themselves against those who wage a moral battle for the right of man to live and think freely",

and in an open letter to academician Engel'gardt (AS 1651) Sakharov declared:

> "I have consciously chosen a way of life and a line of conduct which may be far from pragmatic at a personal level . . ."

(see also p. 217 ff.).

The economic aspect

The economic criticism by the Marxists-Leninists and the socialists of the prevailing system of economic management of the country is further developed and extended by the democrats. The economic views of the democrats can also be regarded as the natural extension of their political views. In the words of the ASCULP Programme: "If from an economic viewpoint the communist system is a variety of state-monopolistic capitalism, so from the political viewpoint it presents itself as extreme totalitarianism, degenerating into despotism." The political hegemony and power monopoly of the Party pyramid manifests itself economically in the absolute control of the Party bureaucracy over all property.

> "In this way, through total state ownership of the means of production, through the monopolistic control of these means and the prohibition of private enterprise in any field, the CPSU extends its power not only to the sphere of politics and administration, but also to the spiritual life of the people. Thanks to this all-embracing power of the CPSU general spiritual slavery exists in the USSR. Any person who wants to have a minimum to live on must profess the official ideology of the CPSU." (Talantov, AS 752)

The only significant exceptions in this respect are the personal property of individual citizens and the right of the rural population to cultivate small private plots (economically the latter right is important because the supply of several important food items—potatoes, vegetables, eggs, meat—depends largely on the production of these plots). The comprehensiveness of economic planning and its binding character is just another expression of the Party's total control over the economy. The present system implies the absence of a market economy of any significant size, and this is regarded by several democrats as the basic cause of the permanent economic plight of the Soviet Union. A document summarizing a discussion among Moscow students registers consensus on the point that the basic harmful factors in the country's economy are: planning, the absence of any share of the workers in management and the absence of material interestedness.[48] Not surprisingly the democrats are generally in favour of a return of private enterprise at least in the production of consumer goods and in services. The few democrat documents which address themselves extensively to economic questions (in particular Zniakov's "Note-Book") reach a judgment which is quite similar to the general democrat evaluation of the political and moral position of the Soviet regime: that it is in a state of deep crisis and that it most likely unable to prevent by itself its ultimate bankruptcy.[50]

> "The absence of a genuine market, the gap between the managers and the immediate production base, and the liquidation of private initiative and its replacement, not by public initiative [as would be] characteristic of socialism, but by naked bureaucratic administration have deprived public life in the USSR of essential elements of self-regulation and have thereby robbed the Soviet system of its viability, which would have manifested itself in adaptability to new circumstances and in dynamic management of the reserves of production resources. The economy of the supermonopoly faces now a complete breakdown, the threat of which becomes clearer every day with each increase of the quantitative indicators of economic development."[49]

An interesting point which is occasionally made in democrat documents is that genuine political and individual freedom requires some amount of decentralization of economic power and at least the abolition of absolute state control over the economy.

Complaints about the existing material inequality in Soviet society, which occupy an important place in the political argumentation of the oppositional Marxists-Leninists and socialists, are made less frequently by democrats. Occasionally even the opposite view may be heard: incomes are too much related to position and not to performance, the virtual absence of effective incentives rewards the lazy who receive the same salary as the industrious (see also p. 204 ff.).

The international dimension

Among the *samizdat* authors discussed in the previous chapters Sakharov and R. Medvedev stand out as observers who are able to grasp the international aspect of the political situation in the Soviet Union. After the appearance of the Programme of the Democratic Movement in 1969, by virtue of the treatment this theme received in the Programme, there was a considerable increase in the interest among the Soviet opposition in the external factors active on the internal political scene and in the global consequences of internal political developments. Before the appearance of the Programme only individual authors who can be ranged among the democrats displayed a serious interest in the international dimension of political dissent in the Soviet Union. The most conspicuous of them is Iurii Galanskov. His article "Organizational Problems of the Movement for Full and General Disarmament and Peace in the Whole World" (AS 538) is exclusively internationally oriented and only occasional statements, almost *obiter dicta*, allow its inclusion in this chapter. The main proposal in Galanskov's article is that an international non-governmental mass organization under the auspices of the United Nations should be formed in

order to work for disarmament and peace. Disarmament and peace, in his view, cannot be expected to come about through political activities of governments but only "as the socio-psychological product of the economic and moral evolution of humanity in the direction of a realization of economic justice and moral perfection".

Another document paying considerable attention to the international aspect is the statement of the Estonian technical intelligentsia (AS 70). This is only to be expected as this statement is drafted as a reply to Sakharov's brochure on "Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom". The Estonians point out that the primary responsibility for international tension lies with the Soviet Union.

> "We, first of all, are obliged to evaluate critically our own role in the world. Is it not from us that the doctrine of militant and aggressive communism took its origin! The doctrine of peaceful coexistence itself was born, not so much from humane considerations, but from fear for our own safety and from opportunist considerations.
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> . . .
>
> We ought to put a stop to the senseless accumulation of territory, to the extension of the power of the state and to an aggressive course; we ought to promote the creation of a zone of neutral countries around our borders, supervised by the United Nations, to make our peace with other countries, to reallocate the bulk of state resources from the building of a war machine to cultural and economic improvements. Because it is we who carry, not half, but the greater part of the responsibility for the tensions in the world, we should take the first and the biggest step towards peace!"

It is intriguing that in several *samizdat* documents written by democrats a positive role is assigned to Russian émigré circles. The NTS (*Natsional'no-Trudovoi Soiuz*—National Labour Federation, the powerful and active organization of Russian émigrés which has its main seat in Germany) is often mentioned with sympathy and in a favourable light; some documents even declare their adherence to the solidarist political ideology of the NTS (see also pp. 162-164). The most articulate in this respect is Zniakov who argues that, because the internal opposition is weak and not very audible abroad, the Russian emigration has the historical task of speaking for Russia and should be strongly supported in the West.

> "The main thing now is that the widest possible layers of the Western intelligentsia should renounce the kind of policy they follow, of non-interference in the affairs of Russia, and particularly their flirtations with the USSR, in order to form a united front, together with the healthy forces of the emigration, for a transformation of Russia." (AS 374)

Another author expressing related ideas is Ruslanov in "Youth in Russian history" (AS 539):

> "The work on re-evaluating the spiritual inheritance in light of the apocalyptic experience of the Russian revolution was started by those members of the Russian intelligentsia who had saved themselves and gone into the first great diaspora. This work, continued and developed by the second generation of the émigrés, led to the creation of a new synthetic world philosophy—solidarism—, which found its political expression in a new Russian political reality—the NTS."

In a somewhat different context Sakharov remarked (in an interview published in the *Sunday Times* of 24 February 1974—Russian text: AS 1593):

> "The historic failure of the so-called progressive public opinion of the 'twenties, 'thirties and 'forties to listen to and understand the Russian emigration must not be repeated."

The Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union

Before the appearance of the Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union (AS 340) it was not unusual to refer generally to the oppositional circles active in the production of *samizdat* as "democratic movement". In his assay "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" Amalrik wrote:

> "Nevertheless *Samizdat* gradually developed, not unlike the 'Cultural Opposition', an independent force which one may already regard as a genuine political opposition against the regime or at least as the embryo of such a political opposition. It is a general movement which calls itself the Democratic Movement. For the following reasons it can be regarded as a new stage in the resistance against the regime and as a political opposition:
>
> 1. Without assuming the fixed forms of an organisation, it regards and announces itself as a movement which has leaders and active members and which is supported by a considerable number of like-minded persons.
>
> 2. It quite consciously defines its objectives and follows a definite tactic, albeit that one and the other are quite vague.
>
> 3. It desires to work publicly and legally and makes use of publicity, distinguishing itself thereby from small and large underground groups."

Amalrik goes on to distinguish three currents (Marxist, Russian orthodox and liberal) within this movement.

Another, anonymous, *samizdat* document circulating in the beginning of 1970 and entitled "On the Question of What Is To Be Done" also discussed the democratic movement and its prospects.[51] This essay regarded the movement as a political current rejecting Marxist socialism; the author advised the movement to beware of extremism and to be loyal to the Party and government leadership, "for its autocratic nature is a reflection of the reactionary views of the majority of the people, and the democratic movement respects all manifestations of the people's will, even those which are anti-democratic."

If one contrasts the statements of this anonymous author and of Amalrik with the Programme of the Democratic Movement, it becomes evident that the movement and the people who published the Programme are not identical with what Amalrik and the anonymous author had in mind. Among the authors and backers of the Programme there is no Marxist wing as in Amalrik's description. Furthermore, although the Democratic Movement did not eschew legal and public action, their tactical views granted a predominant place to underground and "illegal" action. What apparently happened is that a group of dissenters consciously appropriated the already current term of democratic movement as a general designation of the existing, albeit unorganized, political opposition, and put itself forward as the spokesman and focal point of this opposition.

Nothing is known about the makers of the Programme except that they include Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians and Estonians (this is also borne out by the designation of the signers of the Programme as "Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic Area").[52] Most of the ideas expressed in the Programme can be traced to earlier documents. Its first part "Evolution of the World Situation" is much influenced by Sakharov's ideas as expressed in his study "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" (Sakharov is even mentioned by name in the Programme). The analysis of the internal situation in the Soviet Union (Part 2 of the Programme: "The Position of Society and the Objectives of the Democratic Movement") reiterates many themes which had been current in oppositional literature for several years, such as the description of the Soviet economic system as state capitalism. Occasionally one suspects a direct link with other documents, e.g. the definition of "Asian" or "oriental" capitalism, which is also used in the essay "On the Question of What Is To Be Done".

The strategy of the authors of the Programme—to push themselves forward as the central point for the political opposition—has been partly successful; however, their articulate views on fundamental political and economic issues and on tactics have prevented their being generally

acceptable as representative for the entire opposition. For a loyal Marxist like R. Medvedev they are political extremists who are only barely to be tolerated.[55] Sakharov conspicuously refrains from mentioning them. On the other hand it cannot be denied that the Programme and subsequent statements from the Democratic Movement have been very much in the centre of the political debate inside *samizdat* during the years 1969-1972.

To many of the political dissidents in the Soviet Union the history of the country during the last decade must look like the continuous smashing of ever smaller hopes. De-Stalinization was never fully carried through and came to a standstill after the fall of Khrushchev in 1964. The chances for a "socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia, which might still have had a beneficial effect on conditions in the Soviet Union, were destroyed by the invasion of 1968. The regime increased its stranglehold on the movement of public and legal protest to such a degree that in 1973 Sakharov was about the only remaining figure who was still able to raise his voice and be heard in the West. By the middle of 1973 some of the most prominent and embarrassing figures among the opposition had left the country (Chalidze, Zhores Medvedev, Siniavskii); most of the others had been effectively silenced, either through various forms of administrative pressure, or through imprisonment (Amalrik, Grigorenko, Bukovskii) in penitentiary institutions or psychiatric prisons. Sakharov's growing anger and disillusionment (and his almost superhuman moral courage and integrity) is reflected in a number of public statements issued by him after he first entered the discussion in 1968 with the memorandum on progress, coexistence and intellectual freedom. On March 5, 1971, Sakharov sent a Memorandum to Brezhnev and in June 1972 he published a Postscript to this letter (AS 1136). The Memorandum and the Postscript restate most of the principal thoughts expounded in the 1968 manifesto but with more bitterness and less patience, stressing heavily the sorry state of the protection of human rights as the chief obstacle to improvement in the Soviet Union. Even more scathingly the same themes were sounded by Sakharov in an interview with the Swedish newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* of July 3, 1973.[54] The vehemence of this sweeping indictment of the social and political system of the Soviet Union is a far cry from the detachment and moderation of the 1968 manifesto. Sakharov's views have now become very close to that total rejection of the Soviet system as expressed by the Democratic Movement and related circles.

Sakharov's more recent statements seem to indicate, not that he despairs of improvements and genuine reform, but rather that he speaks from a point beyond hope; he states his views without hope and without despair. Together with Roy Medvedev (in his "Book on Socialist Democracy") Sakharov is among the last of the prominent dissidents to address himself to the regime with proposals for reform. In 1972 the main current of

political dissent went underground and engaged no longer in discussion with the political leadership; this discussion is replaced by internal debates in *samizdat* among various oppositional circles. The residual loyalty to the regime implied in Medvedev's and Sakharov's mode of dissent is disappearing.

Although the position of the Democratic Movement had appeared somewhat eccentric at the time its first documents (the Programme and the "Basic Tactics") were published in 1969 and 1970, subsequent developments, in particular the waning of the "legal" opposition, pushed the views of the Movement into the centre of the oppositional discussion. The Chronicle of Current Events, itself sympathetic to the political ideas of the democrats, had (in the words of Reddaway) "waived its usual ban on value judgments" in its issue No. 14 where the Basic Tactics were summarized and sharply criticized. The Chronicle reproached the authors of the Basic Tactics for their presumptuousness in speaking for the entire democratic opposition, for the exaggeration of their own strength, for their unwarranted optimism and especially for their advocacy of illegal and underground methods of opposition. Yet the views of the Democratic Movement gradually attracted more supporters and several individual authors of *samizdat* documents showed their sympathy, for instance by signing their work as "democrats". An important representative of this group was V. Severnyi who published a lengthy essay on "The Economic Position of the Soviet Union" in 1970 (AS 633). Other *samizdat* works close to the views of the Democratic Movement are K. Vol'nyi's "The Intelligentsia and the Democratic Movement" published in 1970 (AS 607), I. Aleksandrov's "Brief Notes on the Present Crisis (see p. 161) and Iu. Glazov's "What is the Democratic movement in the USSR?"[55], both published in 1972.

A considerable part of the dialogue between the Movement and its critics was carried on in the columns of the Movement's journal itself. In No. 5 of *Demokrat* (which appeared in the autumn of 1971) the Movement defended itself against criticism of the Chronicle (AS 1152). In a following issue (probably No. 6) the Movement replied to the charges of Russian chauvinism, made by another *samizdat* periodical, the Ukrainian Messenger, a Ukrainian counterpart of the Chronicle. The same issue of *Demokrat* (AS 1175) carried three articles critical of the ideas and the strategy of the Democratic Movement (Berdylev, A Letter from the Internal Emigration; P. Iavas, Who Are You, Friends-Democrats?; E. Domovoi, In Search of Reality). The main point of Berdylev's somewhat rambling essay seemed to be that the Democratic Movement and its Programme were premature. He disagreed with the Movement's partial espousal of capitalist elements for the future economic system of the country and the underground and conspiratorial elements in its strategy.

Any improvement of the present situation, according to Berdylev, has to be realized through the unavoidable intermediate stage of "socialism with a human face", and this is why he considered the Movement's liberal-democratic ("Kadet") views as untimely and not representative of the mainstream of political dissent. Similar points (lack of representativeness, untimeliness) were made in Domovoi's essay, although his basic position is not so far removed from the views and attitudes of the Movement. His criticism was chiefly directed against the Movement's vagueness concerning ways and means to bring about the desired changes in Soviet society and against the absence of a clear vision of new social groups and the transformation of capitalism in the future (post-industrial) society. Iavas' critique of the Movement's Programme contained some related themes: lack of precision in the Movement's position vis-à-vis socialism, absence of clear-cut ideas concerning practical action, half-heartedness in the determination of strategic goals and tactical methods.

There is undoubtedly some justice in the criticism levelled at the Democratic Movement from various sides, yet it should not be forgotten that the entire movement of political opposition in the Soviet Union is only a few years old (at least in its present form) and that almost all manifestations of it display some element of immaturity and inexperience. The fact that the Movement actively promoted discussion and criticism of its own position in the pages of *Demokrat* was in itself a sign of strength and responsibility, because even the political discussion of the Soviet opposition had too long been characterized by intolerance, self-righteousness and dogmatism. The Movement's claim to leadership was further symbolized by such actions as the announcement of a competition for a new national anthem and the ostensible foundation of a "Commission for the Investigation of Inhuman Activities of Psychiatrists in the Service of the KGB".

The political ideas of the Democratic Movement and Its Critics

The Programme of the Democratic Movement consists of two parts, one outward looking ("Evaluation of the World Situation") and one inward looking ("The Position of [Soviet] Society and the Objectives of the Democratic Movement"). The two are intimately connected. The Programme's view of the internal situation in the Soviet Union is determined by the ideas developed in its survey of the political and socio-economic systems of the world. The Programme believes that capitalism is not on the decline, but that, on the contrary, it is a young and vital system. Social evils and imperialism are rather to be regarded as "infantile diseases" accompanying the initial stages of capitalism. Present-day capitalism has

managed to overcome almost all its negative outgrowths, which formed the basis of Marxist criticism (unemployment, poverty, racial discrimination, crime, overproduction, monopolism, economic expansion and capitalist exploitation). Capitalism has proved to be the system which best promotes general economic welfare and a most favourable climate for the flourishing of human rights. Socialism in the Soviet Union, according to the Programme, has assumed the shape of oriental socialism which has taken over and intensified all the negative aspects of early capitalism: unemployment has been turned into forced labour; the relative and tolerable poverty of old has been turned into a general, lasting and unbearable penury; the Soviet Union has the highest number of [ordinary] criminals in the world and the state itself has become criminal on a scale which is unprecedented; racial discrimination has been replaced by political, class and national discrimination; overproduction is replaced by permanent underproduction of ordinary consumer goods; the capitalist monopolies have been transformed into a single super-monopoly of the state; military and political expansion takes the place of economic expansion; capitalist exploitation is replaced by state exploitation. The successes attained by the Soviet Union in more than half a century of communist rule are small and insignificant and the October Revolution must therefore be considered as a retrograde step, politically as well as economically. No other country has of its own free will chosen the communist path. A revolution is a predominantly destructive process.

> "We can see with our own eyes that the radical revolution of October 1917, which won the day in a dark and poverty-stricken period among a backward people, was politically and economically a step back because it took away public freedoms and slowed down the growth of welfare, while at the same time the more moderate and less violent revolutions of Germany and Austria in 1918 were politically a step forward because public freedoms were increased."

Furthermore, oriental socialism, by its expansionist stance and its military power, maintains international tension and the danger of a third world war. The Programme regards the rise of national socialism in Germany as being evoked by the threat posed by the economic and military might of of the Soviet Union, a country where terror and violence were rampant at that time.

The Programme summarizes its judgment of the Soviet system in the following words:

> "We believe,
> that oriental socialism has destroyed many positive social values and evoked a number of new and disastrous social evils;

> that, after more than half a century of socialist development, our society is lagging behind the capitalist countries:
> a whole generation—in public welfare,
> a whole epoch—in human freedoms;
> that it is necessary that the present and future generations of Soviet society wage a decisive battle for truly national welfare and truly human freedom."

In the light of these views the Programme declares that fighting capitalism is criminal and aimless, that in the Soviet Union one should struggle for a decent standard of living and civil freedom, and that developing countries should understand that the achievement of national liberation is most intimately connected with the protection of civil and democratic liberties.

The Programme is of the opinion that there are three dominant socio-political ideologies in the world of today: the democratic ideology which favours civil liberties and private property, the socialist ideology which favours civil liberties and restricts private property, and the communist ideology which restricts civil liberties and abolishes private property. It has, understandably, caught the attention of several critics of the Programme that its authors gloss over the distinctions between socialism and what is termed oriental socialism (or communism). The most relevant statement of the Programme on this issue is contained in the following passage which gives evidence of the lack of precision in defining the relation between socialism and oriental socialism.

> "The societal ideals of socialism appeared in the earliest stage of their emergence as the wished for dream to an unsophisticated humanity, they gave rise to bright hopes and evoked ardent enthusiasm for their realization with very broad layers of humanity. Oriental socialism, introduced in Russia and being introduced on territories directly or indirectly occupied by Soviet troops, signified the destruction of these illusions."

This point of view is open to criticism from two sides. One is that oriental socialism is no socialism at all but rather a specific form of capitalism (as seems to be implied by other parts of the Programme) and that therefore the real controversy is between capitalism (in its Western or Eastern manifestation) and genuine socialism. This approach is taken by Berdylev (in his article in *Demokrat* No. 6) who is willing to accept the Programme as representative only of "young liberals" (*mladokadety*). Criticism from the other side will stress that oriental socialism (communism) is in fact a manifestation of socialism and that it is inevitable to choose between socialism (including oriental socialism) and capitalism. This point of view is forcefully represented by P. Iavas who challenges the Democratic

Movement by the title of his contribution to *Demokrat* No. 6, "Who Are You, Friends-Democrats?", to speak out on this question: "are you democrats or are you socialists?". If they are socialists, he argues, how do they reconcile their enthusiasm for capitalism with their rejection of Soviet state capitalism? And if they are democrats, why do they propose to leave the decisive sector of the national economy (heavy industry) in the hands of the state? This would perpetuate the complete control of the Party bureaucracy over the existence and the lives of the overwhelming majority of the population and would thereby make illusory any improvements in the area of civil liberties. The implied conclusion, that a modern form of capitalism provides the best breeding-ground for economic welfare and civil liberties, is in accordance with the Programme's views; the same conclusion is reached along somewhat different lines in another critical evaluation of the Programme, Domovoi's "In Search of Reality".

> "Therefore, through its concentration of production, through the monopolies, through the increasing influence of the state sector in the economy and through giving birth to new productive forces and a new social stratum, it is precisely capitalism which moves in the direction of a society of social justice."

An outspoken supporter of modern capitalism among the adherents of the Democratic Movement is V. Severnyi, the author of a lengthy article on "The economic situation of the Soviet Union" (AS 633), "The main part of Severnyi's article is devoted to an analysis of the results and prospects of the Soviet Union's economy (considered "catastrophic" by him), but in a short introduction he argues that socialism was born as a reaction against the growth problems and initial stresses of early capitalism. As capitalism gradually overcame these difficulties, socialism transformed itself, first into a science and then into utopianism.

> "But all expectations proved to be in vain. Capitalism showed itself more and more successful, it introduced a necessary amount of socialized production and ensured an unprecedented growth of production forces. Instead of general impoverishment, of a revolutionary proletariat, a reformist-minded working class into being; instead of total bourgeois dictatorship, a normal *Rechtsstaat* asserted itself.
>
> Success came from an unexpected side, upsetting all Marxist dogmas and forecasts. In Russia, a backward rural country which had not gone through the phases of capitalist development, an influential group of followers of Marx was formed. They grabbed with religious fervour at the resounding novelty of West-European social thought. They were fanatically decided to implement all the Marxist prescriptions, regardless of the historical conditions prevailing in the East. Moreover, they borrowed mainy the worst aspects of Marxism, its unbridled revolutionary spirit and its economic utopianism. Accidentally finding themselves on top of the waves of history, shedding a sea of blood and tears, and at the price of suffering and death they finally realized their promised 'paradise' and their promised 'welfare'. Their economic experiment turned into a deep tragedy for the peoples of Russia and filled the world with alarm and terror. But there is one positive side to this tragedy. It is instructive and may serve as a warning to all [other] peoples of the world."

The analysis of the internal political situation, as presented by the Programme, offers no important new insights in relation to the views which are generally held by the political opposition in the Soviet Union. The Soviet state, the Programme declares, is a deeply anti-democratic and totalitarian-dictatorial social organization, an instrument of violence in the hands of the Party-bureaucratic elite—the new class of exploiters. The Party clique, in order to further its own selfish interests, imposes excessive burdens on the population and robs the citizens of their basic human rights. The Programme is more specific than other *samizdat* sources in pinpointing the real centre of all power—legislative, executive and judicial —at the Central Committee of the Party. The Central Committee, according to the Programme, rules through the Council of Ministers to whom the legislative and judicial powers are in fact subordinate and which effectively controls the army, the police, the security forces, the communications media and the entire technology of the country. To make matters worse, the ruling class, of which the Party-government leadership is the all-powerful summit, is to a large extent recruited from the most undesirable elements of the population: power-seekers, cowards and people with a bad conscience.

The discussion on ethics and religion after the publication of the Programme

The Programme is very brief and somewhat superficial on the moral-religious issue which figured so large in the previous debates among the democrats. The Programme confines itself to stating that the leading philosophical current of today is idealism and, to a lesser extent, various neutral schools of thought, such as pragmatism and existentialism; materialism is unpopular and Marxism-Leninism, one of its branches, is in its death-throes and has lost almost all genuine support. Religion is considered important by the Programme; it foresees a further growth of religion in the future, as it is becoming clearer all the time that science leads humanity

astray and is encountering increasing difficulties in explaining natural phenomena.

The moral-religious element in the discussions around the Programme is very much of secondary importance. The Movement's journal *Demokrat*, however, carried a few contributions which concerned themselves with this theme. The most notable among these was a letter by D. Donskoi, "Towards a Moral-Political Rebirth!". Donskoi expressed his deep disappointment with the Programme which, he believed, repeated the old mistakes of the revolutionary intelligentsia of the past by proposing a "social-mechanical remaking of society . . ., a mechanical transformation of the external world". What is essentially wrong, he writes in a heavily emphasized sentence, is that "Our generation's conscience it out of joint!". What is really required therefore is a moral-political rebirth: every honest and thinking person should develop in himself the following four qualities: moral purity, spiritual depth, unrelenting courage and unbreakable energy. The Rebirth Movement should draw up a charter, establishing the rights, duties and responsibilities of its members. Donskoi's letter apparently originates from the same circles which had published in No. 5 of *Demokrat* the Moral Code of the Rebirth [Movement], a curious document which promulgated the same moral principles as Donskoi's letter (and a few others as well, such as "the unification of humanity in a single global brotherhood and its transformation into a worthy member of the family of the Universe").

Another author who appears to be associated with the Democratic Movement, K. Vol'nyi, repeats the argument put forward by earlier democratic authors, about the devastating effect of the Soviet system on public and private morality.

> "With the loss of the religious concept the people lost its moral principles. The freedom of the February revolution was taken by the people as an opportunity for hooliganism, arbitrariness and violence. The October revolution proved to be the final awakening of the dark instincts of the Asiatic nomad conquerors which had slumbered inside the people, and let loose the evil element in its soul." (AS 607)

The Programme on economic questions

The Programme pays considerable attention to the economic aspects of the present political system and to possible alternatives. Its analysis is based on the usually made connexion between the political supremacy of the Party elite and the predominance of state ownership accompanied by rigid central planning: state-monopolistic capitalism. The Programme ascribes the poor performance of the Soviet economy mainly to the overwhelmingly negative aspects of this system, although it believes that the Soviet Union's economic predicament is aggravated by the "so-called international aid":

> "Carrying on wars in Korea, in Vietnam (where one day of fighting cost the USSR 3 mill. roubles) and aid to Cuba (one mill. dollars a day) have ultimately ruined the country's economy and have led the country in 1969 into a state of deepening crisis."

The same points are made in Severnyi's article on the economic situation of the Soviet Union. On the basis of statistical data for various branches of the economy he demonstrates the unsatisfactory and at times disastrous state of affairs in the country, as compared to the United States.

> "All these things are individual aspects of our reality and, I do not even speak about it, how genuine cultural and socio-political life has been stifled in the country. And then billions of roubles of the national income have been spent in Egypt, Vietnam and many other countries for various adventures. These phenomena, so alarming for our social existence, will continue to grow and extend themselves in future, because the present blind and narrow-minded leaders are unable to remove or change them, or to understand that their causes reside in the principles of our economic system."

An unusual note is struck in the Programme where it discusses wages. It complains that there is little wage differentiation and that the constitutional principle of "from everybody according to his ability, to everybody according to his labour" (the alleged principle of socialism, preceding the principle of communism: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs") is not realized. The equalizing principle of distribution which is in fact applied results in equal remuneration for good and bad work (see also the section on equality, pp. 204-211).

The international dimension

The fundamentally internationalist perspective of the Programme has already been explained (on the basis of the performance of the capitalist system abroad the Programme considers capitalism to be a far superior system than the Soviet Union's oriental socialism). Also, the prevalent aversion among the democrats against "foreign adventures" (Cuba, Egypt, Vietnam) has been noted. The Programme makes the Soviet Union almost solely responsible for international tension; the Soviet Union ought to abandon all attempts to further revolutionary movements in the world.

There is some ambiguity among the Programme's supporters with

regard to China. The Programme regards Mao's China as a manifestation of "Asian social imperialism", the military-economic power of which was created chiefly by the Soviet Union itself. Nevertheless, the present Soviet attitude towards China is considered disastrous. The Soviet Union's responsibility for the emergence of communist China is further emphasized in a comment (unsigned, but presumably representing the editorial viewpoint) in No. 5 of *Demokrat*: the Soviets created Mao's China in order to terrorize and injure their Western enemies, but they fell into the pit they dug themselves—"China, as any totalitarian state, is aggressive. There they will not have parliamentary debates whether to make war or not. Our bosses know precisely from their own experience how these decisions are taken, because Mao's regime and our wise leadership are berries from the same field [*odnogo polia iagody*]." However, a statement "On Russo-Chinese Relations" issued by the Democratic Movement and printed in the same issue of *Demokrat* showed a somewhat different slant. The statement declared that China was in principle entitled to claim certain territories in Eastern Siberia and the Soviet Far East, although such territories cannot be transferred to China as long as that country continued its aggressive policies and its totalitarian system. If a war between China and the Soviet Union were to break out the democrats intend to take up a neutral position, analogous to the attitude assumed by Lenin and the bolsheviks during the first world war (see also p. 222 ff.).

Strategy and tactics of the democrats

As in the parallel sections on the strategy and tactics of the Marxist-Leninists and the socialists, it will be convenient to distinguish between long-term objectives (the kind of society and political system the democrats would like to see realized and introduced in the Soviet Union), middle-term objectives (specific political and economic reforms which may bring the long-term objectives closer to realization) and short-term goals (the activities which should be engaged in right away in order to realize the middle-term objectives).

The political writings of the democrats display a considerable interest in fundamental questions concerning the organization of society and the state. In the words of I. Aleksandrov:

> ". . . the times will demand a particularly precise theoretical and practical response to the situation, and history will not forgive the Russian intelligentsia if it shows itself, on this occasion too, incapable of becoming master of the situation, the leader of all that is wholesome in the boiling cauldron of Russia." [56]

On the most theoretical level there is expectably more divergence among the democrats than among Marxist and socialist dissidents who are after all united by a more or less articulate political doctrine. The unity among the democrats has rather to be looked for at the level of actual political desiderata (which are to a considerable extent identical to those of other oppositional groups). The actual political desiderata may be arrived at from quite divergent political ideologies.

The most outspoken in this respect are some of the religiously inspired democrat authors, in particular the authors of the Programme of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (ASCULP) and P. Smirnov, the author of "The Individual and Society". The ASCULP Programme envisages a Christian state and society, based on the Christianisation of politics, culture and the economy. Smirnov's key concept is equality, based on the equality of all human beings before God. This does not lead him to the construction of a society organized along egalitarian lines, but rather to a society which respects and protects the value and dignity of the individual.

Closely related to the religious inspiration of some democrat authors, although much more widespread, is the ethical element in many political essays of democrat provenance. This element, which of necessity concerns the attitude of the individual, provides additional impetus to the desire to protect human rights and the dignity of the human person. Many democrats stress the fundamental importance of a moral renaissance in the Soviet Union. True, this is often couched in terms which may appear as somewhat naive and childish to non-Russian ears, but the genuineness of the sentiment is beyond doubt.

An important document devoted to the fundamental strategic objectives of the dissident movement is Semen Telegin's "How is one to be?" (*Kak byt'*?, AS 1151). Telegin investigates the possibilities of creating a counter-culture within a totalitarian system and the difficulties to be overcome in this process.

> "In this way it is suggested to attempt to repeat the evolution of public opinion which at one time took place in Russia. It is more difficult now, of course, because one has learnt from the mistakes of the Tsar's government and the meaning of ideology is clear: censorship is stricter, the prison windows are smaller, the penalties are heavier, oppression is better organized, 'whoever is not with us, is against us', etc."

Telegin believes that on a more practical level, first of all, a purely individual and internal reconsideration of the poitical and cultural realities will engender a more general critical awareness.

"As under the Tsars the chief agitator for freedom was autocracy itself, so in our time the system will gradually unite the people against it."

But not everything should be left to this spontaneous course of events (*samotek*). Some people will have to show, though their heroic fortitude and self-denial, the road to freedom.

"This precisely is the road which during the last few years the best part of the intelligentsia has gone: the road of open protest against violations of human rights. The importance of such behaviour is enormous. But this road is not open to the masses—too cruel is the treatment meted out by the authorities to the most modest form of protest."

A third possibility is in the inconspicuous but incessant campaign for other values and another culture, to be conducted on the plane of personal relations.

"What is necessary is a quiet, well-hidden but purposeful activity in order to destroy the official canons, to explain to one's surroundings the true state of affairs, to propagate a new consciousness. What is necessary is not working with masses, but with individual persons."

The Programme of the Democratic Movement is itself almost silent on the foundations of its political ideology. This may be explained by the plurality of its authorship and also by its claim to provide a general platform for the entire political opposition. It comes closest to an enunciation of its political principles in its espousal of the traditional doctrine of the separation of powers.

On a more concrete level the political ideals of the democrats may be summarized by the one term—democratization. To them this means before all the introduction of the political system and the political institutions of the West. There is general agreement that there should be parliamentary democracy, based on general elections in which political parties (including the Communist Party) can freely participate. This again requires extensive political freedom, in particular for the opposition parties. On a more general level the democrats request the introduction of the full panoply of civil rights and liberties. The Programme contains a list of ten freedoms which it believes should be guaranteed unconditionally:

freedom from arbitrary arrest, search and other acts of violence;
freedom of conscience and conviction;
freedom of occupation and profession;
freedom of learning;
freedom of creation;

freedom of correspondence and movement;
freedom of nationality and residence;
freedom of the word and the press;
freedom of assembly and association;
freedom of demonstration and political activity.

Some more extremist views may occasionally be heard on the periphery of the democratic mainstream. The documents concerning the objectives of the ASCULP are too few and too short to allow definitive conclusions, but one may wonder what is meant by the proposal to let church representatives participate in legislative and executive bodies of all levels, "with the right to veto in ethically controversial questions". (According to Osipov's report on the ASCULP, see p. 151, this organization also proposed reserving one third of the seats in the parliament—the Supreme All-Russian Assembly—to members of the clergy, complete freedom of the press and the abolition of all political parties.)

Another peculiar note is struck in some documents which advocate the recognition and introduction of elitist elements in the political organization of the country (ASCULP's ideas concerning the role of church dignitaries can be seen as a specific variety of such elitist views). In an article "Fundamental Conceptions of Society" in *Demokrat* No. 50. Radonezhskii (the name is obviously misspelled Rodonezhskii) argues that the political influence of an individual should be directly related to his relative social usefulness and that the rule of the mass of the population (which will always command a huge majority in numbers) has very serious disadvantages.

Such views are fed by the much more general feeling of alienation from the population, a traditional and powerful theme in the thought of the Russian intelligentsia. The intelligentsia's diffidence with regard to the general population and its amorphous political views has been mentioned before. "The mass of the people", writes Donskoi, "are slaves with a petty bourgeois mentality [*meshchanstvuiushchie raby*] who not seldom idealize their slavery and are able at the same time to be cruel tyrants themselves."

In an article which is specifically devoted to "The intelligentsia and the democratic movement" (AS 607), K. Vol'nyi writes:

"Our former respect for the people, whom we saw as marvellously suffering, has dwindled. In the eyes of the intelligentsia the people has been transformed from martyr into predatory tyrant. Only the people itself is to blame for the terrible sacrifices it has borne during the last half-century. In betraying and destroying the intelligentsia, its sole defender, it has itself bled profusely."

However, the members of the intelligentsia are themselves taken to task by Altaev (in "The dual consciousness of the intelligentsia and pseudo-culture", AS 897) for their deeply bourgeois attitudes.

> "His ideal is the life of his American or European colleague, the free and well-paid specialist, who, indeed, has to work much harder than a member of the intelligentsia in Russia, but who does have his own car, his cottage, a family with four children, a wife who does not work, and who can travel the whole world."

Many members of the political opposition (such widely different figures as Amalrik and Radonezhskii, for instance) believe that there is a tacit understanding between the Party elite and the popular masses to regard the intelligentsia as a common enemy. In a more positive vein the Estonian manifesto "To Hope or to Act?" makes the point that the democratization of the country should begin by instilling democratic ideals among the population. The same idea is expressed in very different words by Smirnov: "The trouble with the unequal society is not that there are 'aristocrats' (in a metaphorical sense), but that not everybody is an aristocrat."

The economic views of the democrats are dominated by a preference for a tri-partite system, consisting of a state, a collective and a private sector. This preference is noticeable already in the ASCULP Programme albeit in a somewhat inarticulate form. The Programme wants to retain for the state only those economic functions which are connected with defence, foreign trade, transport and communications (the inclusion of foreign trade appears incongruous, the economic conceptions of the Programme taken as a whole). For this reason, two thirds of the industrial enterprises should be denationalized and turned over to the workers who would receive shares. With regard to land, the ASCULP Programme declares that land should not be regarded as a commercial commodity and that therefore ownership of large tracts of land should be prohibited by law. Otherwise anybody should be entitled to own land. Agriculture should be entrusted to private or cooperative farming, without any preference for either. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes should be given the right to disband themselves. Industrial enterprises should be economically independent (presumably from the state) and part of the profits should go to shareholders; there should be free participation of private capital in the sphere of consumer goods industries and services.

The vague and partly contradictory economic views of the ASCULP Programme acquire sharper contours in later documents. The underground Moscow issue of *Posev* No. 1 postulated "Allocation of land to the farmers in private labour ownership; the right of farmers to decide freely on the use of the land—individually or collectively"; it further requested the promotion of private initiative in those branches of industry and trade

which are of direct importance to the life of the people (apparently the production and distribution of consumer goods is meant).

Other sources are less explicit and limit themselves to speaking out in favour of some sort of a "compromise" system.

> "Our economists should have the possibility of investigating and borrowing widely and freely, in order to find such compromises and flexible economic forms as would best satisfy the needs, not only of the state, but of all members of society." (Estonian Manifesto, AS 70)

In some sources the theme of the mixed economy is combined with the theme of some kind of workers' control. This is done briefly in *Posev* No. 1 and more extensively in Smirnov's "The Individual and Society". "One of the possible compromises could be economic accountability [*khozraschet*] on the basis of real control of the enterprises by their collectives, accompanied by allowing small-scale private production, in particular in the sphere of consumer goods production and distribution, as this is practiced to some extent in Yugoslavia."

The most elaborate statements concerning the desirable organization of the economy are to be found in the Programme of the Democratic Movement and in Severnyi's article on "The Economic Position of the USSR". Both are adherents of the tripartite model. The Programme assigns heavy and medium industry to state enterprises, light industry to collective enterprises and local industry to private enterprise. By collective enterprises the Programme understands enterprises run by workers' councils or workers' companies. Ownership and control of the three types of enterprises should be granted correspondingly to the state, the group or the private individual. Collective and private enterprises should be independent from the state and equal in rights vis-à-vis state enterprises. The Programme proposes the same three types of property and enterprise for agriculture, without, however, indicating any specific distribution of tasks. The provision of services should be on the basis of group or private ownership of means of production.

Severnyi's model is almost identical to the one advanced by the Democratic Movement's Programme; he bases it in part on a typology of participants in the production process. Passive people, with little initiative, need strict guidance and are best suited to work in state enterprises. The most active elements, possessing great energy, initiative and ingenuity, are most suitably employed in private enterprise. The intermediate category is assigned to collective enterprise. Severnyi goes into more detail than the Programme; he suggests that state agricultural enterprises should be set up on the basis of the present sovkhozes, collective farms on the basis of the present kolkhozes (which are to be turned over in full ownership to the

collectives) and private farms are to be allotted to peasants who want to leave the present sovkhozes and kolkhozes. For the various types of industry Severnyi mentions the kind of organization he would assign to each; for instance, collective industrial enterprises would take care of light industry, the food industry, lumbering, machine building, house building, etc. In the non-industrial sector of the economy (apart from agriculture) the state would be responsible for forestry, transport and communications; trade and services should be assigned in principle to collective or private enterprise.

The rejection of rigid central economic planning is a necessary element of the economic views of the democrats.

Considering the tremendous powers of repression and control in the hands of the Soviet state, it is not surprising that the democrats hardly perform better than the Marxists or socialists when it comes to making suggestions for practical action. One of the most frequent and most dominant criticisms of the Programme of the Democratic Movement is that it is very elaborate in its analysis of the present world and internal situation and in the description of its political ideals, but that it fails almost completely to indicate how these ideals are to be realized.

It is, curiously enough, one of the oldest and most eccentric documents, the ASCULP Programme, which is most explicit on the point of tactics. Its purpose is nothing less but the armed overthrow of the present regime and in a strange mixture of realism and naiveté it sets out the principles of its conspiratorial activities and organization.

Certainly the issue of violence is one that has to be faced by a movement which so totally rejects the prevailing regime as the Democratic Movement and its supporters do. The Programme only declares that "the transition from an undemocratic to a democratic society takes place through the powerful and massive, but *non-violent and peaceful* [italics added] pressure of citizens on the leaders of the society". Iavas, who had already criticized the Programme for its ambiguity in the evaluation of socialism, registers his disagreement on this point too, arguing that the exclusion of violence is essentially unrealistic. The admission of violence is implied by those authors who adhere to or sympathize with the NTS (see before, p. 130). The Estonian manifesto declares that it is willing to wait some time for reforms; "But in the end we shall demand and act! And then the tank divisions will have to roll into, not Prague or Bratislava, but Moscow and Leningrad!"

The Programme's point of view, which appears moderate in this light, is criticized for its dangerous extremism by the Chronicle of Current Events, which believes that the Movement's relative emphasis on its underground aspects, in contrast to the Chronicle's meticulous maintenance of its lawful position, entails great and unwarranted dangers,

particularly for youthful supporters of the Movement.

Under the present circumstances the main roads open to the democrats are those of protest and private agitation. The legal protest movement which was widespread in the late 'sixties is carried on by a steadily decreasing number of persons, due no doubt to the regime's strenuous efforts in harassing and isolating its participants who are extremely vulnerable because the very nature of public and lawful protest requires that the identity of the protester be known. Yet it is improbable that open protest against unlawful acts of public officials will disappear altogether. The question is rather where the authorities are going to draw the line, because obviously not any act of any public official can be beyond publicly expressed private criticism. Also, the Soviet intelligentsia is very much aware of the necessity of civic courage. Several *samizdat* authors have made the point that but for the inertia, fear, cowardice and collusion of millions, Stalinism would not have come to pass. The urgent need to speak out is illustrated by a line of A. Strikh, a *samizdat* author who attacks A. Mikhailov's "Thoughts on the liberal campaign of 1968" (equally in *samizdat*). Mikhailov had argued that the liberal protests addressed to the authorities in 1968 were pointless and self-destructive. Strikh replies: "The government has been given a list of liberals, moans A. Mikhailov, but it is only where liberalism does not manifest itself in any way that the government wil *not* have such a list."

A short and practical, albeit somewhat Machiavellian, guide for subversive political propaganda is supplied by an anonymous author in a document entitled "What is it You Want?" (AS 403). It is proposed to direct two different streams of propaganda, one to the ordinary citizen (*obyvatel'*) and one to the intelligentsia. The ordinary citizen should be persuaded that democracy and civil liberties will increase his economic well-being; Marxism should be presented to him as unattractive and the intellectual as his friend and ally. Similarly flavoured, but differently oriented is the propaganda which the author proposes to direct at the intelligentsia: emphasize the existence of a bureaucratic elite and the powerless and miserable position of the intellectual, call for the elaboration of a comprehensive new ideology.

Dissemination of political ideas by word of mouth is the most elusive form of agitation, both for the KGB and the student of the Soviet opposition movement. Private oral propaganda is recommended in several *samizdat* documents because it is relatively safe and efficient. Its efficiency would seem to be impaired, however, by the phenomenon of social atomization (*razobshchennost'*), observed by many *samizdat* authors: the average Russian intellectual lives his life among a very small group of trusted friends and has very few contacts outside this group. Political propaganda in written or printed form has probably a better chance of

breaking out of such closed circuits.

The Democratic Movement, in its journal *Demokrat*, made a very conscious attempt to establish contacts with a wide circle of sympathizers. In No. 5 it called on dissident groups and movements in Armenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Ukraine to contribute Russian translations of their own oppositional literature for general distribution inside the Soviet Union. Similarly, the editors of "Free Thought" specifically invited a number of *samizdat* authors to contribute to their journal (Antipov, Mikhailov, Strizh, Vol'nyi, Donskoi, Severnyi, the author of "Transformation of Bolshevism", and the authors of the Programme and the Basic Tactics of the Democratic Movement).

The absence of any spectacular proposals concerning direct action (if one disregards such peripheral groups as ASCULP) is easily explained of course by the political realities of Soviet society—the rigid control of all public life by the Party and in particular the existence of a powerful secret police equipped with an extensive and pervasive network of agents and informers. Yet the resulting powerlessness and inactivity of the democrats is not the whole picture; if it were one would expect a mood of apathy and disillusionment. Instead one notices liveliness and sometimes even a mood of expectancy. A dominant theme in the political views of the democrats is that the present regime is no longer able to save itself, that it muddles along from one crisis to another and that in effect its death throes have set in. What is important now is not so much to exert oneself to hasten this process (because the efficacy of such activities is questionable) but rather to be ready to act when the system breaks down. Many democrats have expressed serious concern about what will happen when this comes to pass. They have voiced their fears that the lowest and most destructive forces in Soviet society might come to the surface and cause an unprecedented flood of violence. In this light it is understandable that the elaboration of a set of generally acceptable political ideas and the dissemination of such ideas among the broadest possible strata of society emerges as the basic task of the present opposition.

The individual dissidents and their works

The All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People

No first-hand source material from the ASCULP is available. The first report concerning this organization was provided by the first issue of the Chronicle of Current Events. This reported the trial in Leningrad on March 14 and April 5, 1968, of seventeen members of the organization, charged with anti-Soviet propaganda and forming an anti-Soviet organization (arts. 70 and 72 of the Russian Criminal Code; the text of the verdict in this trial surfaced in *samizdat* in 1973: AS 1555). The four leaders of the group were charged additionally with treason (art. 64). The membership of the group was made up almost entirely of people employed by, or connected with, the University of Leningrad. Igor Ogurtsov, the chief leader and apparent organizer of the group, worked as a translator from the Japanese; of the other leaders, Mikhail Sado was an orientalist, Evgenii Vagin a literary critic and Boris Averochkin a lawyer. The group was formed in 1964, betrayed by one of its members (Aleksandr Gidoni) to the KGB in 1965 and arrested in February-March 1967. The four leaders were tried separately in November 1967. The Chronicle reported that about sixty people were arrested altogether in connection with the ASCULP case (also in other places such as Petrozavodsk and even as distant as Tomsk and Irkutsk) but nothing is known about the fate of the others. Although the organization aimed at the armed overthrow of the regime, no arms had been acquired and its activities were limited to the recruitment of new members and the distribution of literature.

> "The Union for the Liberation of the People is a secret non-partisan military-political organization, founded by like-minded people *[edinomyslenniki]* in order to free the fatherland from the tyrannical totalitarian regime and set up a social-Christian system."
>
> "The liberation of the people from the communist yoke can only be achieved through an armed struggle. For a complete victory the people needs its own underground liberation army which will overthrow the dictatorship and defeat the protective detachments of the oligarchy." (Quotations from the ASCULP Statutes)

The principal source of information about ASCULP is an anonymous article written in 1969 by a Leningrad author who is evidently familiar with ASCULP circles (AS 525). The article contained quotations from the ASCULP Statutes and a critical discussion of its ideology, aims and methods. Its author is not prevented by his serious criticism of some of the aspects of ASCULP's activities from agreeing with the organization's Christian orientation. This orientation is connected by him with Russian nationalism.

An article by the editor of *Veche* (cf. p. 51), Osipov, throws much light on the personal histories of the members of ASCULP and their conspiratorial practices (the statutes of ASCULP were kept by Borodin, one of the key members and the director of a school in Leningrad, inside the hollow head of the bust of Lenin in the school's main hall); see AS 1163.

Iks, Message from the USSR to the West (AS 536)

This long article was published in the USA in 1965, in a Russian-language review (*Novyi Zhurnal*). Nothing is known about the author. He describes with much detail the political and economic system of the Soviet Union, as this is experienced by the ordinary citizen. The article offers little in the nature of a political analysis. The author declares that his aim in writing and publishing his message is threefold: to express his indignation, to warn people in the West for what they may expect from communism, and to protest as a Christian against the perversion of all human values by Soviet communism.

Galanskov—Organizational Problems of the Movement for Full and Universal Disarmament (AS 538)

Iurii Galanskov was a young Moscow poet, known as the publisher of a literary *samizdat* journal called *Feniks*. Two issues of *Feniks* appeared, one in 1961 and another in 1966.[57] The article on disarmament is taken from the 1966 issue. Galanskov was arrested in January 1967 after the appearance of *Feniks* 1966. He was tried together with Aleksandr Ginzburg, the author of the Whitebook concerning the Siniaviskii-Daniel trial (although there was no connection of any importance between the two men). He received a seven years' sentence and died (probably from a neglected stomach ailment) at the age of 33 on November 4, 1972, in the Dubrovlag labour camp No. 3 in the autonomous republic of Mordovia. His article on disarmament is his chief contribution to *samizdat* political literature. Worth mentioning is also his opening manifesto in *Feniks* 1966. The disarmament article concentrates on international questions and pacifism at a highly personal and idealistic pitch. It does not fit well into any of the broader currents of political dissent.

Fedor Zniakov's Memorandum (AS 374)

The Memorandum was written in May 1966 by an author of whom nothing is known but what can be deduced from the Memorandum itself (Zniakov is a pseudonym). The lengthy article (about 40 type-written pages) displays considerable interest in the economic aspects of the Soviet regime's crisis. The author's ideas fit well into the general pattern of the political ideology of the democrats. The most notable features of the article are the important role the author assigns to the Russian emigration (particularly the NTS) and his favouring of an active strategy of the West to influence internal changes in the Soviet Union.

Literary review or political journal; the Posev discussion[58]

A discussion on the desirability of founding a (*samizdat*) journal took place among Moscow University students during the winter of 1966-1967. The discussion centred on the question of whether a literary or a political journal was called for under the prevailing circumstances. The main viewpoints expressed in the discussion were written down and published in the West by *Posev*. The discussion is of great interest because it is one of the very few examples of a compact and well-focused underground debate in the Soviet Union and especially because it concerned a question which was of crucial importance at a moment when the cultural opposition was fading and dissolving and the political opposition in the process of being born.

Talantov's "Soviet Society" (AS 752)

Boris Talantov (born in 1903 as the son of a priest) was one of the most remarkable figures of the Soviet opposition. He was trained as a mathematician and taught and lived most of his life in Kirov. He was an active and militant member of the orthodox church and suffered persecution in various forms on this account. He was arrested on June 12, 1969, and charged under art. 190-1 of the Russian Criminal Code (anti-Soviet slander). The charge referred mainly to his essay on Soviet society and also to various other writings protesting against the persecution of believers.[59] Talantov received a three years' camp sentence. Knowing that he would not survive, considering the state of his health, he took leave of his relatives at the end of his trial. He died in the Kirov prison hospital on January 4, 1971.[60]

The short essay on Soviet society (dated March, 1968) is chiefly a sharp indictment of the role of the Communist Party; it develops the familiar themes of the absolute power of the Party, the absence of human rights, the pyramidal construction of the Party bureaucracy and the return of Stalinism.

To hope or to act?, the Estonian Manifesto (AS 70)

The Estonian Manifesto is a reply to Sakharov's Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom and is sub-titled accordingly. It must have been written during the second half of 1968. Its main points of criticism of the Sakharov brochure concern Sakharov's understanding of the nature of the crisis in Soviet society and the excessive moderateness of his views and proposals. The real causes of the predica-

ment of the Soviet social and political system are not organizational or material, but spiritual and political, according to the Manifesto. The ills of the present should therefore be corrected first of all by a moral revolution. Sakharov's demands for political and economic reforms are considered altogether too modest. The Manifesto requests much more drastic measures. It ends with an appeal to "the leading minds of our society": "do not limit yourselves to science-fiction, pleasant illusions and rosy expectations! Create new public moral values! Work out new social, political and economic ideals!" The document which is signed by "numerous representatives of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonian SSR" may indicate some tension between two sections of the Soviet intelligentsia.

Ruslanov's "Youth in Russian History" (AS 539, 678)

Boris Evdokimov, a Leningrad journalist, was arrested on June 14, 1972, and charged under art. 70 of the Russian Criminal Code (anti-Soviet propaganda) for having published "Youth in Russian History" under the pseudonym of Ruslanov and other articles under the same name or under the name of Sergei Razumnyi (notably "The distribution of political forces in the CPSU"). All these articles had been published in the West by Russian émigré journals. He was declared to be of unsound mind and committed to the Leningrad prison-asylum.

"Youth in Russian History" is a book-length essay which is chiefly concerned with cultural and spiritual trends in Russian history. Its latter part is devoted to the society which emerged in Russia after the October Revolution. It views the Revolution as the triumph of the oriental, populist and obscurantist forces ("Moscow") over the forces of enlightenment, the intelligentsia and Western culture ("St. Petersburg"). The book is dated March, 1969.

Evdokimov's article on the distribution of political forces in the USSR (written under the pseudonym of Sergei Razumnyi, AS 570) is one of the comparatively rare exercices in Kremlinology to be found in *samizdat* literature. The article discusses the origins of the political power structure under Stalin and attempts to evaluate the present relations between various groups within the Politburo.

The works of Grigorii Pomerants[61]

Grigorii Pomerants is an unorthodox philosopher and man of letters, whose works have been published in Soviet academic journals and, after

his expulsion from the Writers' Union in 1954, mostly in *samizdat* form. It would not be easy to classify him in a specific group of political dissidents but many of his philosophical essays discuss general questions of a political nature. As such one could mention: "The man from nowhere", "The moral character of an historic personality" (AS 547, about Stalin), "Draft letter to the 23rd Party Congress", and others. It would seem that Pomerants, both in published works and on account of his activities in supporting human rights appeals, may be regarded as close to the democratic current of dissent in the Soviet Union.

Smirnov, The Individual and Society (AS 597)[62]

Nothing is known of P. Smirnov (undoubtedly a pseudonym), the author of this short essay written probably in the first half of 1969. Some of the terminology of the article suggests that he may be a lawyer or somebody who is not entirely a stranger to legal discourse. The essay refrains almost completely from explicit criticism of the Soviet system. Reasoning from religious principles (the equality of all mankind before God is the basic proposition) it endeavours to supply some theoretical foundations for a just society. Its merit is in providing a beginning for a principled and democratic political ideology which is not socialist.

O. Altaev, The Dual Consciousness of the Intelligentsia and Pseudo-Culture (AS 897)

This essay, published in 1970 in the Messenger of the Russian Student Christian Movement in Paris, only marginally touches upon political aspects of present-day Soviet society. Its profound (albeit sometimes obscure) and incisive comment on the intelligentsia's function as the pivotal element in the evolution of Soviet society makes it a major contribution towards a better understanding of the spiritual and psychological processes underneath the political activities of the opposition.

Semen Telegin, "How is One to Be?" (AS 1151)

The appearance of this essay by Telegin (a pseudonym) was reported in No. 12 of the Chronicle of Current Events. The author refers in his introduction to Amalrik's letter to Kuznetsov (AS 359, dated 1 November 1969); consequently the essay must have been written between 1 November 1969 and 28 February 1970. It discusses in a broad and general

manner the necessity of creating a new culture, opposed to the official culture dictated by the Soviet regime.

In 1972 the same author wrote an article on the newly-introduced emigration tax ("Trade in a valuable commodity").[63]

Amalrik: Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?[64] (AS 357)

This work which is probably the best known of the entire political *samizdat* literature does not need an introduction. Its fame is deserved. Written with calm humour and lethal irony, it stands out as a comprehensive and superior analysis of the Soviet social and political system and an impressive literary achievement. Notwithstanding the original and highly personal character of many of its views, its general political attitude and orientation make it representative of the mainstream of the democratic opposition. After serving a three years' sentence for slandering the Soviet social and political system Amalrik was sentenced to another three years' term without being released in July 1973.

The Programme of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union (AS 340). See p. 132 ff.

Iakir's Open Letter to Andrei Amalrik (AS 370)

Piotr Iakir, himself an historian and prominent member of the political opposition, addressed an open letter to Amalrik on March 28, 1970, in which he expressed friendly disagreement with some of Amalrik's theses. The letter was sent to the Chronicle of Current Events with a request to have it published (the speedy publication of the letter in Chronicle No. 13, dated April 28, 1970, may have suggested Iakir's connections to the authorities, a fact that was to become known after his arrest in 1972). Iakir disagrees in particular with Amalrik's pessimistic views of the future of the democratic movement. He believes that the process started by the proclamation of democratic ideas by a small group is irreversible. He is also doubtful of the validity of Amalrik's forecast of future Sino-Soviet troubles.

On the question of what is to be done

Only a synopsis of this anonymous essay is available, published in No. 13 of the Chronicle of Current Events. The author argues that the establishment of a democratic system in the Soviet Union can be realized only through the support of the masses. The chief obstacle in winning over the latter is the prevailing socialist attitude of mind (the masses support such ideas as the absence of private capital and the popular nature of state property); the author implies that some of the principal socialist ideas current in the USSR are incompatible with democracy. His views are akin to Ruslanov's where he labels the Soviet take-over a "peasant revolution" by which ancient "oriental" features of Russian society (such as despotism and the absence of a competitive market) were perpetuated. The article appeared early in 1970.

"What is it you want?" (AS 403)

The title of this anonymous *samizdat* document is obviously inspired by V. Kochetov's novel *Chego zhe ty khochesh'?*, published in the Stalinist journal *Oktiabr'* of which Kochetov was the chief editor. It probably appeared around the middle of 1970. The document is very short (about 1000 words) and looks like a draft for, or a synopsis of, a longer piece. It offers an analysis of Soviet society, indicates the objectives for political propaganda by the opposition and makes a few concrete proposals concerning suitable propaganda themes. The basic social groups are the intelligentsia (divided into Westernizers and slavophiles), the general citizenry (*obyvateli*) and the (political) elite, to be divided into conservatives, liberals and ultras. Propaganda directed at the general citizen should concentrate on his philistine instincts and alienate him from the authorities and Marxism, at the same time convincing him that the intelligentsia is his natural ally. Propaganda for the intellectuals should stress the absence of spiritual freedom and the fiasco of the October Revolution.

Basic Tactics of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union

The existence of this document first became known through a highly critical review in No. 14 of the Chronicle of Current Events. Its status was confirmed when it was mentioned in the Democratic Movement's journal *Demokrat* No. 5 as one of the Movement's basic documents (together with the Programme and the Memorandum of December 5, 1970). *Demokrat* No. 5 also informs the reader that the Basic Tactics appeared in June 1970. The contents of the Basic Tactics can to some extent be reconstructed from the Chronicle's criticism and the Democratic Movement's defence (as expressed in the opening article of *Demokrat* No. 5). According to the Basic Tactics the legal means of protest and opposition have gradually

been exhausted during the sixties; instead, the importance of various underground and conspiratorial methods is emphasized, with the general aim of providing many-sided information and of educating thereby the largest possible number of people in a truly democratic spirit. Two Leningrad dissidents, Davydov and Petrov, were tried in July 1973 for printing and disseminating a large number of copies of the Basic Tactics (AS 1820).

V. Severnyi, The Economic Position of the Soviet Union (AS 633)

In a lengthy article (which probably appeared in the latter half of 1970) Severnyi (apparently a pseudonym) investigates the economic performance of the USSR on the basis of numerical data concerning Soviet and U.S. agriculture and industry. The general background of Severnyi's study is his view that socialism is a 19th Century reaction to the initial stresses and problems of early capitalism; subsequent developments in the capitalist countries proved that the original socialist position was untenable. However, socialism came to be applied quite unexpectedly and anomalously in Russia where a peculiar combination of economic backwardness and socio-historical circumstances provided a suitable breeding-ground. Severnyi's aim is to demonstrate that Soviet socialism has led to economic disaster and that the full blame for this must be laid on the economic-political system of the country. His proposals for reform include a three-tiered economy (a state sector, a collective sector and a private sector), as alluded to in the Programme of the Democratic Movement. Severnyi labels himself a "democrat" and can be regarded as very close to the ideas of the Democratic Movement.

K. Vol'nyi, The intelligentsia and the democratic movement (AS 607)

In this article the author (the name Vol'nyi is a pseudonym, meaning "the free one") sketches a brief outline of the development of the dissident movement since 1965. He distinguishes between two main currents: one liberal communist and one radical, the latter represented primarily by the Programme of the Democratic Movement. He strongly supports the case for democracy in Russia, but sees enormous difficulties in the path towards democratic developments. He is particularly doubtful of the democratic inclinations of the mass of the Russian people.

From internal evidence one may conclude that the article was written not earlier than the second half of 1970.

Memorandum of the Democrats to the Supreme Soviet (AS 602)

The Memorandum is dated December 5, 1970 (December 5 being Constitution Day in the Soviet Union). Its full title is "Memorandum of the democrats to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR concerning the illegal seizing of power by the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its anticonstitutional activities". The Memorandum itself refers to the Programme of the Democratic Movement and the Basic Tactics of this Movement, and in subsequent documents issued under the imprint of the Democratic Movement the Memorandum is considered as one of the Movement's fundamental statements of policy (together with the Programme and the Basic Tactics). The differences in outlook and mood between the Programme and the Memorandum are considerable nonetheless. The main part of the Memorandum of the Democrats consists of a juxtaposition of constitutional "fact and fiction"; many provisions of the Soviet Constitution are quoted and then the Memorandum explains the real situation. The resulting commentary to the Constitution of the Soviet Union is at the same time an indictment of the Soviet political and social system. The Memorandum's analysis fits into the general pattern of democratic views although it displays a number of inconsistencies. It charges the Communist Party with the overthrow of the Provisional Government and then accuses the Party leadership of usurping all powers actually belonging to the soviets. It is radically critical of the present political system but advocates a restoration of the powers of the Supreme Soviet. Apart from the usual democratic demands (free elections, civil rights, etc.) this is the most notable proposal in the Memorandum. This demand is not only somewhat unrealistic in the light of the Memorandum's own analysis but also inconsistent with the Memorandum's address (the USSR Supreme Soviet). If the chief cause of all present evils is that the Party elite has appropriated all powers belonging to the Supreme Soviet, how is the powerless Supreme Soviet going to correct this?

A. Strikh, A Reply to A. Mikhailov

The Open Letter by Strikh (in some sources the name is reported as Strizh) is directed against Mikhailov's "Thoughts on the liberal campaign of 1968" (discussed on p. 97 ff.). Its contents are known only through an extensive excerpt in the Chronicle of Current Events No. 17. Strikh defends the social usefulness of public protest against arbitrary or unlawful behaviour of the regime, even where such protest will lead to imprisonment of the protesters, because in his opinion this is the first step on the road to realize some amount of democratic freedom. He agrees with

Mikhailov that the intelligentsia should address itself to designing new social and political ideologies, but it should not limit itself to that task. In this respect Strikh puts little trust in Marxist concepts. The letter was probably written in the spring of 1971.

Sakharov's Memorandum to Brezhnev, and Postscript (AS 1136, 1136a)

According to the Postscript following the Memorandum the latter document was sent to the General Secretary of the CPSU (Brezhnev) on March 5, 1971. The Postscript was written in June 1972 (when no reply to the Memorandum had been received). Both documents were released together on June 22, 1972. The Memorandum refers to an earlier letter to Party and government leaders by R. Medvedev, Turchin and Sakharov himself (letter of March 19, 1970; see p. 98), requesting a discussion of that letter. The Memorandum itself returns to the main themes of Sakharov's earliers work "Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" although there is more emphasis in the Memorandum on the internal problems of Soviet society. The general tone of the Memorandum is more disillusioned and bitter than in Sakharov's earlier works. Sakharov's changed mood is even more noticeable in the Postscript which talks about "our bureaucratic and bigoted system with its totalitarian interference in the life of the citizens". Still, the Postscript reaffirms Sakharov's faith in the convergence between capitalism and the socialist regime as the only means to overcome the conflicts and dangers of our time. On Sakharov's more recent views, see p. 217 ff.

Demokrat, Nos. 5 and 6 (AS 1152, 1175)

Only two issues of this journal which called itself "organ of the democratic forces" reached the West. No. 5 contains an obituary of Khrushchev and must be dated in the autumn of 1971. The other issue is tentatively marked No. 4 by *Arkhiv Samizdata* but contains a letter dated November 1971; it is therefore most likely that it was published shortly after No. 5 and has been designated accordingly as No. 6 in this work. Both issues claim to emanate from the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union. No. 6 may almost be regarded as a symposium on the political objectives of the Democratic Movement. Some of the articles it carries are very critical of the ideas and methods of the Democratic Movement (see further p. 173 ff.). The contents of No. 5 are differently organized and of greater variety. No. 5 opens with an unsigned article in the nature of an editorial comment in which the Democratic Movement defends itself against the criticism

levelled against it in No. 14 of the Chronicle of Current Events. This is followed by a highly theoretical essay on "The fundamental concepts of society", an article on the beginning of the War with Nazi Germany, an obituary of Khrushchev and various brief comments, poems and editorial announcements. The issue also includes the Movement's statement concerning Sino-Soviet relations (see p. 142).

Free Thought No. 1 (AS 1180)

This journal is subtitled "A social-political journal" and dated December 20, 1971. The head of the front-page carries the words "Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union", but the date (between the dates of issue of Nos. 5 and 6 of *Demokrat*) indicates that Free Thought was published by a group which was not identical with the authors of the main documents of the Democratic Movement. This is also borne out by an editorial appeal on p. 5 of Free Thought where several *samizdat* authors (including the authors of the Programme of the Democratic Movement and the Basic Tactics) are asked to contribute to Free Thought. (The tactical guidelines for the Democratic Movement as set out in the Basic Tactics specifically encourage individual groups to embark on activities in the name of the Democratic Movement without establishing previous contacts with the originators of the Movement or with other groups. Free Thought may be regarded as a response to this appeal.)

The opening statement of the editorial board proposes a new arrangement for the dissemination of the journal: not by the usual *samizdat* procedure but through a system of subscriptions where prepaid copies of the journal would be handed on by the usual *samizdat* channels through which, in the opposite direction, the orders and payments would have come. The system is worked out in greater detail in another article entitled "From *samizdat* to *kolizdat*" (collective publishing). Another article in Free Thought concerns itself with photographic techniques for publishing *samizdat*. The issue also contains two lengthy articles on the Soviet economy and a large number of brief news items.

No further issues of Free Thought have become known, although the existence of a second issue is reported in AS 1820.

Aleksandrov, Brief notes on the present-day crisis

This document is known only through a short resumé in the 27th issue of the Chronicle of Current Events (dated October 15, 1972).

Solidarist documents, professing adherence to the political creed of the NTS—solidarism, occupy a peculiar place in *samizdat*. Some of them have only been published in the West, having been sent out directly for that purpose, and have not circulated as *samizdat* before. They are nowhere referred to in *samizdat* and thereby remain outside the political debate of *samizdat*. The Russian emigré organization NTS and its main publication *Posev* are mentioned occasionally in *samizdat* (e.g. in Ruslanov's "Youth in Russian History"—AS 539 and 678—and in Zniakov's Memorandum —AS 374), but not their underground affiliations in Russia. Moreover, the heavy emphasis on solidarism sets the documents in question apart from all other *samizdat* materials.

The first solidarist document included in this survey is *Posev* No. 1, a two-page pamphlet sub-titled "NTS communication bulletin, signed "NTS group Falcon" (*Sokol*) and dated 1966.[65] Page one contains a short analysis of the present political situation in the Soviet Union in the form of a preamble, page two follows with a political programme in eleven points. The preamble leaves no doubts as to the anti-communist inclinations of its authors and their adherence to the ideas of the NTS.

> "The NTS fights for the liberation of Russia from the dictatorship of the CPSU, for the establishment of a popular-labour system, for the realization of the ideas of popular-labour solidarism."

(The combination "popular-labour" has a peculiar meaning in solidarist terminology, implying a central role for the ideas of "people" and "labour"; the name NTS itself stands for *Narodno-Trudovoi Soiuz*—Popular-Labour Union).

The eleven-point programme offers the usual list of civil rights and democratic freedoms; the most interesting points are: profit-sharing by the workers; distribution of the land among the farmers, allowing every farmer a free choice between collective and individual farming; encouragement of private initiative in those branches of industry and trade which are of the greatest importance in fulfilling daily needs.

Another document, entitled "Opinions of an NTS group in Russia", was published in 1971.[66] This document is specifically addressed to the NTS organization in the West and comments on the programme of this organization. It is the most moderate and least anti-Soviet of all solidarist *samizdat*. It criticizes the proposal of decollectivizing agriculture, arguing that the Russian peasant of today is professionally and psychologically unfit for individual farming and that individual farming will lead to great inefficiency and waste. Soviet troops should not withdraw from Central Europe, because this would upset the balance of power. The institution of political officers in the armed forces should not be discontinued, because they are necessary for maintaining morale. Any thoughts of armed insurrection are rejected. The main activity of the NTS in Russia, according to this document, should be to spread the solidarist idea; certain Marxist-Leninist ideas can be used in this process.

A group calling itself "The Union of Solidarists" published a short manifesto, addressed to the citizens of Russia, in June 1971 in Moscow.[67] The manifesto contains few concrete political proposals; it rejects capitalism as well as socialism and stresses that the only hope for mankind lies in scientific solidarism.

> "It is exactly scientific solidarism, emerging in the same historical period as scientific socialism, which teaches, contrary to socialism, that life on earth and also in society develops, not so much by virtue of antagonism, of a struggle for survival, of a collision of views, groups, classes and peoples, but by virtue of their fully natural solidarity and of an inborn inclination to live together. Life proves that solidarism has the future."

A two-page pamphlet addressed to the "workers of the fields of Russia" was disseminated in April 1973 by "The Union of Solidarists of Russia" (it is not clear whether this group is the same as the one mentioned in the preceding paragraph).[68] The pamphlet repeats the familiar theme that solidarism is opposed to capitalism and socialism, but is much more explicit than the previous solidarist documents in its proposals. It summarizes its programme in the following points:

"1. The farmer's ownership of the land, the buildings and agricultural produce will be guaranteed by law.

2. The farmer will have the right to choose freely between individual and collective farming.

3. The state will provide all necessary aid to the farmers in developing highly productive agriculture."

The pamphlet adds that these points are "as written down in the Programme of the Union"; this may indicate a relation between the "Union of Solidarists of Russia" and the *Sokol* group which published the underground issue of *Posev* in 1966. The eighth point of the programme of the latter group resembles very closely the demands of the Union of Solidarists of Russia. In order to realize their demands, the Union of Solidarists of Russia encourages the peasants to form small secret cells which may organize concerted action on a local level to weaken the Party's grip. Among the activities suggested are: abstaining from participation in general meetings and in "voluntary" unpaid work on Saturdays (the so-called *subbotnik*), and exemplary management of the private plot (in order to strengthen the private sector of agricultural economy).

In 1973 *Posev* published a lengthy comment on the new NTS programme, contributed by a group of solidarists from Russia.[69] The authors of the document refer several times to their previous statements (which they in part retract) and this warrants the conclusion that they are the same people who wrote the "Opinions of an NTS group in Russia" in 1971. They admit that they misjudged the attractiveness of private initiative in the economy; they state that they organized an opinion poll on this question in Moscow, which resulted in 58% of the answers being in favour of it. On other points they retain their critical attitude; they reject the idea of allowing private schools, because such schools would create a more favourable situation for children of better-off parents. They are opposed to any weakening of Russia's military strength and fail to see the emergence of a revolutionary situation in the Soviet Union (neither do they desire such a situation). They proclaim their allegiance to solidarism, democracy and the rule of law (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*).

In sum one might say that Russian NTS groups are comparatively close to the liberal democrats in their actual political desiderata, but differ in their peculiar political orientation (solidarism) and in their strong emphasis on Russian nationalism.

Chapter 6

CONFRONTATION AND REPRESSION

The fate of the dissident movement in subsequent years

The currents of dissent described in the previous chapters, which had started as small rivulets in the 'sixties, ran into formidable obstacles in 1973. This year, if the image may be maintained, can be compared to a waterfall; the individual currents flow together and become indistinguishable, everything moves faster and after a series of dramatic climaxes a certain amount of peace returns, but at a different level.

In fact, two very different developments took place in 1973 which together transformed the oppositional scene in the Soviet Union. One was the foreseeable confrontation between representatives of the major currents of dissent, and the other the extensive and in many ways successful campaign of repression waged by the Soviet government against its internal opposition. Already in 1972 it had become clear that increasing pressure had been brought to bear on various dissident circles. After many years of failure the authorities finally managed to silence the Chronicle of Current Events as one of the most efficient vehicles of dissident opinion. The majority of political dissidents found itself in prisons, labour camps or psychiatric institutions. A not inconsiderable number of people who had in some way been active in the *samizdat* movement were allowed to leave the country or were deprived of their citizenship and refused re-entry. Many of these were Soviet Jews who had been successful in applying for emigration to Israel, but the Soviet government has shown itself not averse to getting rid of other troublesome citizens as well (Chalidze, Zh. Medvedev, Tarsis, Siniavskii, Solzhenitsyn, and many others).[1] As a result of this policy the ranks of the publicly known dissidents were decimated by the middle of 1974. The main figures remaining were Sakharov and some of the other scientists in his entourage, Roy Medvedev, and a small number of other individual protesters such as Levitin-Krasnov or Vl. Osipov. The pressure on potential dissidents, which had obviously been much increased in recent years, resulted in the appearance of only very few new faces in the dissident movement.

This process has not gone unnoticed by dissident authors themselves. In an article "How to go on? Requiem for the year 1968" (AS 1614) Ia.

Matveev analyzes the psychological differences between "them" (meaning the articulate spokesmen of dissent in earlier years) and "us" (the mute and more or less passive dissenters who succeeded them). Matveev's opening sentences read: "The people of 1968 have gone away. Into non-existence, an existence elsewhere, an existence which is hardly worth that name *[nebytiinoe sushchestvovanie]* or into exile." At the end of his contemplations (written in 1973) he expresses the hope that the amorphous dissatisfaction which has remained may be the starting-point for a total reconsideration of the social ideals of Russia.

> "It is still far, far away, but perhaps there really is the glimmer of something new. Is there perhaps in this elemental form, not yet reflected upon by anybody, of the self-negation of society the first beginning of [a better] future?"

The confrontation between the main political and social currents of the opposition in the Soviet Union was, of course, an inevitable phenomenon. Once the principal positions had been stated, the next natural step was some sort of debate or dialogue between the occupants of these positions. To be sure, the previous years had already produced numerous discussions among *samizdat* authors, but these were usually of limited scope. In 1973 and 1974 several great debates took place in which the chief figures of the oppositional scene took part, and which dealt with the basic questions of the Soviet political system. The debates crystallized around Sakharov's statements on international détente (summer 1973), Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union" (September 1973) and the publication of the first volume of "The Gulag Archipelago" (December 1973).

Détente and democratization in the Soviet Union

During the summer of 1973, when a significant improvement in Soviet-American relations appeared to be round the corner, Sakharov gave several interviews to Western journalists in which he pointed out that international détente should not be realized at the expense of the democratic opposition in the Soviet Union; he asked in particular that the United States Congress should not extend certain advantages (most favoured nation position, etc.) to the Soviet Union if the latter would not at the same time be prepared to allow its citizens free emigration.[2] Sakharov also repeated his previously expressed criticism of the Soviet political and social system. (In another interview, given shortly before to Ulle Stenholm, a Swedish broadcasting journalist, Sakharov had already expressed his fears that the dissidents in the Soviet Union would be used as small change in the détente talks between the Soviet Union and the West; interview of 3 July 1973, AS 1455.)

He was supported on many points by Solzhenitsyn who also made several public statements during the summer of 1973.[3] Both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn then came under heavy attack in the Soviet press; the campaign went on until the middle of September when it stopped abruptly. The main accusation levelled against Sakharov was that he was an opponent of international détente. Sakharov rejected this charge in a public statement made on 8 September 1973, in which he said:

> "I have held and I hold that the only real way to solve world problems is the mutual convergence and rapprochement of the capitalist and socialist systems, accompanied by demilitarization, strengthening of the social protection of the rights of all working people and the creation of an economy of a mixed type. . . . I stress the importance of mutual confidence, one of the conditions for which is wide publicity and openness of society, democratization, freedom to disseminate information, exchange of ideas, respect for all the basic rights of the individual, in particular for the right of every individual to choose the country where he wants to live.
>
> I call attention to the dangers of a pseudo-détente, not accompanied by an increase in confidence and democratization. I regard such a warning as my right and my duty. How can one consider such a warning as a statement against détente?" (AS 1482)

In October of the same year Roy Medvedev published a long *samizdat* article entitled "The problem of democratization and the problem of détente (AS 1500)", in which the question raised by Sakharov was placed within the broader framework of the internal development of Soviet society and the possibilities of influencing this development from inside or outside the Soviet Union.

Medvedev noted first the changed political climate which had produced a different and much worse position for the dissidents; he then continued:

> "But one should also not fail to notice something else: many of these people, under heavy and permanent pressure, subjected to crude and unjust attacks in the press and in oral propaganda, strongly affected by the persecution and arrest of their less well-known collaborators and friends and deprived of the active support which wide circles of the intelligentsia gave them in the past, begin to express more and more extreme views and put forward less and less constructive proposals, guided more by emotions than by considerations of political efficiency."

Looking at the examples of these extreme views, as given by Medvedev, one cannot doubt that Medvedev was addressing himself particularly to Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. The views expressed by many dissidents have

another disadvantage, according to Medvedev, apart from their onesidedness and unconstructiveness.

> "Such views and statements, widely disseminated by Western communications media, will unquestionably meet with doubt and even rejection among left-wing and democratic circles in Western countries and will be used by reactionary groups in the government of our country in order to increase the pressure on the intelligentsia and to split and demoralize the dissidents."

Medvedev believed that democratic changes in the Soviet socio-political system are urgently needed, but that such changes would have to come from inside the system and in fact from the leaders themselves. Neither foreign pressure nor activities of internal groups (dissidents or "democratic" circles within the Party) would be able to exert sufficient influence to bring about the desired reforms. Sakharov's support for the Jackson amendment is therefore unjustified because the American Congress is not able, and should not be allowed, to prescribe the Soviet government's internal policies; Sakharov's action is doubly undesirable because it might even result in the negative effect of the freedom to emigrate not being incorporated in the new Soviet Constitution (which is said to be drafted now).

Medvedev then returned to the question of the addressee of statements about human rights and democracy in the USSR. He argued that Nixon, Pompidou and Heath protected the interests of the ruling classes of their countries and that the capitalist circles of the West were probably not at all interested in the speedy development of socialist democracy in the USSR.

> ". . . in the development of a genuine socialist democracy in our country are primarily interested the left-wing circles of the West, i.e. the socialist and communist parties, the progressive intelligentsia, various left-wing organizations."

These are the people whose support the Soviet dissidents should solicit, according to Medvedev. Otherwise, it is not very clear what Medvedev proposes to do in a positive sense. The democratization of Soviet society, as well as the Soviet contribution to international détente, is a matter for the Soviet government, which, in Medvedev's eyes, is to a great extent immune to outside pressures and internal grass-roots influences.

Similar ideas were expressed by Roy Medvedev's twin brother, Zhores, who, residing in Britain, was deprived of his passport by the Soviet authorities in the beginning of August 1973.[4]

The criticism of the Medvedev brothers was rejected by Sakharov himself in a short statement issued on 20 November 1973.

> "I do not agree with many of the views and the general tendency of the recent statements made by Roy and Zhores Medvedev. I associate myself with the opinion concerning these statements, expressed in the letters of M. Agurskii and V. Maksimov. The Medvedevs have ranged themselves with their pragmatism against those who are now engaged in a moral battle for man's right to live and think freely. The release of political prisoners, freedom of emigration and freedom of conscience are purely moral demands. The spiritual health of society, the economic and political conditions of the life of the entire people depend on their realization. In particular, I cannot possibly agree with the Medvedev's belittling of the role of the question of freedom of emigration. I am convinced that this right is not only important for those who [want to] leave, but also for those who stay behind. I believe we should talk loudly and openly about our tragic problems, addressing ourselves to all honest people regardless of their political convictions. This is our duty to our country and to the entire world. The position of the Medvedevs who emphatically appeal to the so-called forces of the left appears to be mistaken to me." (AS 1505)

A more elaborate reply to the Medvedevs came from Agurskii in a *samizdat* article "Where the Medvedev brothers are right and where they are wrong (AS 1508)". Mikhail (or Melik) Agurskii is a comparative newcomer on the *samizdat* scene; he wrote a review of an anti-semitic book in 1971 or 1972 (of Iu. Ivanov's "Danger! Zionism!", Moscow, *Politizdat* 1969, AS 1192) and an open letter to Osipov's journal *Veche* (see p. 51), protesting against this journal's attitude towards the Jewish question (AS 1481). He is a scientist and a specialist in cybernetics. He was born in 1933 as the son of an American communist who had gone to live in Russia in 1917 and who was arrested in 1938 (AS 1601).

Agurskii's first objection to the Medvedevs is that there is no evidence that détente will lead to an improvement of the internal situation in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, he argues, several periods which showed a significant rapprochement between the USA and the USSR (particularly the mid-thirties) were characterized by increased terror in the Soviet Union itself. On the other hand, there is ample evidence that pressure from world public opinion has had a beneficial effect on the situation in the country. Moreover, he adds:

> ". . . there is another side to appealing to world public opinion. Such appeals, regardless of their effect on the internal situation in the USSR, will warn the West against the false road it would take if it were to consider such a situation normal and acceptable. This is the

contribution and the sacrifice the Soviet opposition has to make for the good of other peoples."

Agurskii then agrees with the Medvedevs that the Soviet opposition should address itself chiefly to leftist circles, but, apparently, for the reason that the left is more influential in the West and that its influence is steadily growing. However, Agurskii's final judgment in this matter is very much at variance with the ideas of the Medvedevs because of his entirely different evaluation of the Soviet political order.

> ". . . the Medvedevs make a serious miscalculation on this point, because, addressing themselves to leftist circles in the West, they tacitly assume that such an appeal is based on the similarity between the social order allegedly existing in the USSR and the ideals confessed by leftist circles in the West, including communists and socialists. But the enormous tragedy of the leftist movement, as well as of the USSR itself, is that under the influence of slogans it confuses socialism with state-monopolistic capitalism which emerged as the form of social structure in the USSR and its sphere of influence, including Eastern Europe and Cuba (as this has been pointed out already by the leader of the Soviet opposition, academician Sakharov). It is precisely this confusion and nothing else which is at the root of the Chilean tragedy, when president Allende attempted to introduce such a system in his country, in the naive but sincere belief that he was thereby building socialism."
>
> . . .
>
> "The Chilean left, together with the left of other countries, did not understand and to this day does not understand that nationalization of heavy industry does not lead to socialism but to dictatorship, no matter what slogans, right or left, are utilized. . . . The tragedy of the leftist forces in Chile was that they did not attempt to change the consumer *[potrebitel'skii]* character of their society, but simply wanted to use the old economic machinery for new purposes, not realizing that such a procedure would automatically result in dictatorship, as this has already happened before in history."

It is therefore not surprising to see, says Agurskii, that state capitalism in the East and private capitalism in the West find each other at one in wishing to strengthen economic relations and business contacts. It is the duty of all the left-wing forces in the world to work towards the realization of genuine socialism.

> "They should be convinced that the condition for building a society with social justice is not the nationalization of the capitalist economy, but the creation of an economy of a new type, free from the disasters

> of the consumers' society. It has to be noted with disappointment that the Medvedev brothers occupy perhaps the most conservative position among the Soviet opposition in their attempt to maintain the status quo with only a few corrections."

Soon afterwards, in December 1973, Agurskii returned to the same theme in a more general article "The economic systems of the East and the West" (AS 1617). In this article, which is chiefly addressed to Western socialists, Agurskii analyzed in greater detail the similarities and differences between the economic systems of East and West, both of which he regards as capitalist. He is most concerned with the lack of understanding for this phenomenon, as displayed by Western socialists.

> "The partisans of socialism in the West, whose numbers are steadily growing, are aware of the existence, in the countries of the so-called 'socialist' camp, of many obvious shortcomings, but, convinced of the fact that in these countries the main purpose of scientific socialism—socialization of the means of production—has been achieved, they regard these shortcomings as something that will pass and can easily be corrected. The absence of basic human rights, the outrageous injustices, national discrimination and an aggressive foreign policy they consider to be some kind of incident which can easily be eliminated by passing a resolution at the next party congress.
>
> This position is fully understandable and explainable because otherwise these people would have to declare faulty the very idea of social justice which lies at the basis of socialism. All this creates an absolutely striking phenomenon. The partisans of socialism in Western countries, protesting sharply and rightly against the minutest violations of human rights in their own countries, display an amazing equanimity when it comes to such violations in countries of the 'socialist' camp, where they sometimes exceed by hundreds and thousands of times the violations committed in capitalist countries.
>
> Such a position can certainly not be explained by the moral blindness and obtuse indifference of these people, or at least the majority of them, to human suffering. The question is that many partisans of socialism in the capitalist countries of the West do not realize to this day that the socio-economic system of the 'socialist' camp is not socialist at all, but represents a form of state-monopolistic capitalism which in several aspects is further removed from the ideals of social justice than the private capitalistic system prevailing in the West."

Heavy and large-scale industry, according to Agurskii, is necessarily connected with some form of capitalism. No amount of "workers' control"

can amend this because either the worker is incompetent or, if he is competent in running a large enterprise, he goes over to the side of the "bosses". The capitalist system itself, whether state or private capitalism, inevitably leads to overproduction and exhaustion of resources. Economically private capitalism is in three ways superior to state capitalism. In state capitalism there are not sufficient stimuli for efficient management; the economy of state capitalism is not sufficiently competitive; and the price mechanism in state capitalism does not function properly. Politically state capitalism almost inevitably engenders totalitarianism.

At the end of his essay Agurskii remarks:

> "This work does not intend to advance some kind of alternative to the socio-economic systems existing in our time. Such an alternative, *if at all possible* [italics added, F.F.], must be based on a much broader analysis than the quite superficial one contained in this work."

He concludes by appealing to Western socialists to direct their efforts to the creation of social forms which could supply the basis for the society of the future, instead of defending, under the guise of socialism, a system which is nothing but state-monopolistic capitalism.

Another lengthy rebuttal of the Medvedev position in the détente controversy came from a certain Valentin Mikhailov in an "Open letter to the Medvedev brothers" (dated January 1974, Moscow, AS 1548). Mikhailov reproaches the Medvedev brothers for their lack of realism in assessing the possibilities of the Soviet political and social system. Even if the kind of détente the Medvedevs appear to have in mind will work out, the economic advantages ensuing from it will benefit only the bureaucratic elite; the idea that the Soviet government will allow détente to result in a free exchange of ideas and in a somewhat larger degree of democracy in public life in the Soviet Union is totally naive, according to Mikhailov, and is contradicted by every bit of historical experience; the Soviet Union, furthermore, has proved abundantly that it is always willing to disregard totally any kind of détente or rapprochement if other circumstances dictate such a course. The use of the labels "right" and "left" is meaningless, because these terms are themselves devoid of meaning. Mikhailov concludes:

> "Respected brothers Medvedev, the *rabfak* simplicity displayed by you would be amusing in itself if you did not injure thereby the best sons of Humanity in their desperate efforts to open people's eyes."

(The *rabfak* or workers' faculty was an institution which existed in the first years after the October revolution for the purpose of quickly exposing reliable proletarians to some sort of higher education.)

In an article dated 15 April 1974 ("Once more about democracy and détente, AS 1680") Roy Medvedev answers his critics. From his reply one can conclude that he received quite a number of reactions and that his initial article obviously evoked strong feelings among Soviet dissidents. The tone of the second article is, on the whole, conciliatory and many of the views expressed in the first article are rephrased in a more cautious manner or with important reservations. Medvedev observes that he has never held that democratic freedoms could only be conferred from above by the Soviet government.

> "My idea, perhaps unsuccessfully expressed, was that a broadening of the democratic movement, which until this day unfortunately was an affair of individuals or small groups from the intelligentsia, would increase the chances for certain concessions from above, which in their turn would widen the scope for the democratic movement and facilitate its activities."

Medvedev agrees with Sakharov's moral point of view but adds that this is not enough; one should investigate the possibilities for promoting democratic developments. In his evaluation of the economic system of the West Medvedev shows a much less negative attitude than in his earlier writings. He recognizes not only the economic advantages of the capitalist mode of production but also seems to discern some connection between private enterprise and the position of human rights.

> ". . . these firms and monopolies, fully controlling the professional activities of their employees and making their material well-being dependent on their loyalty to the firm, are more or less indifferent to the nationality, the religious and political convictions of their employees, or they have at least the chance of being indifferent in this respect."

Furthermore, Medvedev emphasizes that Western public opinion may indeed, in individual cases, exert a beneficial influence in the Soviet Union. In this respect he believes that support from leftist and progressive circles in the West will be especially valuable, but it is not quite clear whether this is because the Soviet government will be more easily influenced by such Western opinions or because the Soviet dissidents should feel closer to such opinions. The following quotation may perhaps show that Medvedev has both reasons in mind.

> ". . . for us the support of left-wing, progressive circles of the Western public is especially valuable. This certainly does not mean that the leaders of the USSR are insensitive to criticism from other influential social forces in the West and the East. But still for the participants in

the struggle for civil rights in the USSR it will be most natural to address themselves for support to the representatives of those social forces who are active in their own countries in the defence of civil rights. It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the support for Soviet 'dissidents' coming from the Chinese or the Spanish press, or from extreme right-wing circles in the West, which prevent the extension of social, economic and civil rights in their home countries."

(It is interesting to contrast Medvedev's judgment on the political weight and wisdom of Western "progressive" opinion with the views of Agurskii and Sakharov. The latter remarked, in an interview with a *Sunday Times* correspondent on 20 February 1974—published in the *Sunday Times* of 24 February, AS 1593:

"The historic failure of the so-called progressive public opinion of the 'twenties, 'thirties and 'forties to listen to and understand the Russian emigration must not be repeated.")

Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union" (AS 1600)

Samizdat literature contains, along with purely literary works, a great many short statements and letters from Solzhenitsyn. The vast majority of these concern Solzhenitsyn's own position as a writer and the harassments and repressions he and other literary figures and friends were subjected to during recent years. Until the middle of 1973 Solzhenitsyn quite consciously refrained from making generalized political statements about the Soviet system in its entirely. The first indication of a willingness to express himself in a general judgment was an interview given to two AFP reporters on 23 August 1973 (AS 1525). (Most of the questions for this interview were prepared by Solzhenitsyn himself.) After a number of questions on specific personal or literary topics, Solzhenitsyn was asked: "How do you evaluate the present situation of Soviet society? Can its development be influenced by the views and statements of Western cultural leaders?" Solzhenitsyn's answer still avoided committing itself to a specific political theory and referred mostly to individual injustices committed by the Soviet regime, but it was clear that he was getting ready to speak out about the regime in general.

The next indication of the direction in which Solzhenitsyn's political ideas were moving was provided by a short essay "Peace and violence", dated 5 September 1973, which became known in October 1973 (AS 1479). The main point of this essay was that not war, but violence was the opposite of peace, and that the Soviet regime was the most intensely violent regime in world history; the number of its victims exceeds the total

number of victims of two world wars. Solzhenitsyn reproaches the West for its lack of understanding on this point and its faulty perspective. The hullabaloo about Watergate, he says, is like a parody of the Kadet's attack on the Goremykin-Stürmer government in 1915-1916.

"And it is laughable to the point of sadness to watch how social movements, public figures and the youth of the West, fifty and seventy years later, repeat 'our' ideas, errors and mistakes."

Annoyance with the West's feeble-mindedness in assessing the realities of the Soviet system is a dominant feature of Solzhenitsyn's political thought. In the AFP interview he had already expressed his anger over the practice of combining any critical remarks concerning the Soviet regime with similar utterances concerning dictatorial regimes in the West.

"And even today many statements of the Western press and public figures, even those who are very sensitive to repressions and persecutions taking place in the East, are accompanied, in order to create an artificial balance for left-wing circles, by the obligatory reservation 'as, of course, in Greece, Spain and Turkey'. But when this fictitious series 'as also in' is constructed, sympathy for us loses its meaning and its depth, it even insults us, and the sympathizers themselves fail to see the grave warning."

Finally, after his deportation from the Soviet Union in February 1974, Solzhenitsyn published a lengthy document in which he set out his views concerning the political situation inside the Soviet Union, the internal and external policies of the Soviet government and his proposals for his country's salvation. The "Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union" was dated 5 September 1973 (the same date as the essay on "Peace and violence") and was sent to the Soviet government in 1973 according to Solzhenitsyn's foreword. It first became publicly known in the West when it was published in the *Sunday Times* of 3 March 1974; it was apparently not widely known in the Soviet Union before that time. The first references to it in *samizdat* are Sakharov's reply of 3 April (AS 1655) and a passing remark bij Medvedev in his second article on détente and democratization (AS 1680, dated 15 April 1974).

The Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union has been publicized widely in the West and has been translated into the major world languages; it is unnecessary therefore to summarize it here. Again, Solzhenitsyn shows himself a keen observer and analyst of social and political phenomena which are portrayed with persuasive eloquence and deadly precision. He is somewhat disappointing, however, as a political thinker. Some of his proposals for reform cannot but strike the Western reader as naive and unnecessarily russocentric at the best.

a sensible existence in an ever more complicated world. Of course, there is something like a vicious circle here, but I fail to see why such a thing is not possible in principle in our country. In the Russian past there were many marvellous democratic improvements, starting with the reforms of Alexander II. By the same token I cannot agree with the reasoning of those people in the West who look upon the failure of socialism in Russia as a result of its specific nature, of the absence of democratic traditions."

Sakharov finally sums up his objections to Solzhenitsyn's Letter in the following words:

"Solzhenitsyn, in my judgment, overestimates the role of the ideological factor in the present Soviet society. Hence his belief that the replacement of Marxism by a healthy ideology, and it seems that he has in mind the orthodox religion, will save the Russian people. This belief lies at the bottom of his whole conception. But I am convinced that in actual fact the nationalist and isolationist tendency of Solzhenitsyn's thinking and the religious-patriarchal romanticism characteristic of him lead him to very substantial errors and make his proposals utopian and potentially dangerous."

Not surprisingly, Solzhenitsyn's views received a much more sympathetic hearing from Osipov, who devoted two essays to the defence of Solzhenitsyn: "Five objections to Sakharov" (AS 1696) and "The question of the aims and methods of the legal opposition" (AS 1760); on Osipov, see p. 51.

Roy Medvedev, who had already expressed some passing criticism of Solzhenitsyn's Letter in previous documents (e.g. AS 1680), returned to the question in a long essay written in May 1974 (AS 1874): "What lies before us? On the letter of A. I. Solzhenitsyn". Without referring to Sakharov, Medvedev's criticism of Solzhenitsyn comes remarkably close to Sakharov's rebuttal. Medvedev also attacks Solzhenitsyn's russocentrism and adds the point that Solzhenitsyn's proposals are not even in the genuine interest of the Russian people. He argues that Solzhenitsyn's economic ideas are naive and potentially disastrous and that, in particular, the latter's rejection of economic progress makes no sense. What is, however, most interesting about Medvedev's essay is that it is not so much a critique of Solzhenitsyn's first major venture in the field of political ideology, as an astonishing reflection of a shift in Medvedev's own political standpoint. It appears that Medvedev, while still regarding himself as a Marxist, has moved much closer to the democratic mainstream.

He devotes considerable attention to religion and the position of the orthodox church. He recognizes the fact that there are tens of millions

of believers now in the Soviet Union and that it is quite likely that the influence of the church will grow in the years to come.

"Many people again turn to religion, in the attempt to fill the spiritual vacuum in which they find themselves. For many members of the intelligentsia a return to the church represents a legal form of protest against increased political and ideological pressure."

Although he is convinced that the orthodox church has no future in Russia, he believes it may continue to exist for centuries. In the meantime the constitutionally guaranteed rights of freedom of conscience and of religion should be fully observed and the official policy of persecution and discrimination should be halted.

Even more startling are his views on socialism. While he regarded himself in the past as a Marxist-Leninist belonging to the democratic wing of the Communist Party, he now defines his political ideals as follows:

"Socialism is a social system where the free development of each individual is a condition for the development of the whole society. ...

For me, as for every thinking Marxist, socialist democracy means not only a guarantee of the rights of the majority but also of the minority, including the minority's right to formulate and defend its own ideas and convictions. Socialist democracy means that freedom of conscience, of the word and the press, of receiving and disseminating information, of scientific and artistic creation are guaranteed. In a socialist society dissidents and the opposition should not be persecuted, because without the right of opposition no democracy can exist."

With this kind of socialism, of course, none of the non-socialist dissidents would disagree.

Solzhenitsyn, Medvedev continues, has no idea of what Marxism is about and he then launches into an enumeration of misunderstandings about what he believes to be Marxism.

"Marxism, for instance, has never held that there cannot be any personal economic initiative in a socialist society or that all small private enterprises and cooperatives, including those in the sphere of services, should be forbidden.

Marxism is not responsible for the senseless centralization of cultural life in our country, which impoverishes and weakens the culture of many large cities.

Marxism has never held that under socialism there could only be one party and that no opposition should be allowed.

Marxism is not responsible for the conflict between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic. Marxist ideology is not responsible

for the blood of 25 or 26 million people who lost their lives in the years of Stalinist repression (Solzhenitsyn writes about 66 million, but that is an exaggeration)."

Although he considers himself a Marxist still, Roy Medvedev admits that "there are many imprecise, one-sided and even incorrect statements in the works of Marx and Engels and of Lenin", but, he adds, Marxism-Leninism is not a faith but a scientific doctrine which is entitled to make mistakes and be wrong [occasionally].

In the final part of his essay he expresses the hope that a new socialist party will emerge in the Soviet Union which will be different from present social-democratic and communist parties.

> "Such a new socialist party could form a loyal and legal opposition to the present leadership and stimulate a renewal and revival of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Such a new socialist party, not being the heir of the old Russian socialist parties, could build its ideology on only those views of Marx, Engels and Lenin which have stood the test of time, and it would at the same time be able, unfettered by the present dogmatism, to develop scientific socialism and scientific communism in accordance with the requirements of the present era, taking into account the historical experience of our country."

The Gulag Archipelago

The first rumours about the existence of a comprehensive work covering the history and operation of the camp system of the Soviet Union began to circulate after the suicide of Elizaveta Voronianskaia in September 1973.[5] In a statement issued by Solzhenitsyn on 6 September it was alleged that the whereabouts of the manuscript of such a work had been extracted from Mrs. Voronianskaia after five days of uninterrupted interrogation by the KGB. (It appeared from a later *samizdat* document—AS 1740—that Mrs. Voronianskaia had been involved in the retyping of secondary "generations" of the manuscript of the Gulag Archipelago. According to a KGB report presented at a faculty meeting of the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute on 25 April 1974, Solzhenitsyn had handed over two copies of the Gulag Archipelago manuscript to Professor Etkind in Leningrad in 1971. Mrs. Voronianskaia remained in touch with Solzhenitsyn through Professor Etkind or his wife. As a result of the faculty meeting Etkind was dismissed and deprived of the title of professor. At the same day he was expelled from the Writers' Union.) After Mrs. Voronianskaia's suicide Solzhenitsyn decided to authorize publication of *Arkhipelag Gulag* in the West. The Russian edition appeared about the end of 1973 in Paris (YMCA-Press); the first translations came out during the first half of 1974. In June 1974 a second volume was published.

It had been obvious, at least since September 1973, that several copies of The Gulag Archipelago were available in *samizdat* (in August 1973 Solzhenitsyn had intimated that his "main work" would be made public if anything were to happen to him).[6] Very soon after the publication of the book the first reactions of Soviet dissidents became known. In a telephone interview on 9 January 1974 Sakharov referred to Solzhenitsyn's work although he did not make it clear whether he had read it at that time (AS 1545). In an interview with the *Tribune de Genève* on 20 January Sakharov indicated unambiguously that he was familiar with at least large parts of the work (AS 1579). A long review of the book by Roy Medvedev, appearing a week later, quoted pages from the Paris edition (AS 1590). Another *samizdat* author, Shragin, reported on 3 February that he had become familiar with the work through listening to readings in Russian-language broadcasts from the West (AS 1602). It seems therefore that *Arkhipelag Gulag* is being disseminated in the Soviet Union through the three standard channels of *samizdat, tamizdat* and *radizdat* (see p. 16).

Much has been written in the West about the immense historical, political and artistic importance of the Gulag Archipelago. The many reactions to the book in *samizdat* literature prove that Soviet dissidents are well aware of its potential impact. Lidia Chukovskaia, the poetess who was ejected from the Writers' Union for defending Solzhenitsyn, declared that the publication of *Arkhipelag Gulag* could be compared, in the immeasurability of its consequences, only with the death of Stalin (AS 1586). And Roy Medvedev put similar feelings in the following words:

> "I believe that few people who have finished reading this book will stand up from the table the same as when they opened the first pages. In this respect I cannot compare Solzhenitsyn's book with anything in either Russian or world literature." (AS 1590)

The connections between the political ideas of Soviet dissidents and what has been written in The Gulag Archipelago are numerous and immediate. But one must realize that these connections exist at different levels. Perhaps the most conspicuous and superficial, albeit still important, point made by the book is the detailed portrayal of the vast and all-embracing machinery of terror, secret police, camps and annihilation as the most essential and lasting characteristic of the Soviet political system. The inexorable descriptive force of Solzhenitsyn's narrative destroys once and for all the various excuses that have been proposed in the past by sincere or cynical apologists. Terror has not been a temporary phenomenon, it was not a deplorable but inevitable by-product of "the building of social-

ism", it was not merely the result of an historical incident which led to Stalin's dictatorship. The facts on which The Gulag Archipelago is based are undisputed, even by an otherwise very critical reviewer as Medvedev, who very aptly points out that, while *Pravda* declares Solzhenitsyn's facts to be unreliable, *Literaturnaia Gazeta* argues that the book contains nothing new.[7]

Closely related to the question of mass terror as a systemic element of the political structure is the question of Lenin's role. In the discussion of the political ideas of the democrats we have observed that some of the most audacious critics have questioned Lenin's canonized position in both official and dissident political thinking in the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn is quite unambiguous in The Gulag Archipelago in putting at least part of the blame for the fatal developments after the October Revolution on Lenin. These views are acknowledged and, apparently, shared by Sakharov in two carefully worded phrases in the above-mentioned interview with the *Tribune de Genève.*

> "The author analyzes in detail the very sources of the repressive policy in that early period of Soviet history which we are want to ennoble with a romantic revolutionary halo. These first repressions were inspired by fanaticism, and artificially instilled class hatred and assumed in those years the shape of unrestrained red, class and anti-religious terror."

The Lenin issue is of course most crucial and most painful for those dissidents who regard themselves as true Leninists. Medvedev's remark that one cannot read Solzhenitsyn's book without being changed oneself must perhaps be read in this connection. Medvedev's review contains two pages devoted to Solzhenitsyn's views on Lenin and although no ultimate judgment emerges, these pages demonstrate the soul-searching occasioned by Solzhenitsyn's frontal attack on the hitherto unassailable Vladimir Il'ich. Medvedev admits that Lenin is guilty, not only of mistakes (*oshibki*), but also of abuse of power (*zloupotrebleniia vlast'iu*); Medvedev's strongest words are that the greater part of the mass violence which took place since the summer of 1918 was completely unnecessary and harmful even from the point of view of the logic and the interests of the class struggle. Medvedev maintains that a fair judgment should acknowledge that a certain amount of violence in revolutionary and civil war conditions is inevitable and that Stalin's terror exceeded by far what Lenin would have countenanced, but at the same time he does not seem to imply that these considerations provide sufficient excuse for Lenin's conduct. For a man like Medvedev the net result of reading The Gulag Archipelago is probably increased doubts about the October Revolution and Lenin's historical role.

> "No cybernetics, however, can prove that the armed uprising of 24 October 1917 was an historically premature step and that all the subsequent atrocities of the Stalinist regime were caused by this fatal mistake of Lenin."

At the end of his review Medvedev reaffirms his belief in Marxism, but without reference to Lenin.

> "It is not Marxism which caused the perversions of Stalinism and the overcoming of Stalinism will certainly not signify the downfall of Marxism and scientific socialism. . . .
>
> . . . I am deeply convinced that in the foreseeable future our society must be built on a combination of socialism and democracy and that it is precisely the development of Marxism and scientific communism which will permit the creation of the most just human community."

The importance of The Gulag Archipelago for the Western public and for Soviet relations with the West is stressed by Sakharov.

> "There is much disbelief and lack of understanding, sometimes intentional and in bad faith and in other cases the fruit of amazing credulity vis-à-vis the false official version. The lack of understanding displayed by the Western intelligentsia has been one of the causes of many of our tragedies. This lack is also highly dangerous for the West itself which [thereby] falls into the trap of left-wing extremism."

At a deeper level, beyond the directly political effect on Soviet and Western audiences, Solzhenitsyn's work poses questions of moral responsibility and basic ethics. In the words of Shragin:

> "The Gulag Archipelago is a hard and angry, but a good book. Solzhenitsyn does not impose blind hatred which is ready only to punish and kill. No, he inspires us to turn into ourselves, he awakens our sleepy conscience, he reminds us of our responsibility for the evil which is wrought around us.
>
> . . .
>
> We got so lost in the sophistries of our Party morals that we ended up by torturing indiscriminately our own people and strangers, friend and foe alike, anybody who happened to run into a squall. We lost all idea of the absolute value of human life and freedom. And then Solzhenitsyn showed us the consequences of people losing the very first and very fundamental moral principles and inhibitions. 'Cain, where is your brother Abel?', that is the question which stands before us now."

Another well-known *samizdat* author, Evgenii Barabanov, puts it in this way:

> "The Archipelago is a great testimony but it is more than that. It is a road towards atonement and expiation. ... Now that the truth has been spoken aloud, the *moral choice* depends on us, on all of us, on every one of us: will we continue to lie when the lie is evident or will we find the courage in ourselves to accept the whole truth and live with it. This choice does not imply civil disobedience or political action. What is involved is the rehabilitation of the moral principles without which any human community is inconceivable." (AS 1603)

In the light of these statements which obviously echo the general feelings among Soviet dissidents it is entirely natural that the *samizdat* press has come out strongly in favour of publication of The Gulag Archipelago on the widest possible scale. A declaration to this effect was issued on 13 February 1974 by ten prominent dissidents (AS 1584); several other dissidents subsequently associated them with this "Moscow Declaration" (AS 1605). One may indeed readily admit that if the entire Soviet population had the opportunity to read The Gulag Archipelago, the effect on the Soviet Union would be far-reaching and incalculable.

Concluding remarks

"The democratic movement in the USSR has practically been defeated." These sad words were uttered by Il'ia Privorotskii, a Moscow physicist, in an open letter protesting against Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the USSR in February 1974 (AS 1604). They undoubtedly represent the views of many Soviet dissidents at that time. Most of the activists of the previous years have left the Soviet Union or have been locked up in prisons, camps and asylums. Of the not so numerous dissidents remaining at liberty inside the USSR some have chosen to abstain from making any public statements. It is certainly not up to us to pass judgment on people who have spent most of their adult life behind bars on account of their opinions, although one may admire the more the courage of somebody like Anatolii Marchenko who, from his place of exile in the Kaluga province, has joined several protests and declarations of other dissidents (e.g. AS 1607, 1774).

However, a careful stock-taking of events in 1973 and 1974 will reveal that the political situation for the dissidents has changed completely but that one cannot say that dissent has disappeared from the scene. A small nucleus of vocal critics of the regime has never stopped its activities (especially Sakharov and the human rights group around him); they have

been joined by a small but very significant number of new voices, mostly from the scientific community. This means that the authorities have not even been successful in what must have been one of their first objectives: deterring oppositionally inclined citizens from speaking out in public. In this respect it is also noteworthy that five new issues of the Chronicle of Current Events appeared in 1974 (see p. 50). Moreover, political prisoners, either individually or collectively, have succeeded in a number of cases in communicating with the outside world by smuggling appeals and reports about conditions in prisons and camps to friends outside.[8] In this way the authorities have even failed in silencing effectively a number of the "older" dissidents. Indeed, it has often been noted, both by dissidents themselves and apparently by KGB officers, that official treatment of political opponents is inherently half-hearted, and this of course allows dissidents some room for action. Bukovskii, for instance, received a vicious sentence for his reporting on the practice of sending political dissenters to mental asylums; but when his mother, Sakharov and many others protest against Bukovskii's sentence and in fact repeat the same accusations, nothing much happens.[9]

The basic reason for the Soviet government's failure to eliminate dissent is, in the opinion of many Soviet and Western analysts, its refusal to come to grips with the real political and social problems which lie at the root of dissent. Among Soviet observers it is especially Amalrik who has worked out this thesis in detail in "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?". It is precisely because the Soviet regime is behaving like a "weak tyrant" (in the expression of the late Tibor Szamuely) that the repressive campaign of 1973 has had so little effect—only the surface through which the forces of dissent have to break has become a little bit tougher, but underneath nothing has changed. This view is eloquently expressed in a remarkable open letter to Brezhnev, written in September 1973 by Iu. Orlov, a mathematics professor from Moscow (AS 1594).

Orlov begins his letter by stating that the Soviet Union is progressively lagging behind in the world, in cultural, intellectual, scientific and economic development, on account of its inflexible ideology of scientific Marxism. It is dangerous, harmful and stupid, he argues, to call one's ideology "scientific" and to have it backed up by the repressive machinery of the state. It is alright, he continues, to move forward along the chosen part of rejection of private ownership, but one should also realize that present-day capitalism does not develop along the lines dictated by Marxism and has proved itself to be a viable and in many ways attractive alternative (especially in the realm of individual freedom and human rights). A serious drawback of Marxist theory is its failure to recognize the innate spiritual requirements and properties of man: the driving force of morality, the desire for real freedom (and not freedom in the Marxist

sense of "knowledge of necessity") and the peculiar character of human violence (different from, and more dangerous than, other forms of violence in nature). The rigidity of the present political system and ideology, according to Orlov, has resulted in the Soviet rulers being cut off from their most important feed-back mechanisms and sources of information in the country. In order to criticize this government the Soviet citizen has to send his message abroad and hope that it will in some way come back to the Soviet leaders. "Is there nobody then in the Central Committee who understands the stupidity of this situation?", exclaims Orlov. The first and most urgently required means to correct this situation, he believes, is to allow a free press. Such a step could initiate other improvements and innovations.

Chapter 7

NATIONALISM AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM AND A POLITICAL FORCE IN THE USSR

The political questions which have been discussed hitherto acquire an additional dimension by the fact that the Soviet Union is a multinational state. From this fact two sets of problems arise. What solutions, if any, do various currents in the political opposition advocate for the problems posed by the multinational character of the state? What connection is there between the national aspirations and the general political views of specific national groups or, in other words, do the national groups add significantly to the variety of oppositional political theory?

The chief preliminary observation to be made here concerns the peculiarities of the ethnic scene in the Soviet Union. Slightly less than one half of the total population is formed by the Russians (or Great Russians, to distinguish them from the Ukrainians or Little Russians and the Belorussians of White Russians). Historically the Russians have been the dominating race and indeed the Tsarist Empire as predecessor of the Soviet Union came into being as the result of the expansion of European Russia and the subjugation of its neighbours. The Soviet Union has shown itself a worthy successor by enlarging its territory considerably, mostly during and just after the Second World War. Although the Soviet Union proclaims itself a federation of fifteen equal Union republics, a brief glance at the map indicates that the Russian republic (the RSFSR) constitutes by far the largest part of the territory and that the other republics are ranged around the RSFSR in a semi-cicle. The geographical indication can easily be supplemented by a wealth of other evidence to show that the Russian republic and the Russians are "more equal" than the other republics and the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. It follows then that the national question in the Soviet Union should not be posed in an abstract way but rather as: what is the Russian attitude towards the other nations and what is the attitude of a non-Russian nation towards Russian domination?

A further complication is supplied by the great variety in cultural level, historical past and economic potential of the various non-Russian peoples. There are the Ukrainians, the most powerful and numerous group, with a long history of national animosity towards the Russians; the three strongly

Western-oriented Baltic republics have experienced national independence in the twenty years between the two world wars; in Central Asia the Russians may be regarded as semi-colonial oppressors, but they have unquestionably also been the carriers of Western civilization which put an end to centuries of oriental despotism. It cannot be surprising, in view of this variety, that the response of the various national groups to the political tensions in the Soviet Union and to the regime's national policy in particular is very unequal.

The national question as an issue in oppositional political thought

If one studies the comparatively rich resources of oppositional political literature (as they have been surveyed in the preceding chapters) the rather astonishing conclusion will be reached that the national question is not a very important issue at all. The only notable exception is supplied by the various documents of the Democratic Movement. The overwhelming majority of political *samizdat* is implicitly russocentric. The problems and tensions of Soviet society and its political organization are viewed as Russian problems; there is an almost total preoccupation with the past, the present and the future of the Russian people and its place in history and the world. On this count there is even no difference between the various political currents of the opposition. The preoccupation with Russia's fate is already reflected in the titles of several *samizdat* works, such as Varga's "The Russian road of transition to socialism and its results" or Ruslanov's "Youth in Russian history". For the majority of *samizdat* authors the national question apparently is of such secondary importance that they do not consider it necessary to devote any attention to it within the limited space of their short articles and essays. This hypothesis is borne out by the treatment accorded to the national question in Medvedev's "A Book on Socialist Democracy" which is unquestionably the most extensive, and one of the most comprehensive analyses of the socio-political situation in the Soviet Union.

Medvedev devotes a short chapter to "Socialist democracy and the problems of national organization in the USSR". Although he recognizes that the type of socialist democracy he advocates should not oppress nationalist tendencies, he attaches paramount importance to "the mutual *rapprochement* of the several socialist nations" and "the formation of a new historical community, the community of the Soviet people", "which will embrace all nationalities of the USSR". The better part of the chapter proposes policies which will hardly be popular with the non-Russian peoples of the USSR. Medvedev questions the privileged position of nationals and the national language in the Union republics. He suggests that some of the organizational units of national groups (Union republics,

autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, national districts) might be done away with or demoted to a lower status (e.g. by changing an autonomous republic into an autonomous province). The constitutional right to secede, granted to the Union republics, should be more than an empty phrase, although, as Medvedev adds, he would protest strongly against the secession of any republic. He believes, however, that the risk of introducing periodic referendums concerning secession would be quite small.

> "One can predict the results of a referendum with the aid of opinion polls and even influence these results because the reasons for dissatisfaction may be known and therefore also be eliminated."[1]

The general tenor of Medvedev's treatment of the national question suggests that on this count the majority of the authors of political *samizdat* is not too much out of step with the regime's policy which tends to play down the nationality issue and promotes russification in the guise of a gradual rapprochement between the nations of the Soviet Union and the forming of a single Soviet people (Medvedev's words are straight out of the official jargon).

Other *samizdat* sources are more outspoken and positive in their assertion of the special place of Russia and the Russians. In this category one can range the few documents which purport to emanate from the NTS. A strong russophile strain is equally observable in the ASCULP documents. In the latter case one meets the not uncommon combination of Russian nationalism and the religious element in the shape of Russian orthodoxy.

One of the most extreme examples of Russian chauvinism is "A Word to the Nation" (*Slovo Natsii*), a manifesto published in 1971 and signed by "Russian patriots" (AS 590). "A Word to the Nation" purports to be a general political essay and as such addresses itself primarily to the general *samizdat* reading public. It is strongly critical of democratic ideals and institutions and advocates a mixture of Russian nationalism (with clear racist overtones) and Christianity. It scorns and ridicules the national aspirations of the non-Russian nations, alleging that some of them (Ukrainians, Georgians and Armenians) are excessively favoured by the present system while other nations which have been allotted national territories do in fact not exist (Belorussians, Mordovians, Bashkirians, Karelo-Fins).

The Word to the Nation differs from the official policy in favouring a loosening of the state's grip on the economy and in its professed Christian orientation. In other areas it probably echoes feelings which may not be too unwelcome to the regime, especially in its race-oriented advocacy of Russian supremacy.

"A great deal of fuss is made about anti-semitism in Russia. The Jews too claim the role of a minority oppressed by the Russians, but meanwhile they have all but gained a monopoly in the fields of science and culture by conducting a policy of national nepotism."

The message then asserts that the Russians are facing "a threat of biological degeneration"; an end should therefore be put to "random hybridization". Democracy is of no use in this process.

"Democratic institutions do not play a healing role, but rather aggravate the disease. For that reason the moral reorientation of dictatorship, an ideological revolution of sorts, is more important to us than the victory of democracy over dictatorship."

One should add that the views of the Word to the Nation have been widely rejected in *samizdat* literature. The document itself has been the object of specific critical essays, such as Levitin-Krasnov's "The Living Word" (reported in Chronicle No. 19), S. Severnyi's "To the authors of the Word to the Nation" (reported in the same issue of the Chronicle) and V. Gusarov's "A Word on Liberty" (AS 688).

Although the Word to the Nation may be regarded as a document which is not representative of the whole of *samizdat* literature, one must concede that the sentiments it puts into words are widely based and deeply rooted. One of the milder manifestations of such sentiments is the common propensity for national self-glorification which has repeatedly been observed in the preceding chapters. In its primitive form this feeling will express itself in a kind of juvenile boasting and bragging about the country's physical force, reminiscent of the newspaper rhetoric of West-European nazism. (If one tries to distinguish between the two types of militaristic bombast one might suggest that the nazi variety reflects the frame of mind of the urban philistine and the Soviet one that of the country lout.)

In his book "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" Amalrik has already identified the force and vitality of vulgar nationalism as a kind of residual political ideology (after the passing of Marxism-Leninism). Amalrik explains how the reservoir of Russian chauvinism is tapped by the present regime as an additional source of power and legitimation, but how at the same time this sort of nationalism might turn out to be a dangerous and unreliable ally.

Some of the best educated and most broadminded of the *samizdat* authors make only passing sympathetic references to the national aspirations of the non-Russian peoples. Sakharov advocates a genuine application of the Union republics' right to secede and the restoration of the rights of the peoples oppressed and deported under Stalin (the latter point is also made by Talantov).

Among the mainstream of *samizdat* (i.e. apart from the specifically non-Russian sources) the only group which fully comes to grips with the national question is the Democratic Movement. Its Programme contains an entire chapter devoted to this subject. The opening statement of this chapter is: "The Soviet Union is a forcible amalgation of peoples around the Great Russian national core." After an extensive elaboration of this thesis the Programme reaches the conclusion that the movement for national liberation of the non-Russian peoples of the USSR and the Russian movement for political freedom and a democratic society should work together and strengthen and complement each other. The Programme calls for political self-determination through referendums and under the auspices of the United Nations, for cultural and economic autonomy for those nations which prefer to remain inside the Union of Democratic Republics (envisaged by the Programme as the replacement of the Soviet Union) and for the right of small nations to limit the number of non-autochthonous inhabitants. The Programme finally declares, in a sublimation of Russian national pride, that it is the sacred historical mission of the Russian people to prove its maturity, wisdom and goodness by abstaining from violence, removing the injustices of the past and returning the freedom and rights of those peoples who have been forcibly united with Russia in the past.

Finally, it should be recognized that the Russian political opposition, notwithstanding its weak theoretical support for a radical confrontation of the national issue, has often behaved bravely and unselfishly in the defence of specific oppressed national groups. One of the most inspiring examples of this behaviour is certainly Grigorenko's ceaseless effort to further the cause of the Crimean Tatars (the original population of the Crimea, deported by Stalin and only partially rehabilitated afterwards).[2]

National voices in the political debate

Among the *samizdat* documents originating among various national groups one does not encounter such a rich collection of political literature as offered by underground materials of Russian provenance. This may be explained in part by the factor of distance and accessibility; there is presumably some amount of unrest and dissent in areas such as the Caucasus and Central Asia but political documents expressing these feelings (probably in the native language) will not easily reach the normal channels leading to the West. However, the evidence offered by the available "national" *samizdat* strongly suggests that this explanation is insufficient. About certain national groups (particularly the Ukrainians, the Balts and the Crimean Tatars) *samizdat* documents are available in con-

siderable number and these collections display the same characteristic observed above: the number of general political statements and studies is very small.

Another, more satisfactory, clue is provided by the contents of the vast majority of "national" *samizdat* documents. In the latter category the share of incidental protests against particular actions of the authorities is significantly higher than in Russian *samizdat* (where it is already about two thirds). In fact, "national" *samizdat*, apart from a few literary works consists almost exclusively of protest letters about individual actions of government or Party representatives. Even the few documents with a more general and abstract tenor are usually in the form of letters to the authorities; the *genre* of the political essay or study, comparatively common in Russian *samizdat*, is seldom met in national *samizdat* literature.

Whereas in the general run of protest letters the emphasis is on the legal element (the letters complain about the violation of Soviet law by particular authorities), in "national" *samizdat* the emphasis is on the national element (the letters complain about individual acts of national oppression or harassment). National dissatisfaction and frustration form the overriding sentiment in this sector of political opposition. This may explain both the contents of "national" *samizdat* (as an expression of the injured national sentiment) and the virtual absence of a wide-ranging political discussion—satisfaction of national aspirations is so predominant a political sentiment that all other political desiderata fade into the background. Of course this psychological process ("if we were only free from our oppressors") is well-known in history and from other parts of the world; understandable as it is, it has the drawback, if not corrected in time, of leading to a state of unpreparedness once the national aspirations are realized.

Even the few efforts of Ukrainian and Baltic authors to come to a more general analysis of the political situation in the USSR concentrate heavily on the national issue. They ostensibly base themselves on orthodox Leninist principles, purporting to show that the past and present national policies of the Soviet regime have deviated from these principles. The Leninist weighting of these documents may be interpreted as an indication of less advanced political maturity: in Russian political *samizdat* there is a well-documented evolution from more or less orthodox Marxism-Leninism to a greater variety of liberal political views. There are some signs that a similar process affects the views of certain Ukrainian dissidents such as Moroz and Chornovil. On the other hand one should recognize that adherence to Leninist scripture presents a tactical advantage to nationalist dissent. Expression of national dissatisfaction is unpopular enough as it is with Soviet authorities; in order to claim some amount of ideological legitimacy and protect oneself against the charge of anti-Soviet activities

reference to Lenin's theories on the national question is the least unattractive of the available methods of protest.

At the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that the diversity of the national scene in the Soviet Union is a dominant factor in any discussion of the national question. After the few general remarks about political dissent among national groups, made in the preceding paragraphs, it will therefore be necessary to direct attention towards the most important individual nations involved in various forms of political dissent and protest. First among these are the Ukrainians and then the Baltic nations, the Crimean Tatars and a few others. The question of Soviet Jewry is deliberately left out of this chapter. Although Jews are regarded as a nation by Soviet law, their history, geographical dispersion and other circumstances make them different from any other national group in the USSR. Furthermore the extensive collection of Jewish *samizdat* is mostly devoted to specific problems such as the right to emigrate to Israel, the various forms of official and popular anti-semitism and the international political aspects of the existence of the state of Israel. Finally, the question of the Soviet Jews is adequately documented and discussed in many Western and Israeli publications.

The Ukrainians

The Ukrainians are by far the largest national minority in the Soviet Union, are endowed with a strong sense of national identity and have an almost continuous history of resistance against Russian domination. There are sufficient indications to assume that national sentiments are by no means less intense among Ukrainian communists; in fact the number of Party members among Ukrainian citizens who have in some way been subject to persecution and oppression because of professing Ukrainian nationalist views appears to be remarkably high. Also, since political dissent in the Ukraine is so intimately connected with the national issue it is not so clearly a product of the last seven or eight years as it is in Russia (although the general fashion of dissent—the use of the *samizdat*, the writing of protest letters to authorities—has affected the way national dissatisfaction in the Ukraine made itself known). The armed insurrection of Ukrainian nationalists during and after the Second World War (when they fought both the Nazis and the Soviet regime) came to an end only in 1950 when the last remnants of the Ukrainian Insurrectionist Army (UPA) where liquidated by Soviet security forces in the Western Ukraine. Members of the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the civilian organization behind the UPA) who survived the fighting and Stalinist camps turn up later on in the Ukrainian protest movement (e.g. the author Karavanskij).

In 1951 a Ukrainian nationalist, Vsevolod Ramzenko, published a book "Why we want an independent and unified Ukrainian state"; this book was reportedly printed on a clandestine printing press belonging to the OUN and appeared to advocate a Ukrainian state independent from communist domination.[3]

Only ten years after the liquidation of the UPA, in 1960, a group of people led by Lukianenko and Kandyba founded a Union of Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine in L'vov (Lemberg, the capital of the Western Ukraine where resistance to russification traditionally had been and still is strongest). The Union had a draft programme which has become known through a letter to Shelest (then first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party) written by Kandyba in 1966.[4] The small group who had founded the Union was arrested soon afterwards and received ferocious sentences. It appears that the members of the group were all, or almost all, communists whose chief political aim was to bring about the establishment of an independent and sovereign Ukrainian state which would take its place within the socialist commonwealth of nations while otherwise retaining in full a Soviet-type communist political system. As a first step towards this objective the group sought the introduction of democratic freedoms as a means of uniting the Ukrainian people in the campaign for independence.

Another group known mostly from second-hand sources is the Ukrainian National Front. According to the Chronicle of Current Events (No. 18) this group, consisting of at least eight members, had circulated a journal "Freedom and the Fatherland" of which about fifteen issues appeared between 1964 and 1966.[5] The group was arrested in 1966 and 1967 and tried in 1967. Again extremely heavy sentences were imposed on most of the members. There is mention of a programme entitled "The demands of the UNF" and of a document stating the tactics of the Front but apart from the professed non-violent character of the organization very little is known. The Ukrainian National Front appears to have been a more or less local affair in and around the town of Ivano-Frankovsk in the Western Ukraine; four of the members had been convicted previously for participation in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The connection with this patently anti-Soviet organization (which is also evidenced by the fact that some of the members had apparently circulated old OUN pamphlets which they had found in the Carpathian mountains) may perhaps explain the severity of the sentences, because otherwise the organization had engaged only in producing a *samizdat* journal and sending statements to government and Party authorities.

Several participants of the Ukrainian dissident movement have compiled collections of documents which provide good insights into the motives and attitudes of Ukrainian dissenters. The best known among these collections are the Chornovil Papers, prepared by the Ukrainian writer V. Chornovil and containing a large number of documents, letters, statements, etc., mostly from 1965 and 1966.[6] Another collection by I. Kandyba, one of the founders of the Union of Workers and Peasants, was published in France in 1968.[7] One of the most astonishing figures of Ukrainian resistance, S. Karavanskij, produced a collection of documents mostly concerning his own case, a remarkable illustration of the unbreakability of the human spirit.[9] (After being arrested in 1944 for participation in the OUN, Karavanskij received a sentence of 25 years at the age of 24. Having served more than sixteen years, most of them in the dreaded camps in the Arctic, he was released and returned to the Ukraine. He worked in a variety of jobs, wrote extensively on literary subjects and got married. When he started to complain to the authorities about the oppression of the Ukrainian language he was rearrested and without trial sent back to serve the remainder of his sentence. From the Mordovian labour camp he continued sending petitions to the authorities, protesting against the treatment meted out to him and the repression of other Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals. In a dramatic letter to the camp commandant in December 1966 his wife Nina Strokataia asked for her husband to be shot in order to put an end to his long torture—AS 949. In 1972 Karavanskij was still reported, in No. 27 of the Chronicle, as an inmate of the prison of Vladimir.)

While recognizing the value of these collections for understanding the mood among Ukrainian intellectuals one has to admit that they throw little light on the political ideology of Ukrainian dissent; the minor part of them which is not devoted to the fates of individual dissidents consists almost wholly of a discussion of the official policies towards the Ukraine and a critique of such policies from an orthodox Leninist viewpoint. This approach is adopted even by Karavanskij of whom it is hard to believe that he would have any sympathy whatsoever with Marxism-Leninism.

In January 1970 the Ukrainian Herald (*Ukrains'kij Visnyk*) began to appear, a journal which in its organization corresponded closely to the Chronicle of Current Events; the Ukrainian Herald contains news items about individual participants of the dissident movement and about cases of repression of the Ukrainian language and culture, lists of political prisoners, letters from readers, short *samizdat* items and reports about newly circulating works in *samizdat*.[9] The third issue of the Herald (1970) carried a sharp statement directed against the Democratic Movement denying this organization the right (in its "Programme of the Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltic Lands") to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian democrats. The Democratic Movement answered in No. 6 of *Demokrat*, pointing out that the Ukrainian Herald did not yet exist at the time the Programme was published, that the section on national policies

in the Programme had been drafted exclusively by Ukrainians, Balts and other non-Russians and that the Democratic Movement had to defend itself on the other side against the charge of an anti-Russian bias. One cannot help feeling that the Herald's attack of the Democratic Movement was particularly ill-considered as it was precisely this Movement's Programme which stood out by its liberal and broad-minded treatment of the national question.

However, the controversy between the Ukrainian Herald and the *Demokrat* is indicative also of an another, more positive, phenomenon: the connection and interaction between Ukrainian and general dissent. In this context it is worth mentioning that prominent Ukrainian dissidents have publicly supported dissident groups and individuals outside the Ukraine, while many participants of the dissident movement in Russia have come out in favour of their Ukrainian colleagues.

An Open Letter signed by "a group of Russian nationalists" and addressed to the editors of the Ukrainian Herald, contained the following opening phrase:

> "On encountering your message in print we were filled with an exciting feeling of affinity, of unity of outlook on many problems, although one sometimes senses that you, unlike we, have no faith in Russia." (Chronicle No. 22).

The relationship between the Ukrainian Herald and the Chronicle is comparatively friendly; the Chronicle has paid much attention to the Herald's activities and has quoted it generously, and the Herald has commented critically, albeit not ungraciously, on the Chronicle's coverage of Ukrainian affairs (cf. Chronicle No. 22).

Nevertheless it seems that the development of a political opposition in the Ukraine is a phase behind as compared to Russia. In the Ukraine the older stream of political opposition which was articulately anti-Soviet has mingled now with a younger stream; the result is a rather narrowly nationalistic political objective which otherwise keeps close to the official doctrine of Marxism-Leninism (although presumably in part out of tactical considerations).

Other national groups

The largest number of *samizdat* documents from a single national group (apart from the Ukrainians) concerns the Crimean Tatars. They were one of the smaller nations which suffered deportation during the Second World War on the grounds of collaboration or anticipated collaboration with the German forces. In the course of the de-Stalinization campaign inaugurated

by the 20th Party Congress in 1956 these nations were rehabilitated and received back their former political-territorial autonomy with the exception of the Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars. The latter nation, which is settled now mostly in Uzbekistan began agitating for a return to the Crimea in 1965 (although the earliest available documents date from 1967). The fight put up by the Crimean Tatars is the more impressive if one considers their relatively small number, about half a million people altogether. It is probably the fact that the exiled Tatars are concentrated heavily in the neighbourhood of Tashkent which has made possible the high degree of participation in the campaign for a return to their homeland. The Crimean Tatars have bombarded the authorities for years with petitions, signed sometimes by tens of thousands of them; they have maintained something like a permanent (but of course unofficial) representation in Moscow consisting of a constantly changing group of elected spokesmen; they have conducted a nation-wide poll among their entire adult population concerning the return to the Crimea and the re-establishment of the Crimean Autonomous Republic; they finally have been publishing an information bulletin (*Informatsiia*) in *samizdat* which already numbers more than a hundred issues (No. 101 was reported in July, 1971, in Chronicle No. 18). About a dozen issues reached the West (mostly of numbers in the 70's and 80's and dating from 1968 and 1969)[10]; it seems that roughly two issues of the bulletin appear per month. If this is the case the bulletin must have started around the middle of 1965. This then would be connected with a general political awakening of the Crimean Tatars at that time; the late moment of partial rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars (September 5, 1967) may then be explained as a small concession of the authorities to Crimean Tatar demands.

If the Crimean Tatars may consider this small amount of official recognition of their grievances as a positive result of their action, they were undoubtedly successful in recruiting widespread support from dissident circles. The Chronicle has continually and sympathetically reported on the activities of the Crimean Tatars and some of the leading figures in the dissident movement have gone out of their way in publicly endorsing the Crimean Tatar cause. Most notable among these are the former general Grigorenko who was arrested in 1969 in Tashkent where he was staying in connection with his activities in supporting the Crimean Tatars and the communist author Kosterin who was an outspoken advocate of this nation until his death in 1968; his funeral grew out into a massive Crimean Tatar demonstration.

The movement of the Crimean Tatars is of great political interest because it displays with great force and intensity features which are common to the political aspirations and activities of many national groups in the USSR. One of these common features (it has already been identified

in the case of the Ukraine) is the narrow national focus; the Crimean Tatars are vociferous in reclaiming their former national autonomy (a most modest demand in view of actual constitutional law and practice in the Soviet Union) and the right to live in their land of origin. In connection with these demands they may complain about the conduct of the police and the KGB and the indifference or even hostility of Party and government representatives. They make no allegations suggesting that there is something basically wrong with the entire socio-political system (although they quite possibly think so).

An even smaller national group which is well represented in *samizdat* collections is the Meskhetians, a Turkic population from Southern Georgia deported to Central Asia, together with a few other small Turkic groups, in November 1944. The most remarkable thing about the Meskhetians is their unsurpassed degree of organization. It appears that local assemblies of the Meskhetian people (numbering about 200,000) elected representatives who met on February 15, 1964, on a kolkhoz near Tashkent. There the more than 600 delegates founded a Temporary Organizing Committee for the Return of the People to the Homeland. A great number of delegates' meetings appear to have been held during subsequent years (No. 19 of the Chronicle reports about the 33rd delegation of Meskhetian Turks in August 1969; at the 22nd national meeting more than 6000 delegates were said to have been present—Chronicle No. 7). Apart from these meetings national assemblies have been mentioned, the 6th on May 2, 1970 (Chronicle No. 19) and the 7th on July 18, 1971 (Chronicle No. 21). The different locations of these assemblies (Saatly in Azerbaidzhan and Srednechirchik in Uzbekistan respectively) may imply that in fact several local organizations of Meskhetians exist. The Meskhetian demands are similar to those of the Crimean Tatars—to return to their homeland in the Adzharian Autonomous Republic in Georgia.

Presumably of greater interest from a political point of view are two reports from Armenia where in 1969 and 1970 two political trials took place. In the first trial seven Armenians were tried for preparing a journal entitled "In the Name of the Motherland", which called for the independence of Armenia. In 1970 five other Armenians were tried who had founded an illegal group *Shant* and disseminated nationalist leaflets. The short report in Chronicle No. 16 also mentions a newspaper *Paros* and a document entitled "Programme and Constitution of the United National Party" but it is not clear whether these latter documents were ever disseminated outside the group.

An early Armenian document is available in a letter by an Armenian communist, E. G. Ovanesian, to the Central Committee of the CPSU (AS 1216). The letter was probably written in 1965 and has been published in various émigré periodicals. Its content is both loyal to the Soviet government (although anti-Stalinist) and sharply critical of local policies concerning the Armenian nation. It urges the return to Armenia of certain territories which are now included in the Soviet republic of Azerbaidzhan and of other territories now under Turkish rule. The letter is bitterly anti-Turkish and reproaches the Soviet leaders for a compromising attitude vis-à-vis Turkey.

In the Baltic countries one would expect, in view of the historic orientation towards the West and the relatively short exposure to the Soviet political system, a more mature mood of dissent. However, owing to various reasons (presumably a strong measure of political control, language difficulties, etc.) little has penetrated into the general *samizdat* collections. The majority of *samizdat* documents from the Baltic countries are concerned with religious protest and petitions against individual acts of religious oppression (of protestants in Estonia and Latvia and of catholics in Lithuania). One of the most important political statements coming from the Baltic area is the manifesto "To Hope or to Act?", a reply to Sakharov's Memorandum (see Ch. 5 p. 153) but in this document the national question is bypassed altogether and this leads to the hypothesis that its authors were Russians living in Estonia. This hypothesis is further strengthened by the fact that the manifesto fits completely into the political debate of the Russian opposition, is written in Russian and signed, not "members of the Estonian technical intelligentsia", but "members of the technical intelligentsia of the Estonian SSR". Another document which could be of great interest in the context of this chapter is an issue of a *samizdat* journal entitled "Estonian Democrat" (in Estonian) which is mentioned in Chronicle No. 25. The journal, dated 1972, is said to contain the Programme of the Estonian National Front, formulating principles for an independent Estonian political and social system. The journal also published an anonymous letter by 17 Latvian communists to the communist parties of several East and West European countries and to Aragon and Garaudy (AS 1042). The latter document found its way to the West and has been published. It is to a great extent similar to statements of dissident communists from the Ukraine. It spells out in detail the degree of russification of all public life in Latvia. It protests against these policies as incompatible with Lenin's teachings concerning the national question. The Latvian communists ask foreign communist leaders to intervene on their behalf with the leadership of the Soviet Union. The secession issue is not raised explicitly but total disillusionment with the present Soviet regime is obvious.

> "As we said at the beginning of this letter, we became communists a long time ago. When we worked in the underground and suffered in the prisons and labour camps of bourgeois Latvia we only had a

theoretical knowledge of the essence of the socialist state and the entire doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and we had a limitless faith in the ideals of this doctrine. When we saw the socialist state (at that time the only one in the world), we immediately saw that in real life things are not what they are in theory. But we deeply believed that these mistakes were temporary, that one had to fight them and that they could be liquidated. We did not immediately understand the depth of these mistakes. Only gradually, after some time, we became convinced in our daily work that what is spoken and written officially with us is only for show, that it is a tendentious shuffling of facts and lies, that all the party conferences, meetings and congresses have all been carefully prepared beforehand; they meet only to provide a semblance of intra-Party democracy, they have to approve what has been said 'from above' by, ultimately, the first person in the country (on his own). Any attempt to go against this opinion is judged an attack on the party and on Leninism and the dare-devils [who engage in such activities] are not only removed from all positions, but are deprived of their freedom, arrested, placed in camps and prisons, in inhuman conditions, they are exiled and sometimes even disappear forever without a trace."

In the last sentence of their letter the authors proclaim: "The present policy of the leaders of the CPSU is disastrous for the communist movement of the whole world."

There are some indications that outside communist circles there is a certain amount of more radical political opposition. Lewytzkyj mentions the trial in 1962 of a Latvian group named the Baltic Federation.[11]

Among the most recent contributors to national *samizdat* are the Volga Germans, who joined the movement in 1973. Their most important contribution is *Re Patria*, a collection of documents of which the first issue appeared in January 1974 (AS 1776).

Chapter 8

SOME SELECTED TOPICS DISCUSSED IN SAMIZDAT LITERATURE

Samizdat literature, by its volume as well as its variety, is a rich source of information on numerous aspects of life in the Soviet Union. In this book we have concentrated on the expression of political ideas through *samizdat* documents. Often enough such documents also pay attention to specific social, political and economic problems which may be closely related to general political ideology but which did not lend themselves easily to being woven into the narrative of this book. Such discussions focusing on specific themes are nevertheless enlightening for a general appreciation of the tone and texture of the *samizdat* world (apart from the interest they deserve *per se*). For this reason certain smaller and more specific topics are selected in this chapter for close examination. In some cases points which have been made briefly in previous chapters are elaborated; other sections are devoted to questions connected with the political ideas of dissenting circles, but not specifically with any of the currents discussed before.

Stalinism

In more than one sense Stalinism is the central theme of the entire *samizdat* movement; almost any *samizdat* document is in one way or another concerned with, and directed against, the horrors of the recent past and the survival into the present of important elements of Stalinism. The term Stalinism can be taken to refer to the historical period of Stalin's rule, the political system built by Stalin around his person, the political ideas supporting and legitimizing this system and, finally, the moral climate emanating from, and reinforcing, the Stalinist system. (The historical period of Stalinism, from the late 'twenties to 1953, is named *stalinshchina* by some *samizdat* authors, in order to distinguish it from the other meanings of *stalinizm*.)

It is of course clear that the present situation in the Soviet Union differs in many ways from the Stalinist past; it is equally clear to many dissident authors that many important elements of that past have survived up to

the present day and that indeed the years following the fall of Khrushchev in 1964 have shown a certain revival of Stalinism. The latter phenomenon is often referred to as neo-Stalinism.

Inasmuch as Stalinism is still a major element of the dominant political system it is outside the scope of this study which addresses itself to the problem of political opposition in the USSR. There can be little doubt, however, that within the Soviet Communist Party there are other forces at work apart from Stalinism. Medvedev distinguishes between Stalinists, conservatives and Party-democrats. The Party, or rather the present ruling bureaucratic elite, does not entirely consist of Stalinists and this implies that sometimes the Stalinists are on the losing side. They have succeeded, for instance, in bringing de-Stalinization to a standstill but they have failed in rehabilitating Stalin. This situation has resulted in the emergence of a curious form of opposition—ultra-Stalinism. Dissatisfaction among certain old Stalinist elements has been so intense that it has forced some people into more or less open opposition against the present regime. There have been several manifestations of such opposition in *samizdat* literature.

The most important instance of Stalinist opposition reported in the *samizdat* press concerned the Fetisov group.[1] Fetisov, an economist, left the Communist Party early in 1968 as a protest against de-Stalinization. Shortly afterwards he was arrested together with seven followers (most of them were architects) and tried under art. 70 of the Criminal Code (anti-Soviet propaganda). Fetisov and four others were declared to be insane and sent to a prison-asylum. The Fetisov group is occasionally referred to in *samizdat* documents; our main source of information is a report in the Chronicle (No. 7). The report summarizes the main points of Fetisov's programme (which evidently must have been available in written form): strict totalitarian control and the de-industrialization of European Russia where a system of patriarchically run communes would have to be re-established (one is reminded of Solzhenitsyn's proposals in his Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union; cf. p. 177 ff.). Fetisov's violently anti-semitic and Russian chauvinist views gained support, according to the Chronicle, in a variety of circles: members of the technical intelligentsia attracted by certain technocratic advantages of Fetisov's constructions, members of the Slavophile-oriented intelligentsia, and people of little education "who long for simple, strong methods for transforming the world". The continuing attractiveness of Stalinism for the latter group, its populist appeal, is stressed also by Medvedev who quotes an anonymous *samizdat* author of an article entitled "The Word is also Act".[2]

> "A section among our workers still thinks in the wrong direction and dreams of the absolute, unlimited and deified lord, their omnipotent protector against the petty tyrants and wastrels. Stalinism, in a sense, represents the deprived worker's dream of the people who daily humiliate him on the pretext of the strictest justice being brought to account. Powerlessness seeks its revenge with a superior power."

The Russian-chauvinist and anti-semitic connections of ultra-Stalinism are high-lighted by the existence of officially tolerated nationalist clubs (*Rodina*—Motherland, and *Rossiia*—Russia)[3] which have served as action bases for Stalinist elements and which demonstrate the continuing Stalinist influence within the regime (particularly strong, according to Medvedev, among local and provincial Party authorities).

Sometimes ultra-Stalinism expressed itself directly through *samizdat*. Chronicle No. 17 carried a short summary of a document entitled "Two Thousand Words from a Worker" (the document itself has not become available as yet). The document was datelined Moscow, 19 October 1970.

> "An anonymous pamphlet in the form of an Open Letter to the *Novosti* Press Agency about the article in *Komsomol'skaia Pravda* of 17 October 1970 on the award of the Nobel Prize to A. I. Solzhenitsyn. It denounces the article as 'alien to us'. It suggests going further in the condemnation of Solzhenitsyn and giving the prize to 'our best writers'—Kochetov, Shevtsov, Gribachev."

Another *samizdat* document throwing light on internal tensions in the Party caused by the resurgence of hard-line Stalinists is a report of a discussion in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism some time before 1966 (AS 466). This discussion was devoted to the draft third volume of the official History of the Communist Party of the USSR, covering the early years of Soviet power. To this particular discussion, with a view to the period in question, a number of old bolsheviks had been invited. The general tenor of the speeches was that the draft was half-hearted about Stalin's role during the years under review. Then an old Party member Shagaev climbed the rostrum and delivered the following remarkable speech.

> "I was always in a lowly position in the Party. Maybe my speech is of a low level. Maybe it will evoke some stirring. The purpose of the draft is to provide an objective evaluation of the history of the Party. But it did not succeed. Everything came down to the question of Stalin's personality cult, to an indirect running down of Stalin, that is what many who spoke here did. You slandered Stalin viciously. (Cries of indignation: 'Stalinist groveller!', 'Scoundrel!', 'Down from the rostrum!', 'Self-seeker!', 'He protected Stalin and is still a rat now!'. The Chairman quietens down the meeting and emphasizes that we have to give everybody the chance to speak for 20 minutes.) Stalin

governed the country right. Lenin was in favour of Stalin being general secretary. (Indignation in the entire hall. Shouts: 'Lies!', 'Slander!'. The Chairman has difficulty in restoring order.) This is what I wrote when N. S. Khrushchev was in power: 'Stalin was the most solid and consistent Marxist. You, Khrushchev, wrongly call Stalin an apostate. You untruthfully call Lenin's letter to the congress a testament, a political testament. It was impossible to realize collective leadership with Trotsky, Zinov'ev, Bukharin and other Trotskyites and Bukharinites. Bukharin pushed us towards capitalism, declaring 'Enrich yourselves!'. (An explosion of indignation in the hall. Shouts: 'Lenin exercized collective leadership with them?', 'Stalin enriched himself, stealing all the merits from the Party and Lenin!'. The Chairman again restores order.) Through delicate manoeuvring Stalin succeeded in getting rid of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites. That was right. By their anti-Party activities they angered Stalin even more and he annihilated many innocent people. If you chop wood the chips will fly. There is nothing terrible in that. We only gained from that. Stalin was un unshakeable Marxist. Alright, he was rude once to Krupskaia and because of that there was soon no Lenin anymore. But Stalin cannot be blamed for that. He protected Lenin but it turned out the other way. (Indignation of the whole hall. Shouts: 'Come to yourself, schizophrenic!', 'Blackguard!'. The Chairman again restores order.) To the end of his life Stalin was devoted to Marxism. Stalin was an eminent genius. He carried out collectivization, industrialization, the defensive preparedness for war was raised to [its proper] height." (Indignation in the hall continues.)

At this point the Chairman tells Shagaev that his time is up; Shagaev requests an extension but this is voted down unanimously. A fist-fight with two women is barely avoided and Shagaev is escorted outside the hall into the corridor where he keeps on shouting: "Stalin was a genius!"

Equality

In any political ideology which can reasonably be termed socialist, equality must be considered a key concept. It is a recurrent theme, not surprisingly, in the writings of *samizdat* authors discussing the social and political situation of their country. The contexts in which the subject of equality is approached by various dissidents vary considerably. Quite generally *samizdat* authors agree that the degree of inequality in Soviet society is high, both in respect of income and related material benefits as well as of social status and political power. This phenomenon is usually

connected with the emergence of a bureaucratic elite of Party-government officials.

> "The centralized state of the Party bureaucracy, realizing the production value through its own state trading system, appropriates the added value created by the labour of the workers and spends it for its own needs, i.e. basically for the needs of organizing and developing the socialized national economy, but also for increasing the privileges of the upper stratum of the Party bureaucracy." (Varga, AS 166)

Historically, the growing disparity in income and other privileges is of course connected with the ascent of Stalin and the introduction of the Stalinist system of government. This point is emphasized by Alekseev-Gavrilov (and also by Varga):

> "Immoderately large salaries at the top came into being, secret privileges in all areas of life: illegal appointments and nominations, payment of premiums and various emoluments, priority in medical services, secret distributions of articles and goods in short supply, various illegal facilities in the sphere of domestic services. Considerable economic and social inequality arose between the majority of the population and a ruling minority . . ." (AS 80)

Even sharper is the author known as Pseudo-Medvedev:

> "This is how this anti-popular class came to power. It is precisely those bloody years which initiated the shameful practice of the 'blue envelopes' in which the big bureaucrats received sums which many times exceeded their enormous salaries. The state, naturally, concealed such an original use of public funds to the population, but to hide from the people the opulent stores run by the provincial Party committee, the luxurious Chaikas [a big Soviet car], the orgies in superexpensive restaurants and the fashionable country mansions is impossible.
>
> According to secret statistics there are about 13.000 legal millionaires in Moscow, i.e. big bureaucrats in whose savings accounts seven figure amounts have been entered." (AS 306)

In an interview with a Swedish journalist (on 3 July 1973) Sakharov observed that the privileges of the Party leaders are primarily connected with their Party position, which in the Soviet Union has become the most important factor in determining a person's career.

> "The whole character of recruitment and promotion is strongly connected with a person's network of relations within the system.

Every major administrator has a group of people who are linked with him personally and who move around with him from one post to another." (AS 1455)

Other advantages may be in the form of secret additional payment and in access to scarce commodities at low prices.

> "There is a secret distribution system which not only offers products of different quality and a wider choice, but where also prices are lower. In other words, for the same rouble people may receive more in these stores, which means that the nominal amount of their salaries does not really reflect their buying power."

The wealth of the few is contrasted by the poverty of the masses. An anonymous pamphlet which appeared in 1972 under the signature of a "Citizens' Committee" accuses first the leaders of the country in words similar to those of Alekseev-Gavrilov:

> "These hidden colossal sums are appropriated openly and secretly by the Kremlin rulers and their servants—the big and medium partocracy *[partokratiia]*, the apparatchiks, etc. These sums are used for their luxurious way of life, their dachas, villas and limousines, for their enormous salaries and premiums, for their special rations, concealed from the people, their special spas, hospitals and sanatoriums. The Kremlin rulers and their hangers-on live better and richer than many Tsarist magnates before the revolution, and they call themselves the 'vanguard of the Soviet people', its servants." (AS 1129)

After developing this theme further the pamphlet goes on:

> "Respected citizens! There is no socialism in our country! That is no socialism, when there are twenty times more spongers and bosses in the country than there were in Tsarist Russia! That is no socialism, when the average wages of a worker is 100 roubles and the salary of a big official several thousands a month!"

The same indignation is audible in Varga's essay, where he proclaims after analyzing the causes and present dimensions of inequality in the USSR:

> "In this way the actual economic relations in industry and agriculture have grown into a glaring contradiction of the ideals of socialism and the Party programme."

It is not surprising that the present inequality and particularly its inconsistency with the officially proclaimed socialist ideals are criticized most vehemently by dissident Marxists-Leninists.

A manifestation of inequality which is considered especially vexing, probably because of its simultaneous offensiveness to national pride, is the existence of special stores for privileged Soviet citizens and foreign visitors from "capitalist" countries. This phenomenon is the subject of a heavily sarcastic attack in Glumov's essay "The Leninist Test".

> "In the big towns there are *Berëzka* stores. . . . At the door stands a Cerberus (our own Soviet kind, not imported) who without fail picks out his countrymen (evidently by the absence of the yoke on their necks) . . . The Soviet country, understandably, needs foreign currency. But then the capitalist countries need it even worse, as they are always having a crisis going or on the way. . . . But what do I talk about *Berëzka*! In Leningrad there is a remarkable store on the Makarov Quay, *Vneshposyltorg* [appr. Foreign Parcel Trading Company] it is called. . . . If you go in there your eyes will pop out of your head—nothing but imported goods such as you would not find in the stores for the population even under the counter. And the prices are reasonable. . . . That is where they should take the excursions after having seen the *Avrora* [the warship which fired the first shot in the October Revolution], it is quite close. That would really show the sight-seers something. What we fought for and what we ran into. At the same time they could read a lecture. In this way and in that way, comrades, a superabundance of money emerged in our country in the sixth decade of Soviet power: diplomatic roubles, bonds, yellow certificates with a stripe and without a stripe, blue certificates and, finally, ordinary labour roubles. Well now, with your labour roubles you should not go into this store; there your rouble, pah!, is a scrap of sweaty paper, although it has been printed on it that it is guaranteed, as they say, by the whole national wealth. The lecture is over. If there are any questions write to the editors of *Pravda* and they will undoubtedly write a long article explaining in detail for whom and for what objective reasons secret stores and secret money were created and why these privileges mark a new stage in the movement towards communism." (AS 1198)

As several of the preceding quotations indicate, popular indignation is directed not only, and perhaps not even primarily against the higher incomes of the elite, but especially against the multitude of other privileges. The author of a letter from Volzhskii, a small town in the Volgograd province, commenting on the life-style and privileges of the local bigwigs, remarks that their wives never buy anything in the local shops and adds ironically: "People only presume that they are looked after in the communist fashion *[po-kommunisticheski]*—that is to say according to their desires."[4]

Another aspect of inequality emphasized by several authors is the difference in living standards between the big cities and the province. In his discussion of the question of equality in "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" Sakharov writes:

> "There is very great material inequality between town and country; the situation is especially bad in areas which do not have access by transport to the private market and which do not produce goods which yield high profits in private trade. The difference is exceptionally great between towns with developed types of privileged industries and old towns 'which have outlived their age'. As a result about 40% of the population of our country finds itself in a very difficult economic situation."

An article in "Free Thought", one of the Democratic Movement reviews, by Kazakov makes the same point:

> "The inhabitants of Leningrad and Kiev have considerable advantages over the population of medium and small towns. But they receive an even bigger profit on account of the sharp difference in supply of foodstuffs and industrial goods. The inhabitants of most medium and small towns are forced to buy such goods as meat, eggs and milk on the market where they have to pay twice as much as the inhabitants of Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev." (AS 1180)

A general complaint is that the salaries of higher functionaries are secret. The differences between those salaries and average workers' wages are said to be quite large. According to Roy Medvedev:

> "It is known that the ratio between the salaries of higher employees or directors and of ordinary employees may be as high as ten to one in many enterprises, in others twenty to one, and quite often even fifty to one. On a national scale the ratio [occasionally] may be as high as hundred to one, especially when extra services such as medical treatment, vacations, etc. are considered." [5]

Medvedev's general statement is borne out by Kazakov's elaborate study "On the Question of Comparing the Living Standards of the Workers of Russia, the USSR and the Capitalist Countries".[6] After listing pay scales (1968 figures) for secondary school teachers (80-137 roubles), doctors (105-170 roubles), nurses (60 roubles), librarians with higher education (70-85 roubles), and restaurant bookkeepers (62.5-75 roubles), he calculates the average monthly wages of a kolkhoz farmer at 37 roubles. On the other hand, according to Kazakov, the head of a defence construction bureau earns from 1500 to 4000 roubles a month (including premiums). A minister earns 2000 roubles but this does not include premiums, additional payments, special supplies and special services. Other functionaries with extremely high incomes are secretaries of town, provincial and regional Party organizations. Kazakov adds: "About members of the Central Committee one should not even talk. They are envied by the Rockefellers, the Duponts and the Krupps."

Several authors express themselves as to what they consider to be proper income differences. The socialist review *Seiatel'* (No. 1) states: "Income differences which exceed a ratio of 1 to 3-5 contradict common sense"; in its concrete proposals *Seiatel'* is more modest (or realistic): nobody should earn more than five or six times as much as anybody else.[7] The same figure is mentioned by Medvedev, who adds:

> "Furthermore [in comparing income differences] the lowest wage level is not based on the subsistence minimum but on the present minimum wages, i.e. from 60 to 75 roubles a month, or also on the average wages of workers and employees of from 110 to 120 roubles. This is certainly a wrong method. It is absolutely necessary to create a reasonable ratio between maximum and minimum wages. In this respect one should first calculate the subsistence minimum, which can hardly be less than 300 to 400 roubles a month for the average family of four persons in the conditions of a modern city. The incomes of families which are still below this minimum should gradually be raised to this level. Maximum incomes then (including any possible extras) should not exceed 1500 to 2000 roubles a month."

It is to be noted that Medvedev, whose views in general are more balanced and sophisticated than those of other dissident Marxists-Leninists, does not go in for crass egalitarianism (Marx' *rohe Gleichmacherei*). On the basis of what he considers to be the fundamental principle of socialism, wages according to work, he defends at length the correctness of higher incomes and special privileges for anybody who makes a special contribution to the general welfare, political leaders as well as the managerial, scientific and cultural elite.

> "In the interest of the country, top functionaries who are responsible for the welfare of the entire nation should not even lack anything. They must be the first to receive the most complete information, they must be in the best of health, enjoy adequate vacations, etc. Many of them must be protected. They represent our country and our state, which brings additional expenses." [9]

As to the other members of the elite, Medvedev argues:

> "The talents of the individual also belong to the national wealth; the people should therefore foster and protect them."

While the extreme inequality prevailing today in the Soviet Union is attacked by dissident Marxists-Leninists because it offends the socialist ideal, non-socialist authors are more inclined to criticize this inequality because it is an element in strengthening and maintaining the position of the ruling Party bureaucracy. Consequently, this latter point of view is not directed against inequality per se and is even compatible with anti-egalitarianism. Sakharov, in his "Thoughts on Progress" (1968) occupies a position which is very close to Medvedev's moderate stand in this matter.

> "I want to stress that I am not against the socialist principle of payment according to the quantity and quality of work, because a comparatively high income for the best administrative officials, for highly skilled workers, teachers and doctors, for workers in dangerous and unhealthy professions, for scientists and people in the cultural and artistic professions (constituting a small fraction of the wage packet), and not accompanied by secret privileges, does not threaten society and is even useful to it, provided such income is based on merit."

In his 1971 Memorandum to Brezhnev, where he stresses competetiveness and the lifting of restrictive regulations with regard to salaries and incentives, his position may perhaps have shifted somewhat.

In his interview with Ulle Stenholm of 3 July 1973, Sakharov clearly expressed the thought that income differences may have a positive function in conferring social status.

> "Materially, out intelligentsia is badly looked after, even in comparison with people who engage in physical work. This disproportion is even greater when we compare it to the standard of living in Western countries which are at about the same level of economic development.
>
> The lowly position of the intelligentsia also results in its ideological repression and creates an anti-intellectual atmosphere in the country, because the professions which require an education, the professions of teachers and doctors, do not command the necessary amount of respect."

Iu. Orlov, in his Open Letter to Brezhnev (AS 1594), proposes that, as an experiment, the wages of economic managers should be linked to the profit made by their enterprises (this, of course, is already the case, albeit indirectly, through providing premiums for overfulfilment of production quota). The combination of anti-egalitarianism and criticism of the privileged position of the Party bureaucracy is most obvious in the Programme of the Democratic Movement.

> "The constitutional principle 'From each according to his ability, to each according to his work' has not been realized. There is little difference in wages. Workers who work poorly and who work well receive almost the same on account of the levelling principle."

Occasionally, among non-socialist authors the question of equality is approached on a more general and theoretical plane. One of the most significant contributions in this respect is P. Smirnov's essay "The Individual and Society".[10] The ideas of Smirnov, who in the traditional Russian way attempts to summarize the history of the world, are hard to summarize themselves but what follows are at least some of the principal strands of his philosophy. Christianity which had preached that before God all men are equal has failed to carry out the social revolution which it itself evoked. This failure led to the Renaissance, then to the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution and tyranny, because equality before God was replaced by equality before the state. The only acceptable way out is the realization that people are not equal in their talents, energies and desires, but only in their value. The function of the state then is not to enforce equality where there is, and should be, none, but to ensure that nothing happens which constitutes an attack on the values of the individual.

In an entirely different vein the negative aspects of egalitarianism (or rather of Russian egalitarianism as he sees it) are depicted by Amalrik in his chapter on justice in his famous study "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?". After explaning how the concept of freedom has never taken root in the Russian mind, he continues by observing that there seems to be at least one positive idea which is part of the Russian heritage, the idea of justice.

> "For justice one would even be willing to be burnt at the stake, but certainly not for the rigt 'to do anything you want'. But if one looks closer at what is behind it, this concept, with all its apparent attractiveness, shows an extremely destructive side of the Russian soul. In practice 'justice' assumes the shape of the desire 'that nobody is better off than I am'. (This has nothing to do with the notorious 'levelling', because one is usually quite contented with the fact that many others are worse off.)
>
> This view expresses itself in hatred of anything which is outstanding; one does not attempt to emulate one's betters, but only tries to bring them down to one's own level. This view expresses itself in hatred against any initiative and any way of life which is superior or more dynamic than one's own."

Health and education

The state of public health in the Soviet Union is among the many minor themes discussed in *samizdat* literature. Several authors mention the unsatisfactory or downright poor situation of medical care in one breath with the state of popular education, particularly at the kindergarten and primary school level.

> "The state eagerly economizes [at the expense of] the children and the health of the workers. The low quality of kindergartens and, particularly, creches is known to everybody. But can it be otherwise with the appalling overburdening of the personnel? A pitifully small part of our money is assigned to 'free' medical treatment. The norms for the expenditure for hospital patients have been lowered significantly in recent times (60 kopeks a day per patient for food), the hospitals are overcrowded. There is not enough junior medical personnel because the work is very hard and the pay is low. The district doctor has to see tens of patients every day and one has to wait for hours in the waiting-rooms. Nevertheless the work norms for doctors and institutions for children are not lowered but even increased." (Zorin & Alekseev, AS 368)

Sakharov, in the paragraph on "Social policies" in his Memorandum to Brezhnev (AS 1136), deals with the same two problems.

> "There must be a radical improvement in the quality of education: increased salaries and independence for schoolteachers and college lecturers . . ."
>
> . . .
>
> "Reform of the health service. Expansion of the network of private polyclinics and hospitals; a more important role for doctors, nurses and health visitors in private practice; salary increases for health employees at all levels . . ."

In his letter to the Soviet leadership (AS 1600) Solzhenitsyn also points to teachers' salaries but goes beyond the problem of the low material level of educational provisions when he writes:

> ". . . our school is a poor teacher and a stupid educator, it only squanders and wastes the years of youth and the souls of young people. Everything is so arranged that the pupils have no reason for respecting their teachers. There will only be a true school when excellent people with a real vocation become teachers. But in order to have this their work should not be paid as it and they should not be kept in such low regard; but how much money and effort this is going to cost! Now, however, the teachers' training college has the lowest reputation among all the institutes and a grown man is ashamed to be a school teacher."

The health and education themes are obviously connected with a number of other critical attitudes of dissident authors. The sorry state of general medical services and, on the other hand, the much better treatment available to members of the bureaucratic elite is an important aspect of the generally privileged position of the latter section of the population. The serious flaws in the educational system may be viewed as part of the general crisis of morality as it is described by many *samizdat* writers. A link to criticism of the economic system of the Soviets is provided by the awareness that free education and free medical aid must remain illusions as long as teachers and doctors do not drop out of the blue sky. This awareness is demonstrated by the fact that the terms free education and free medical aid are often used ironically by *samizdat* authors. "Free medical aid" is even the title of an article by the poetess and translator Natalia Gorbanevskaia, in which she relates her experiences in a psychiatric hospital and a maternity ward (this article, incidentally, also indicates the connections between criticism of the system of public health and criticism of the sinister political repression aspect of mental health services in the USSR)[11]. In the Postscript to his Memorandum to Brezhnev Sakharov writes:

> "A free health service and education are no more than an economic illusion in a society in which all surplus value is expropriated and distributed by the state. The hierarchical class structure of our society, with its system of privileges, is reflected in a particularly pernicious way in the health service and education. The condition of the health service and of popular education is clearly revealed in the run-down state of public hospitals, in the poverty of the village schools with their over-crowded classes, the poverty and low standing of the teacher, and the official hypocrisy in teaching which inculcates in the rising generation a spirit of indifference towards moral, artistic and scientific values."

Samizdat on the Soviet economy

Questions of economic policy are prominent in many political *samizdat* studies. As the previous chapters have indicated, the importance of the economic aspect in the formation of political views manifests itself chiefly in two ways. For many thinking citizens of the Soviet Union the apparent failure of the government's economic policies in many areas is the starting-

point for more comprehensive criticism of the system; this is in particular the case, not surprisingly, with adherents of Marxist economic theory. Others, who are more inclined to fundamental criticism of the political validity and moral legitimacy of the present regime, will point to the utilization of the prevailing economic system and the monopolization of economic power as just another instrument of the elite for maintaining its dominant position. Of course, as the disillusion of dissident Marxists increases, their position tends to move closer to that of other critics.

Apart from the general importance of economic questions in *samizdat* discussions, such questions also form the subject of a significant number of specialized essays. From the very beginning of *samizdat* publishing articles have appeared which devoted themselves mainly or exclusively to the investigation and discussion of the economic problems of the Soviet Union. Among the early *samizdat* literature one finds several "off the record" utterances of eminent Soviet economists. From 1965 there is a report of a talk on the Soviet economy by academician Aganbegian, delivered to the editors of the publishing house *Mysl'* (AS 186). The Varga Testament, dating probably from 1964, has been discussed in Chapter 3; although it is heavily political, Varga was one of the leading Soviet economists until his death in 1965 and his Testament has firm economic underpinnings. An early article on strictly economic matters is Savin's "The financial system of *khozraschet*".[12]

Later *samizdat* publications on economic themes have sometimes directed themselves specifically to the analysis of figures concerning economic achievements. Within this category one may mention Babushkin's "Results of the execution of the eighth five-year plan of the development of the national economy of the USSR, 1966-1970" in "Free Thought" No. 1 (see p. 161), Kazakov's "The question of comparing the living standards of workers in Russia, the USSR and capitalist countries" in the same number of "Free Thought" (on Kazakov's article, see also the section on equality in this chapter, p. 208), "The distribution of the national income of the USSR", a long economic study by Gol'tsov and Ozerov, which appeared in 1971 (AS 1411) (on the concept of national income, see also an article in "Political Diary" No. 72: "Some economic problems of Soviet industry"; about the "Political Diary" itself, see pp. 5 and 49) and A. Vasil'ev, "A comparison of the living standards of the workers of Russia, the USSR and capitalist countries", Part 1 "A comparison of the living standards of the workers of Russia before the Revolution and in the present time", AS 1670.

Popular attitudes

Samizdat, if one considers its authors and its readers, is an affair of the Soviet intelligentsia. Most *samizdat* writers are very well aware of this and the relationship between the intelligentsia and the people, always the chief head-ache in Russian intellectual life, is a theme which continues to exercize them. Several *samizdat* essays are specifically devoted to this subject (e.g. Volnyi's "The intelligentsia and the democratic movement"—AS 607, Altaev's "The dual consciousness of the intelligentsia and pseudo-culture"—AS 897) and the majority of the general political studies published in *samizdat* deals with the function and position of the intelligentsia in one way or another (e.g. R. Medvedev's chapter on the intelligentsia in his "Book on Socialist Democracy").

The consequence of the strong self-identification of the intelligentsia is a corresponding reduction of the concept of "the people". The Russian *narod* (people), at least in most *samizdat* publications, does not have the same general and neutral meaning as in most Western languages (the totality of the indigenous inhabitants of a country) but indicates something narrower: the total population minus its elite (including not only the intelligentsia, but also the political and economic elite), the general populace, the ordinary people. The average *samizdat* author looks at the *narod* as something alien and unknown, as something outside himself. In a section entitled "And the people?", Amalrik writes (in "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?"):

> "It is very difficult to answer this question if only because nobody —including the bureaucratic elite—really knows what currents are at work in the broad layers of the population."

In a tentative answer to his own question Amalrik suggests that the general attitude of the people may best be designated as "passive dissatisfaction".

> "This dissatisfaction is not directed against the entire regime—the majority of the population does not even think as far as that and also does not believe that anything different is even possible—but against certain aspects of the regime, which are nevertheless indispensable preconditions for its existence.
>
> The workers for instance are angered by their defenceless position vis-à-vis the factory managers, the kolkhoz farmers by their complete dependence on the kolkhoz chairman (who in his turn is entirely dependent on the district authorities) and all of them are angered by the extremely unequal distribution of wealth, the difficult conditions of daily life, the scarcity or complete absence of urgently required goods, the prohibition on changing one's residence or job, etc."

Amalrik's views are borne out by the not very numerous *samizdat* documents which immediately express popular attitudes. Some of these register complaints and grievances of a kind which are expressed regularly in the official press but which for some specific reason (the style, the number of signatories, etc.) lent themselves rather to *samizdat* publication. A letter to Kosygin written in 1967, complaining about the state of public transport in Leningrad, bitterly attacks local authorities and refers cynically to the eternal promises of future wealth; its publication in *samizdat* may be explained by the aggressiveness of its tone but also by the fact that is was signed by 614 people (who added: "The entire population would readily be willing to sign").[13]

Especially in letters from the provinces the appalling poverty, not only of the workers and peasants but also of ordinary professional people (teachers, engineers, technicians, etc.), is stressed[14]. The political awareness which speaks from this letters is usually amorphous and rudimentary. In a letter from Volzhskii (a small town in the Volgograd province) the anonymous author develops a kind of backyard Marxism-on-its-head:

> "The workers, as a rule, work for an hour and sit for three hours or just pretend to be working. Then they work for another hour and the remainder of the day, until they go home, they sit and do nothing at all. They say: 'We produce just so much as they pay us for. Did not Marx teach us that capitalists take the surplus value from the worker and put it in their own pockets? So we, on the basis of Marx' teaching decided not to give the surplus value to the new capitalists.' This application of Marxist doctrine has been current now for several years."[15]

Other documents go a step further and advocate positive action. Two pamphlets circulating in Moscow in 1972 protest against increases of food prices and generally against the dearth of first necessities and call on the population to strike (AS 1129).

> "Ten years have passed [since the price increases of 1962]. The prices are still rising. They rob us on all sides. The government and party leaders fatten themselves at enormous expense. Closed sanatoriums, Chaikas [big Soviet cars], special food parcels, dachas, special hospitals—those are their privileges.
>
> And we can hardly make ends meet!
>
> The 'friends' abroad get grain, butter, meat, sugar, textiles, guns, tanks, rockets.
>
> And we can hardly make ends meet!"

Very occasionally the particularly unhappy situation of women is discussed in *samizdat* documents. One article, arguing that equality for Soviet

women has meant that they received the worst of two worlds, appeared under the pseudonym of "Partynova" (AS 588). The most eloquent indictment is undoubtedly Solzhenitsyn's paragraph on this subject in his "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" of September 1973 (AS 1600).

The over-all picture emerging from the small bits of information about the life style and views of ordinary Soviet citizens is the same that has been sketched by some of the more perspicacious analysts from among the *samizdat* authors: a society which has been atomized and fragmented into innumerable small units, bent upon their own preservation and the pursuit of their own petty material interests. Of course, the picture of universal shallowness, amorality and triviality is exaggerated, as the very existence of *samizdat* demonstrates; but it is the picture which catches the eye of both Soviet and Western observers.

Sakharov

In recent years, Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov has emerged as "the leader of the Soviet opposition" (Agurskii) in the eyes of the world, as well as among Soviet dissidents. This is a most unusual position which deserves some consideration, because the Soviet dissidents number quite a few outstanding and remarkable men and women. There is Amalrik's brilliant analysis of the Soviet Union's social and political system; the superhuman courage and dedication of Bukovskii; the gallant wit of Levitin-Krasnov, the orthodox non-conformist; the passionate devotion to Marxist ideals of the Medvedev brothers and their desperate effort to uphold the honesty of the Leninist model; the stubborn bravery of Grigorenko through years of confinement in a prison-asylum; the ardent patriotism of Ukrainian leaders, some of whom spent almost their entire adult life in camps and prisons. One could go on forever—*samizdat* literature, whatever its political relevance or intellectual merit, abounds with stories of incredible courage, devotion and sacrifice.

What is it that makes Sakharov still the dominant figure in this impressive and glorious company? (Only of Solzhenitsyn can it be said that he is of the same towering stature.) The easiest explanation is provided by Sakharov's social position; whereas most dissidents can be written off as non-entities by the regime (describing dissidents as parasites, spongers, drop-outs and marginal people is indeed standard procedure in the official media), Sakharov, full member of the Academy of Sciences and one of the country's top scientists, cannot be dismissed as such. Still, this explanation will prove too superficial at closer sight. If one studies Sakharov's writings and the place they occupy in *samizdat* literature, one is struck by a combination of qualities which is exceptional, considering the circumstances in which these pieces were written.

Sakharov was born in Moscow in 1921 into, what he described himself as "a cultured and close family".[16] His father was a teacher of physics and an author of textbooks and popular-scientific works on this subject. His family background seems to have been happy and harmonious ("From childhood I lived in an atmosphere of decency, mutual help and tact, a liking for work, and respect for mastery of one's chosen profession.") and this may help to explain the maturity and moderacy of his later views. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1942 and worked as an engineer in a war plant until 1945. From 1945 to 1947 he worked under the famous theoretical physicist Igor Tamm and after defending his dissertation in 1948 he became a member of a nuclear physics research group working on the development of thermonuclear weapons. He remained working in this field until he was taken off all secret projects in August 1968 after his "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" had begun to circulate in *samizdat*. His contributions in this field of physics were recognized by the Soviet authorities when he was awarded the Stalin prize, the highest distinction for scientific achievements awarded in the Soviet Union, and when he was made a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences at the unprecedented age of 32.

Sakharov never became a Party member and was in a position to acquire an intimate knowledge of the working of the Soviet military-industrial complex and the moral make-up of its leaders. He describes himself how his concern about the consequences of the military use of nuclear energy pushed him very gradually onto a road of opposing certain aspects of government policy. One of his first brushes was with Khrushchev, who in a speech to nuclear scientists in 1961 is reported to have said: "I would be a slob, and not chairman of the Council of Ministers, if I listened to the likes of Sakharov."[17] Such conflicts became more frequent in the following years and in 1966 his name appears for the first time among the signers of protest letters (to the 23rd Party Congress, against the rehabilitation of Stalin)[18]. In 1967 he read Roy Medvedev's "Let History Judge", the first *samizdat* work he became acquainted with, which made a deep impression on him. In the same year he wrote two articles on the role of science and the intelligentsia and on the danger of a thermonuclear war. These articles were not published but served as the basis for "Thoughts on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom" which was written early in 1968 and was his first *samizdat* publication. Publication of the "Thoughts" resulted in his being removed to a relatively "harmless" research position at the Physics Institute of the Academy of Sciences and marked a turning-point in Sakharov's career. From then on his energy was spent chiefly in defending and protecting other dissidents and in advocating political, social and economic reforms in the world and particularly in his own country. In the latter respect his most important

statements, according to his own opinion, are the "Thoughts", the Memorandum to the Soviet leaders of 19 March 1970 (written together with V. Turchin and Roy Medvedev), the Memorandum to Brezhnev (5 March 1971) and the Postscript attached to it (June 1972). To this list one may certainly add his long letter of criticism of April 1974 (AS 1655), directed against certain points of Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" (of 5 September 1973).

It should be stressed that Sakharov's general political writings (he would probably object to this qualification himself) are in many ways a reflection of his civil rights activities. He never meant to be a political thinker and even points out himself that he is not a "specialist" in such affairs. However, his continuous efforts in helping individual dissidents occasionally forced him to address himself in more general terms to his government or to world opinion.

Sakharov's political views have changed and matured noticeably since he wrote the "Thoughts" in 1968, although his fundamental attitudes have remained the same. His disillusion about the Soviet political system has grown deeper and his criticism has become sharper and more comprehensive.

(In an interview on 3 July 1973—AS 1455—he replied to the question of what could be done by the dissidents themselves in the USSR: "Almost nothing can be done, in my opinion, because the system is internally very stable. The more unfree the system is, the more it remains internally conserved.")

Indicative of this change is what one might call the shift in his ideological self-identification. In 1968 he regarded his own views as "deeply socialist" and still in 1970 (in the Sakharov-Turchin-Medvedev Memorandum) he holds that democratization in the Soviet Union should serve the cause of "maintaining and strengthening . . . the socialist ideology". Two years later he admitted to an American reporter that he did not consider himself a socialist any longer.[19] Of great interest in this respect is a reply he gave in another interview, on 8 January 1974 (AS 1545).

> *Question*: Many people accuse you and Solzhenitsyn of being enemies of socialism. Solzhenitsyn is even called a fascist. Is this correct? *Reply*: The first part of your question is unserious [*neser'ezna*] inasmuch as nobody knows what socialism is or what it should be. The country where Solzhenitsyn and I live, we both love, but certainly not because its [political] system is called one or the other.

In an earlier interview (with Ulle Stenholm, on 3 July 1973, AS 1455) Sakharov had expressed himself in these words:

"Take socialism, for instance. In the beginning it seemed to me that I understood what socialism was and I regarded it as something good. But gradually I understood less and I began to doubt the correctness of our economic principles and to wonder whether there was anything else in our system but empty words and propaganda for internal and international consumption."

"Evaluating our socialism, I do not see any theoretical novelties in it for a better organization of society. . . . We went through a most terrible political struggle, [and as a result] the destruction and embitterment have gone so far that we are now reaping their sad harvest: tiredness, apathy and cynicism, and it will be very difficult for us to recover from these, if we recover at all."

It is clear that, talking about socialism, Sakharov has its Soviet version in mind. His disappointment with the Soviet experiment in socialism seems to spring especially from the increasing awareness that the excesses of the Stalin era, some of which live on until to-day, are not the aberrations of one man or one period but are intrinsically connected with the system as it was set up in 1917 by Lenin. This awareness is demonstrated, albeit with circumspection, by several more recent statements.

"I believe that the deep causes of these crimes [the crimes Solzhenitsyn writes about in 'The GULAG Archipelago'] are not in Stalin's personality. In the first days of the revolution, when Stalin was not yet in power, fanaticism, the preaching of class hatred, embitterment and the destruction of the rule of law already started to do their work and this was no coincidence."

In another interview about the same book Sakharov remarked:

"The author investigates in detail the very sources of the repressive policy in that early period of Soviet history which we are wont to ennoble by a romantic revolutionary aura. These first repressions were inspired by fanaticism and artificially incited class animosity and took the form in those years of a boundless red, class and anti-religious terror."

It should be noticed that Sakharov (understandably in his position) refrains from mentioning Lenin's name; but as Lenin is inseparably connected with the first four years of Soviet power (a fact nobody in the world would contest), the conclusion is clear enough.

Sakharov possibly goes even one step further in his critical review of Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" where he attacks Solzhenitsyn's view that Russia perhaps is not ready for democracy and that for the time being an authoritarian system in conditions of legality and orthodoxy would be the most desirable solution (AS 1655). To this Sakharov objects:

"Only in democratic conditions can a people develop a character fitted for sensible existence in an ever more complicated world."

And after pointing out that the vicious circle (no democratic traditions, therefore no viability of democratic reforms) must be broken and that, moreover, there were important democratic steps taken in the 19th Century, he continues:

"Hence I also reject the arguments of those in the West who regard the failure of socialism in Russia as a result of its specific nature, of the absence of democratic traditions."

It is not clear whether Sakharov means that the failure of socialism in Russia (as it cannot be ascribed to Russia's own past) should now be blamed on something inherently wrong with socialism itself. This interpretation certainly cannot be ruled out in view of Sakharov's other pronouncements on this subject. Sakharov would then not only reject official Marxism-Leninism (Soviet socialism), as we know he does, but also socialism in a more general sense.

With the change in Sakharov's political views the emphasis in his activities as a member of the movement of dissent changed. The deeper his disillusion with the political system, the more he devoted his energies to civil rights activities, general as well as individual. As to the former one can point to his public statements on the right to emigrate (AS 694, September 1971), on the practice of placing dissidents in asylums (AS 1015, July 1971), on the danger of the Soviet Union's adherence to the Geneva Copyright Convention being used against *samizdat* authors (AS 1402, March 1973), on the necessity of international détente being accompanied by general observance of human rights (AS 1482, September 1973), etc. Along with these, numerous documents issued by the Human Rights Committee of which he was one of the founder-members, devote themselves to general questions of human rights in the Soviet Union or to the defence of the rights of individual dissidents. Apart from his work as a member of the Human Rights Committee, Sakharov personally has also intervened incessantly on behalf of numerous dissidents in trouble with the authorities: writers such as Solzhenitsyn, Lidiia Chukovskaia, Galich and Nekrasov, Ukrainians, Soviet Jews, Lithuanian Catholics, and even foreigners such as Pablo Neruda and Angela Davis.

Although Sakharov rejects Solzhenitsyn's view that Russian Orthodoxy should replace Marxism as the country's ideology, his attitude towards religion is quite positive, as borne out by the reservation he entered to his signature under the "Humanist Manifesto" (a document issued by a number of leading British and American academics and humanists).[20] In his reservation Sakharov deplored the Manifesto's juxtaposition of religion

and humanism, and of religion and scientific knowledge.

It is not only the depth of his perception and the scope of his activities that make Sakharov such an outstanding figure among Soviet dissidents, but also the personality of the man as it manifests itself in the tone and style of his work. Gradually through the years grave seriousness and deep sadness permeate his words but there is no despair; although there are flashes of sharp indignation he always retains his characteristic reasonableness and moderation.

The moral considerations which seem to dominate more and more in his mind may be illustrated by the answer he gave to an interviewer who asked him why he remained active as a spokesman for human rights and dissent in the Soviet Union.

> "There is the natural need to create ideals, even where no immediate road to realize them is in view. . . .
>
> And then there is another important element. Our country may serve as a warning. It may restrain the West and the developing countries from making mistakes on the scale as were made in the course of historical developments in our country. The fact that we speak out does not yet mean that we are hoping for something. It happens that a man does not hope for anything, but still will speak out, because he cannot remain silent." (AS 1455)

Sakharov, in sum, is not typical as a dissident in the sense that he could be considered as the best average example of the category; in many ways (his career, his social position, some of his views) he is quite untypical. But it can be said that in a less superficial sense he is their best representative, as an example of intellectual honesty and genuine spiritual freedom. It is amazing to see (and it must be amazing to Soviet leaders also) how Soviet society could produce this man, who was born under Lenin, grew up under Stalin, and who received and rejected the most glittering prizes the new power had to offer.

Sino-Soviet relations

Russia is not only a big, but also an inward-looking country and it is understandable that *samizdat* authors concern themselves chiefly with internal problems. The statements made on foreign policy are usually of a rather general nature (the Soviet Union should abandon its hostile stand vis-à-vis the West, participate in international disarmament, etc.) and occasionally display isolationist tendencies ("let the Cubans, the Arabs, the Vietnamese, etc. look after themselves"). *Samizdat* documents are often more articulate on East European problems, but such views may be

seen as an extension of attitudes regarding the internal situation: if so much is wrong inside the Soviet Union itself, the Soviet regime should refrain, *a fortiori*, from imposing its system on its East European neighbours.

The relation to China, however, and the USSR's Chinese policy are the subjects of vehement discussions in *samizdat* and are also important factors in *samizdat*'s evaluation of the internal situation.

The China debate in *samizdat* is hampered, even more than in the West, by the lack of reliable information of what is going on inside China itself. It is not surprising therefore that initially most *samizdat* authors writing on this subject did not get much beyond expressions of disgust about the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the Mao cult, and of concern about the aggressive character of Mao's regime. Sakharov, ordinarily one of the most moderate spokesmen of the dissidents, wrote in 1968:

> "In recent years the scourge of demagoguery, violence, cruelty and meanness again hit a great country which had just started its socialist development. I am speaking, of course, of China. It is impossible to read without fright and pain about the mass infection of anti-humanism spread by the 'great helmsman' and his comrades-in-arms, or about the Red Guards who, according to the Chinese radio, 'jumped with joy' at the public executions of the 'enemies of the ideas of chairman Mao'. The idiocy of the personality cult in China has assumed monstrous, grotesque and tragicomical forms, reducing to the absurd many features of Stalinism and Hitlerism." (AS 200)

An utterly negative appraisal of the present Chinese regime is at times combined with something like *Schadenfreude* about the échec of the USSR's earlier Chinese policies.

> "One has to admit, our wise government picks itself amazingly undesirable friends; they made friends with Hitler and he attacked them; they made friends with Mao Tse-Tung, they in fact brought him to power, they armed him, trained a host of nuclear scientists, nursed him as an ally against the 'common enemy'—and what a good neighbour they received." (AS 368)

This is what Zorin and Alekseev wrote; an anonymous commentary in No. 5 of *Demokrat* is even more acid:

> ". . . they dug a hole for others and themselves fell into it. They created China to terrify and destroy the Western enemies and now they themselves tremble with fear that they will have to face China in war. And China, like any totalitarian state, is aggressive. There

they will not debate in parliament: will we make war or not. Our bosses now perfectly well from their own experience how such decisions are taken because the Mao Tse-Tung regime and our wise leaders are berries from the same field." (AS 1152)

The Programme of the Democratic Movement makes the same point but without the sarcasm of the two previously cited authors.

> "The most tragic miscalculation of Soviet foreign policy is the return of Asiatic social-imperialism in the form of China. Mao's China whose military-economic power was essentially created by the Soviet Union before 1959, now represents a mortal danger to Russia. The failure of the foreign policy with regard to China is a direct consequence of the undemocratic, irresponsible and dictatorial rule of the country, which silences the voice of the most responsible ['thinking'] people of the society." (AS 340)

An interesting element of these appraisals is that they are not only devoid of any sympathy towards Mao's China but also that they all somehow connect the rise of Mao's China with the intrinsic defects of the Soviet system.

Undoubtedly the most harrowing question of the China problem for most Russians, not excluding the dissidents, is whether China really wants war. Perhaps the question should even be phrased as: is war with China inevitable? Several influential dissident authors have answered this question affirmatively. In Amalrik's "Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?" the inevitability of war with China is one of the key points of the argument. Amalrik believes that China is pushed towards war by both ideological and practical considerations. "The inexorable logic of the revolution" and the desire to avenge centuries of national humiliation, but also unsurmountable internal difficulties of an economic or social nature will make war attractive to the Chinese leaders as soon as they feel strong enough. In Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" it is in particular the struggle for ideological leadership which will force a clash between China and the Soviet Union.

The war-with-China question is the central theme in a debate in the December 1969 issue (No. 63) of the "Political Diary" (AS 1010). Six different viewpoints are summarized, each of them supported by one or more members of the Soviet establishment (the China specialist N., a scientist K., a high-ranking civil servant G., a reserve officer I., an historian N., the author B., an old bolshevik V., academician S., a scholar M. and the author T.). The China specialist believes there is no real danger of war but that the Chinese regime, for internal reasons, is keen on promoting an atmosphere of being threatened by the USSR; he adds confidentially that the Soviet government is also not entirely averse of such a course itself, in order to divert the attention of the population of its own internal difficulties. At the other end of the line there is the opinion of K., G. and I. who believe that war with China is inevitable and that the Chinese rulers are deliberately heading for it. In view of this they are in favour of a preventive strike before it is too late. The other participants in the debate all reject the idea of a preventive war, for moral as well as political reasons. They are generally inclined to regard the danger of war with China as real and to be little optimistic of the Soviet Union's chances in such a war. They hope that with the passage of time conditions in China will change and that the military threat of China will diminish. The Soviet Union should be willing to make territorial concessions according to some of them, but others believe this would not provide a solution. M. and T. stress that any increased tension in Europe should be avoided as this would weaken the country's position vis-à-vis China; this is another reason why the return of Stalinism is dangerous.

Although the China debate continues in *samizdat* publications, no fundamentally new themes turn up after the discussion in "Political Diary". The point that maintaining tension in the relationship with China is an essential aspect of the Soviet regime's internal policies forms one of the central ideas of a lengthy *samizdat* article "Why is war with China necessary?" (AS 1458) which appeared in the second half of 1973 (written by an unknown author using the pseudonym of Andrei Samokhin).

The problem of Sino-Soviet relations is viewed by Samokhin within the framework of the internal political situation of the Soviet Union. The author puts his finger on a number of unresolved issues, such as the permanent difficulties in certain sectors of the economy (notably agriculture, housing and the food industry), the revival of religion, national tensions in the Union republics and the rise of the movement of dissent. He argues that it is especially these factors which form the background of the present policy of the Soviet government vis-à-vis China. Samokhin then analyses in greater detail the history of the relations with China and the USSR and discusses the present strategic and political dimensions of the question. An inevitably weak point in his analysis is the comparative lack of information on developments in China itself and the attitudes of the Chinese leaders. In general it would seem that Samokhin's political views are close to those of the democrats.

The China problem also constitutes one of the principal points of difference in the Solzhenitsyn-Sakharov controversy (Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to the Soviet Leaders" of 5 September 1973—AS 1600—and Sakharov's reply of 3 April 1974—AS 1655). Sakharov believes that Solzhenitsyn overestimates the Chinese menace and that, furthermore, Solzhenitsyn's view of the situation (the two communist superpowers competing for

ideological hegemony) is erroneous; the conflict (according to Sakharov) is rather of a geopolitical nature and the approach of the leaders of both countries is predominantly pragmatic. As China for a relatively long time will not have the capacity for a war of aggression against the Soviet Union and a Soviet war of aggression would certainly be doomed to failure, Sakharov is of the opinion that the danger of war with China is not excessively great and that in fact overestimation of this danger would be a poor service to the cause of democratization and demilitarization of the Soviet Union.

(Already in his interview of 3 July 1973—AS 1455—with Ulle Stenholm, Sakharov had taken care to point out that he had abandoned his former views on Sino-Soviet relations.

> "For instance, about the Chinese problem I wrote there [i.e. in the Memorandum to Brezhnev, cf. p. 101] in such tones as I would perhaps not like to use now. . . . I would, for instance, not like to accuse China of aggressiveness at this moment anymore. The question of the Chinese threat must be re-evaluated.")

This view is not much different from Samokhin's who holds that because the Soviet government is opposed to democratization it fosters anti-Chinese feelings, crude nationalism and an atmosphere of military alarm. Samokhin ends his analysis with the following conclusion:

> "The Soviet leaders intend to use the conflict with China for purposes which have nothing to do with the genuine interests of our people and they intend to strengthen their power at the expense of our blood."

On a more practical level *samizdat* literature makes few suggestions. The general tendency is, quite understandably, to limit oneself to a description of a situation that is outside the author's control. Only the Democratic Movement published a curious statement (in No. 5 of *Demokrat*) in which they declared that in case of war between China and the Soviet Union the Democrats would follow the same course of neutrality that Lenin had advocated in 1914, because they would then consider the military defeat of the totalitarian belligerents desirable. The Democratic statement recognized the territorial rights of China but adds that it would be pointless to hand over territory to the present Chinese regime because of its totalitarian and militaristic character. A final solution of the Sino-Soviet controversy will be possible only when the two countries both have different regimes.

Whereas earlier *samizdat* sources would tend to describe the relationship with China in Yellow Peril terminology (China as the huge, unknown and threatening neighbour), later documents often reduce the situation to

saner and more realistic proportions. There is somewhat more knowledge of, and understanding for, China itself, an awareness that one source of war danger also lies with the Soviet government, and an understanding of the connexion of Sino-Soviet relations with other external and internal aspects of the policies of the Soviet government.

EPILOGUE

> "20th Century democracy is far from being the Kingdom of Heaven and one should not offer prayers to it, but its ugly aspects are certainly a much lesser evil than the ugly aspects of socialism." (*Iks*, "A message from the USSR to the West", AS 536)

The first question to be answered in evaluating political *samizdat* writings regards their relevance *per se*, as a phenomenon in contemporary Soviet society. Soviet officialdom uses several approaches in dealing with *samizdat*, the most sophisticated one being the argument that *samizdat* is an unimportant aspect of social life in the USSR, an activity engaged in by a negligible number of marginal people. This assertion has had a certain amount of success in the West; one reason may be that the dissident movement does not fit into the designs of specific interest groups in the West in furthering their own political, cultural and economic relations with the official Soviet Union.

The argument can be dismissed for two reasons. First, history, and the history of the Russian revolution most particularly, provides ample evidence of the power of ideas advanced by a small number of people apparently out of step with the society in which they live. It would be foolish to assess the value and force of an idea by the number of people who support it or by its popularity in society at large. Second, it can no longer be seriously maintained that the Soviet dissident movement is a quantitatively unimportant phenomenon. The names of thousands of dissidents are known and among them are prominent representatives from the worlds of letters and science. Moreover, the dissidents have proved that, regardless of their number or actual power inside the USSR, they are a force to be reckoned with on the international political scene.

In attempting to assess the relevance of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union, one naturally turns to historic parallels. Two obvious ones present themselves: the Russian intellectual world of the 19th Century and the West-European underground press of the 2nd World War. One characteristic common to all three is the frequent impracticability of the ideas advanced. It is, of course, only to be expected that people who have no political power themselves and who have little or no access to the seats

of power are inclined to disregard the realities of everyday life and to escape into the building of comprehensive theories and grand conceptual schemes. The similarity between the political theories of Soviet dissidents and the political thought of certain sections of the 19th Century Russian intelligentsia is especially striking. This is due, not only to the similarity of the social-psychological situation of the authors involved, but also to direct historical links. It is only natural that Russian intellectuals who disagree with the officially imposed political philosophy turn to their own past and pick up the thread where it was broken off by the October Revolution. The political discussions in *samizdat* literature often return to the familiar themes of the 19th Century: the role of the intelligentsia and its relationship with the people, Slavophilism versus Westernizing (*zapadnichestvo*), the mission of Russia in the world, the moral responsibility of the individual for the evils of society, and so on. Occasionally one even gets the feeling that time has not moved and that one is back in the charmingly exhilarating but slightly *weltfremd* atmosphere of Russian intellectual life one hundred years ago. This feeling is especially strong when reading earlier *samizdat* documents which have usually been composed in spiritual isolation and without the aid of relevant literature or source material. Not a few of the documents discussed in this book do indeed start from scratch; their authors have observed the society in which they live, thought about it, and sat down behind their desks to fashion an all-embracing theory which would explain everything and provide a solution for everything. Built in to such a process are integralism and intolerance to other ideas, and when this approach is accompanied by the traditional pugnacity of Russian intellectual debate and the equally traditional inclination to fuse intellectual views with moral judgments, the climate becomes unsuitable for the establishment of a broad political consensus. The reader of political *samizdat* documents is often frustrated when he observes how people who do not seem to be too far apart politically lash out at each other for what appear to be trivialities or theoretical differences without any practical consequences.

On the other hand, this picture is certainly not of general validity. There are also a number of examples pointing the other way and, if I read the signs correctly, the number is increasing. The most powerful example in this regard is the general respect for, and the enormous prestige of, Sakharov, himself a monument of moderation, good sense and human dignity.

Furthermore, one has to admit that the scope for practical action is very limited in the case of the Soviet dissidents. Any attempt to build up independent political power through the means available in Western countries (the foundation of political parties, the organization of meetings, societies, demonstrations, the publishing of newspapers, journals, books,

etc., propaganda through the mass media) is clearly out of the question and in many cases even suicidal in the present conditions. Apart from incidental protests, the dissemination of abstract political views through the semi-illegal *samizdat* network is the principal method of exerting some remote influence on the development of Soviet society and the Soviet body politic.

It can even be maintained that the weakness of the political debate in the Soviet Union turns into strength, if one takes into account that fundamental political discussion in the West is often bogged down in a mass of technical controversies concerning minute details of socio-economic policies. The *samizdat* debate may appear excessively theoretical at times, it *is* very often about first principles and about basic issues of social and political life.

Furthermore, the political discussions in *samizdat* literature cannot be separated from the unique historic experience of Russia; indeed, in the final analysis this is what they are about.

With the October Revolution Russia embarked on an unprecedented experiment aiming at a total economic, social and political metamorphosis of the country. There is no point in denying this venture its self-styled designation as socialist. The Soviet experiment was generally recognized as socialist by leading foreign socialists at the time of its inception and indeed it would be hard to find any plan or proposal ever advanced by a socialist party or government which has not at one time or another been tried out in the Soviet Union. In this light the position of the socialist current of the dissident movement becomes untenable. (As described in chapter 4, the dissident socialists reject the Soviet political system on the ground that it had, from its very beginning, nothing to do with socialism.) The question then becomes: what is the meaning of the Soviet experience for the future of socialism as a political idea?

Without trying to give a generally acceptable and unambiguous definition of socialism, one may attempt to single out certain characteristics which would enable us to distinguish between socialism (in its most current past and present shapes) and other comprehensive political ideologies. I submit that the most important forms of socialism, past and present, are in agreement about the following points. Socialism aims at the construction of a basically different society, characterized by a high degree of equality between its members and by a high level of realization of popular sovereignty. The two characteristics are closely related, because the principle of equality requires equal distribution of political power and naturally leads to the sovereignty of the whole people, while vice versa popular sovereignty cannot be reconciled with privileged power positions of specific groups and individuals and presupposes a high degree of equality.

(Another dominant feature of socialism, according to a number of

prominent socialist thinkers, is its compassion for, and special attention to, the poor, the powerless and the underprivileged. This aspect of socialism, however, cannot be regarded as useful in distinguishing socialism from other political theories, because it would undeniably also be an element in any Christian-inspired ideology.)

In the Europe of the Ancien Régime the official political doctrines all professed allegiance to certain general tenets of the Christian religion: the moral commands of justice and mercy did not derive from any *raison d'état*, but were rooted in religious belief and thereby—at least in theory—put a brake on any absolute sovereign power. The general acknowledgment of man's sinfulness and the belief in a life hereafter introduced an element of relativity and even resignation into the evaluation of any actual of potential social situation.

The emergence of socialism as a more or less articulate political doctrine after the French Revolution is inextricably bound up with the weakening of the once universally professed views on the nature of man and society. When the perspective of paradise in the next world became dimmer and lost its immediate hold on social and political ideology, the desire to create paradise in this world became more urgent. The failure, apparent to many, of the "Christian state" of the Ancien Régime to live by what it professed, and to create a just and humane society, inspired a secular translation of the traditional Christian values of justice, unselfish dedication to the common good, modesty and compassion for the weak and the poor. In this development equality occupied a peculiar place. Unlike justice, mercy, unselfishness and compassion, equality is not a Christian virtue. In the traditional Christian view equalities and inequalities were facts which might or might not be subject to change through human action. But there was one particular kind of equality which made all inequalities appear insignificant: that of all men before God, or to be more exact: the immeasurable value of the human individual to God, which made any comparison of the relative values of individuals irrelevant. This idea has unquestionably been abused as a facile alibi in tolerating or promoting injustice. It is clear, nevertheless, that, apart from its purely religious significance, it has been a potent factor in the historical development of political thought in Europe. In traditional Christian thought the evaluation of existing inequality is dictated by the Christian view on material wealth and worldly power, and by the demands of justice, compassion and modesty. The Christian religion is concerned with the saving of man, and not with the changing of society (although this will certainly be the result of man's conversion).

When the Christian perspective began to fade, when European man lost his strong awareness of the reality of the next world and of man's equality before God, the existing inequality in society became less tolerable.

Equality then emerged as an ideal to be aspired to, becoming in some ways the key concept in designing a better society. The social virtues preached by Christianity were transformed, to some extent, into the servants of equality. Justice is what promotes equality; compassion (now often renamed solidarity) is good because it involves a voluntary transfer of a surplus of power or wealth to the poorer and weaker members of society.

The ethical side of socialism was from its very beginning accompanied by a political side: the new society was to be realized not only by persuading people that it was morally better, but also by political reforms and therefore, in the last analysis, by power. If people would not give up excess power and wealth voluntarily, it would be taken from them by force. This political element predominated in Marxian socialism from its very beginning (in the Communist Manifesto: "You reproach us in one word that we want to abolish your property. Indeed, that is what we want."). In fact the ethical side of socialism became very much of secondary importance in Marxian socialism, because it was held that the economic relations in society and the social system based on these determined "ideology". It was therefore not only unnecessary, but even ideologically wrong to begin by persuading the possessors of power and wealth that a socialist distribution system was ethically superior. The first thing to do was to establish such a system which then would give birth to the new man who would be able to understand and accept the superiority of the system.

The political element of socialism, its willingness to use political power and, ultimately, physical force in realizing its plans for a better society, is most outspoken in Marxian socialism with its heavy emphasis on class antagonism, violence and revolution; it is never wholly absent in any reasonably significant socialist current, nor can it be, because a socialism which would abandon all desire for political power would implicitly abandon all political aspirations and would turn itself into a purely religious doctrine, albeit without religion. By its willingness to use at least some amount of force in bringing about a better society socialism tapped an enormous reservoir of political power but lost its moral innocence. Socialism had now become potentially attractive to anybody who believed that he owned a less than equal share in the general fund of power and wealth and who desired to increase his share. In the view of many Soviet dissidents this is precisely the point where the rot set in after the October Revolution: "the wrong people" got into the system.

Let us return now to the question which was posed earlier: what is the meaning of the Soviet experiment for the future of socialism? The first difficulty we encounter lies in our lack of distance. Nobody is able at this moment to dissociate himself sufficiently from his own emotions and apprehensions concerning events in Russia since the October Revolution. It may be possible to reach a reasonably balanced judgment concerning

the fall of the Roman Empire or even the age of Napoleon, because we do not identify strongly with any of the individuals, groups or currents involved. In the case of the Russian Revolution and its aftermath such detachment cannot be expected. Of course this does not prevent us from making up our own minds and from examining the views of those who were most closely involved in the Soviet experiment.

If one bases a judgment on the materials offered in *samizdat* sources the conclusion can be no other than that the construction and operation of the Soviet system was a colossal failure as an experiment in socialism. This failure had been forecast, if one attaches significance to such events, by the suicide of some of the major early Soviet poets during the first twenty years of Soviet power. If the poet is the seer of our times, the small signs of disaster may have been more horrifying to him, who had earlier been the prophet of the glorious future.

What was sensed diffusely by the sharp-eyed few in the 'twenties is now observed by numerous independent-minded persons in the Soviet Union. We have seen that the general lines along which various dissident currents judge the Soviet system are surprisingly similar. It is in their views of the desirable future that they show their different political approaches. For the Marxists-Leninists and the socialists the solution is to give—genuine—socialism another try (the socialists, as pointed out before, believe that the Soviet experiment has had nothing to do with socialism from its beginning). Other groups adhere to other eschatological views; there is the Christianized society of ASCULP, the various visions of a purified Russia showing the modern world a way out of the dead-end of technocratic civilization, as such visions are presented in one form or another by a number of authors. There is also the "westernizing" trend, which tends to shy away from such chiliasm and wants freedom, democratic rights and decency restored.

If there is one positive feeling that unites the opposition (apart from its negative appraisal of the Soviet system), it is the conviction that organizational reforms are not enough or are not even essential. The feeling is expressed in many different ways: as a call for the creation of new moral values (e.g. the Estonian Manifesto, AS 70), in the admission that protest may be an inescapable moral duty, regardless of its practical effect (Sakharov), in the belief that any change in the political and social system will be pointless unless accompanied by a moral reorientation of society and the individual; the general tenor is clear enough: on the basis laid by Marx and the groundwork erected by Lenin, Stalin built a monument of amorality, the like of which has never been seen. Even the naive exclamation "let us create new moral values" signifies a welcome return to normalcy and decency in a society which has been fed for more than half a century on a diet of *partiinost'*: good is what the Party at this moment

declares to be good.

The political alternatives discussed in *samizdat* literature are ultimately not so different from the alternatives facing us in the West. If we want to continue to work towards a socialist society, we can offer a programme which has great political and ethical appeal, but which offers at the same time a convenient rationalization for the most common forms of greed, envy and jealousy. This means that socialism's claim for strong central power—which is must have if it is going to bring about a fundamental change in society—must be looked at with permanent suspicion, because approval by the majority is not enough and who will guarantee that the socialist leaders are not after power for its own, and their own, sake? The Soviet experience of this is anything but promising.

The Christian religion is still able to inspire political action and offer a comprehensive set of political ideas, but at this moment it seems that Christianity is itself too divided and confused to be a factor of immediate political importance. What is more important, however, is that in a world which is increasingly post-Christian, Christians will have to find political ground which they can share with other groups. In the effort to work out a political ideology which is non-socialist (because socialism is a dead-end), acceptable to non-Christians (which is a necessity in this era) and which may inspire broad layers of society (which pure conservatism cannot), the work of dissident authors in the Soviet Union may be of outstanding importance, because the dramatic convulsions of their society may have made them more sensitive to the fundamental issues at stake.

Notes to Chapter 1

SAMIZDAT: ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATION

1. Documents referred to in this work under AS-number have been published in the *Arkhiv Samizdata* (Samizdat Archive) collection of Radio Liberty in Munich. The nature and organization of this publication is explained on p. 7 ff.

2. Some of these materials in AS 571: "Letter to psychiatrists . . . accompanied by official psychiatric reports . . ." and 579: "Information on six medicines used in Soviet psychiatric cases and their effects on the patient"; English translations in *Survey* No. 81 (1971), German translations in C. Gerstenmaier (ed.), *Wladimir Bukowsky, der unbequeme Zeuge* (Stuttgart 1972) and W. Bukowsky (ed.), *Opposition. Eine neue Geisteskrankheit in der UdSSR?* (1972). A full report of the Bukovskii trial in AS 1077.

3. The White Book has been published in English as *On Trial. The case of Sinyavsky (Tertz) and Daniel (Arzhak)*, (M. Hayward, ed.) London 1967.

4. Cf. Feldbrugge (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Soviet Law* (Leiden 1973), s.v. "Administrative Agencies", "Freedom of the Press" and "Police".

5. J. Telesin, "Inside 'Samizdat' ", *Encounter* Vol. 15 (1973) No. 2, pp. 25-33.

6. P. Reddaway, *Uncensored Russia* (London 1972), pp. 362-363. As explained on p. 50, this work contains an English translation of the Nos. 1-11 of the *Khronika Tekushchikh Sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events, hereinafter *Chronicle*). In Reddaway's edition the translated texts have been arranged according to theme and are accompanied by copious notes and comments and a long introduction. In the following this work will be referred to as *Reddaway*.

7. There is, in the approach of Soviet officialdom, a curious connection between what is anti-Soviet and what is pornographic. The connection dates back to the censorship regulations of 1931 which mention state secrets, anti-Soviet statements and pornography almost in one breath as the major areas of censorship activities. Pornography is very much an "underground" phenomenon in the Soviet Union, as is *samizdat*, and there is a sprinkling of sexually libertine materials in *samizdat* literature, such as *Seksual-Demokrat*, a journal produced by Voronezh students and reported in No. 25 of *Chronicle*. It is unclear whether the illustrated *Oktobriana* story, which was both anti-Soviet and *risqué* in the ordinary sense, and which received wide publicity in the West, ever circulated inside the Soviet Union (cf. *The Times*, 29 October 1971, 1 November 1971, 4 November 1971, *The Sunday Times*, 7 November 1971, *The Times*, 30 December 1971). Charges of pornography have occasionally been included in attacks against prominent dissident authors (Amalrik, Esenin-Volpin, Daniel). The official attitude in this respect may perhaps reflect an

inherent connection between rigid bureaucratism and excessive prudishness. The entire subject deserves a special study.

8. See D. and C. Barry, "The USSR Supreme Court and the Systematization of Soviet Criminal Law", in *Codification in the Communist World* (Barry, Feldbrugge and Lasok, eds.), *Law in Eastern Europe* Vol. 19 (Leiden 1975), note 47, p. 20.

9. Telesin, note 4.

10. This was reported by Zhores Medvedev in an article in *The Observer* of 7 July 1974.

11. For instance, in cases against Rybakov (*Chronicle* No. 25), against the Leningrad hi-jackers (*Chronicle* No. 20) and against Galanskov (cf. P. Litvinov, ed., *Protsess Chetyrekh. Sbornik materialov po delu Galanskova, Ginzburga, Dobrovol'skogo i Lashkovoi. Seriia: Biblioteka Samizdata No. 1*, Amsterdam 1971, p. 62). See also my article "Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union" in *Contemporary Soviet Law: Essays in Honor of John N. Hazard*, The Hague 1974, note 4, p. 59.

12. Cf. Loeber, "Samizdat Under Soviet Law" in *Contemporary Soviet Law: Essays in Honor of John N. Hazard*, The Hague 1974, and my article quoted in the preceding note; also: Feldbrugge, "Law and Political Dissent in the Soviet Union" in *Current Legal Problems 1973*, London 1973, pp. 241-259.

13. The copyright aspect of *samizdat* publishing has prompted many articles by legal experts. Extensive bibliographic information is offered by Maggs, "New Directions in US-USSR Copyright Relations", *Amer. J. of International Law* Vol. 68 (1974) No. 3, pp. 391-409, by Loeber, "Samizdat Under Soviet Law", Index, Autumn 1973, and *id.*, in his article quoted in the preceding note.

Notes to Chapter 2

SAMIZDAT AS A FORM OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. Roy Medvedev, *Kniga o sotsialisticheskom demokratii*, Amsterdam/Paris 1972; a French edition (*De la Démocratie Socialiste*) was published in Paris in 1972, a German edition (*Sowjetbürger in Opposition. Plädoyer für eine sozialistische Demokratie*) in Hamburg/Düsseldorf in 1973. An English edition was in preparation in 1974. The Russian edition has been quoted in this work.

2. Medvedev, *op. cit.* p. 56.

3. *id.*, pp. 61, 62, 63.

4. *id.*, pp. 63, 64.

5. *id.*, p. 77.

6. B. Lewytzkyj, *Politische Opposition in der Sowjetunion 1960-1972. Analyse und Dokumentation*, München 1972. In the following quoted as *Lewytzkyj*.

7. *Lewytzkyj*, p. 66; also mentioned by Amalrik in *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*

8. *Lewytzkyj*, p. 58; *Posev* (1967) No. 24; *Chronicle* No. 18.

9. Also mentioned by *Lewytzkyj*, p. 63.

10. *Chronicle* Nos. 12 and 14; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 64.

11. *Reddaway*, p. 183; *Chronicle* No. 15; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 80.

12. *Chronicle* Nos. 14 and 16; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 66.

13. *Chronicle* No. 16; Makarenko's case is mentioned in an article in *Pravda*, 13 October 1970.

14. *Posev* (1968) No. 5; *Problems of Communism* (Sept.-Oct. 1968) No. 5 contains excerpts in English from an article by Levitin-Krasnov, taken from No. 7 of *Tetrad' sotsialisticheskoi demokratii*; full Russian text in *Posev* (1968) No. 5 and in AS 741.

15. *Chronicle* No. 14; on the Union, see *Reddaway*, pp. 405-408; *Chronicle* No. 18; *Posev* (1969) No. 8.

16. *Reddaway*, pp. 150-170.

17. *Chronicle* No. 17 reported the founding of the Committee and *Chronicle* No. 27 the election of Podiapol'skii. Numerous statements by the Committee may be found in AS and in *Chronicle* Nos. 18-26.

18. *Chronicle* No. 26.

19. *Reddaway*, p. 391; *Chronicle* Nos. 12 and 13.

20. At p. 113.

21. *Lewytzkyj*, p. 66. Several documents from the Union in M. Browne (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine*, London 1971, Part One: The Jurists' Case.

22. At p. 115.

23. *Chronicle* Nos. 18 and 20; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 66.

24. *Chronicle* No. 17; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 114.

25. At p. 111.
26. Ukrainian text in *Suchasnist'* (a Ukrainian émigré periodical), 1969 No. 12, pp. 92-98.
27. *Chronicle* No. 18; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 116.
28. *Chronicle* No. 18.
29. *Chronicle* No. 24.
30. *Chronicle* No. 16; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 116.
31. *Chronicle* Nos. 19, 20 and 21; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 107; *Reddaway*, pp. 270-279.
32. *Reddaway*, pp. 249-269; *Lewytzkyj*, p. 106; *Chronicle* No. 31 (entire issue).
33. The Baptist *initsiativniki* are the source of hundreds of *samizdat* documents which have found their way to the AS. Many Baptist documents have been published in English in Michael Bourdeaux, *Faith on Trial in Russia*, London 1971.
34. *Chronicle* No. 18.
35. *Ibid.*
36. *Chronicle* No. 25.
37. French text in *Samizdat 1. La Voix de l'Opposition Communiste en U.R.S.S.*, Paris 1970, p. 521. This volume, published by a Trotskyist group in France, contains a great number of interesting documents. The accompanying comments attempt to explain dissent in the Soviet Union as a basically Trotskyist movement.
38. *Posev* (1973) No. 6, p. 11.
39. Excerpts from this issue and from another issue of *The Bell* in *Posev* (1967) No. 24, (1968) No. 4 and (1968) No. 1. See also *Reddaway*, p. 441.
40. Only Nos. 4, 5, 7 and 8 have been published in AS (499, 479, 659, 660). Nos. 1-8 appeared in 1972 in Strasbourg as "Social Problems".
41. Cf. *Reddaway*, pp. 178-180. *Demokrat* No. 5 is reviewed critically in *Chronicle* No. 25.
42. *Chronicle* Nos. 23, 24 and 25.
43. AS 610, 629, 785, 790, 805, 809, 814, 829, 832, 837, 838, 843, 849, 864, 869, 880, 1013, 1020, 1093, 1098, 1108, 1116, 1140, 1230, 1301, 1306, 1325, 1563, 1568, 1576, 1599, 1665, 1687, 1688, 1705, 1770.
44. AS 690, 883, 1039, 1117, 1154, 1155, 1205, 1330, 1337, 1370.
45. AS 781, 783, 786, 789, 791, 792, 798, 803, 804, 870, 872, 1099.
46. AS 1203, 1204, 1380, 1382, 1384, 1386, 1388, 1389, 1669.
47. *Chronicle* No. 17.
48. *Chronicle* No. 16.
49. AS 86, 291, 307-308, 314-316, 396, 398-400, 637-638. See also *Reddaway*, pp. 249-269.
50. *Chronicle* No. 17.
51. About Vladimir Prison, see Iu. Ivanov, *The Town of Vladimir*, AS 1133; also in *Vestnik Russkogo Studencheskogo Khristianskogo Dvizheniia* (Messenger of the Russian Christian Student Movement; in the following: *Vestnik RSKhD*) No. 99.
52. *Reddaway*, pp. 428-429.

Notes to Chapter 3

THE MARXISTS-LENINISTS

1. On Varga himself and on the authenticity of the Testament: Philip J. Jaffe, "The Varga Controversy and the American Communist Party", *Survey* No. 84 (1972), pp. 138-160, esp. pp. 159-160. The Varga Testament has been published in Russian in *Grani* (1968) No. 68 and as a separate booklet in French, *Le Testament de Varga*, Paris 1970. Also AS 166.
2. The entire journal *Russkoe Slovo* (The Russian Word; AS 521) has been published in Russian in *Grani* (1967) No. 66; English excerpts in *Problems of Communism* (1968) No. 5, pp. 66-72.
3. The letter is also known by its closing sentence: "Russia waits for new people". Published in Russian in *Posev* (1969) No. 1 (AS 80).
4. Published in Russian in *Posev* (1969) No. 9, where it follows immediately after an article by Talantov. This may perhaps explain why it is attributed to him in *Arkhiv Samizdata* (AS 763).
5. Published in Russian in *Posev* (1970) No. 1 (AS 306).
6. See note 1, Chapter 2.
7. AS 1198.
8. AS 1551.
9. AS 69, *Posev* (1968) No. 12.
10. Published in Russian in *Posev* (1969) No. 2; French text in *Samizdat I*, Paris 1969, pp. 424-427.
11. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 343.
12. *id.*, p. 339.
13. *id.*, p. 37.
14. *id.*, p. 278.
15. *id.*, p. 347.
16. A good explanation of the *nomenklatura* system in D. J. R. Scott, *Russian Political Institutions*, 4th ed., London 1968, pp. 181-182.
17. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 300.
18. Published in *Posev* (1968) No. 4; German text in C. Gerstenmaier, *Die Stimme der Stummen. Die Demokratische Bewegung in der Sowjetunion*, Stuttgart 1971. On *Kolokol*, see also *Posev* (1966) No. 1.
19. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 312.
20. See P. Litvinov (ed.), *The Demonstration in Pushkin Square*, Boston 1969.
21. Frankfurt a/M. 1971.
22. *Chronicle* No. 20.
23. Information supplied in editorial comment in *Posev* (1969) No. 9.
24. *Chronicle* No. 26.

25. *Let History Judge*, New York 1971 and London 1972; *A Question of Madness*, London 1971 (written together with his brother Zhores).
26. Medvedev, *op. cit.*, p. 308.
27. *id.*, p. 311.
28. *id.*, p. 318.

Notes to Chapter 4

THE SOCIALISTS

1. Russian edition, *Razmyshleniia o progresse, mirnom sosushchestvovanii i intellektual'nom svobode*, together with additional materials, published by *Posev*, Frankfurt a/M. 1970, under the title *Memorandum Akademika A. Sakharova.* English edition, *Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, London and New York 1969.
2. A long excerpt of Mikhailov's essay in *Chronicle* No. 17.
3. AS 368; published as a separate pamphlet by *Posev*, Frankfurt a/M. 1970.
4. AS 360; Russian text in *Posev* (1970) No. 7; English text in *Survey* (1970) No. 76.
5. AS 1138 and 1139; also published in *Vol'noe Slovo* (The Free Word, selected *samizdat* texts) No. 5, Frankfurt a/M. 1972.
6. Interview with *Newsweek* correspondent Jay Axelbank; cf. *The Observer*, 3 December 1972.
7. Some of these reactions are reproduced in the Russian edition quoted in note 1.
8. See *Posev* (1969) No. 10.
9. This section is based in part on the chapter on Levitin-Krasnov in Michael Bourdeaux' *Patriarch and Prophets*, New York-Washington 1970, pp. 255-303.
10. Bourdeaux, p. 261: from the preface to a collection of articles "The Sword of the Lord" (AS 738).
11. "At the Hour of Dawn" (AS 741), Russian text also in *Posev* (1968) No. 6.

Notes to Chapter 5

THE DEMOCRATS AND RELATED GROUPS

1. *Medvedev*, pp. 81-82.
2. On the ASCULP, see *Reddaway*, pp. 376-380; an anonymous article (AS 525), published in *Posev* (1971) No. 1; and an article by Vl. Osipov, "The Berdiaev Circle in Leningrad" (AS 1163), published in *Posev* (1972) No. 11.
3. AS 536.
4. AS 374.
5. AS 752, "Soviet Society 1965-1968"; published in *Posev* (1969) No. 9.
6. AS 539 and 678; published in *Grani* (1971) Nos. 80 and 81 and as a separate booklet *Molodezh' v russkoi istorii* by *Posev* Publishing House (Frankfurt a/M. 1972).
7. AS 597; published in *Posev* (1969) No. 7.
8. AS 897; published in *Vestnik RSKhD* (1970) No. 97.
9. "Publitsisticheskii zhurnal ili politicheskaia gazeta?", *Posev* (1967) No. 3; the symposium consists of articles by A. ("Why a literary-publicistic journal is necessary"), B. ("The situation requires a political journal!"), B. Starikov ("How to go further"), A. Ladov ("A political journal"), O. Chistov ("The regime and present-day opposition").
10. AS 70; published in *Posev* (1969) No. 1 and also as an appendix to the edition of Sakharov's Memorandum quoted in note 1, Chapter 4.
11. London 1970, New York 1971. German edition *Kann die Sowjetunion das Jahr 1984 erleben?*, Zürich 1970. Russian edition *Prosushchestvuet li Sovetskii Soiuz do 1984-go goda?*, Amsterdam (Alexander Herzen Foundation) 1969.
12. AS 1136; Russian text in *Russkaia Mysl'*, 6 July 1972 and 10 August 1972 (the Postscript); English text in *Survey* (1972) No. 84.
13. See note 6, Chapter 4.
14. AS 370.
15. AS 340; published as a separate booklet *Programma Demokraticheskogo Dvizheniia Sovetskogo Soiuza* by the Alexander Herzen Foundation, Amsterdam 1970. German text in *Lewytzkyj*, pp. 136-175.
16. The "Basic Tactics" are known from a critical summary in *Chronicle* No. 14 and from a report in *Posev* (1971) No. 4.
17. AS 602; published in *Vol'noe Slovo* (The Free Word; Selected *Samizdat* Texts), *Dokumental'naia Seriia* No. 1, Frankfurt a/M. 1971.
18. AS 1152 and 1175.
19. AS 1180.
20. See *The Times* of 29 August 1973.
21. In AS 752; see note 5.

22. See note 9.
23. Published in *Posev* (1966) No. 46.
24. *Grani* (1968) No. 67.
25. In *Youth in Russian History* (see note 6), pp. 106-107.
26. Ruslanov, *op. cit.* p. 92.
27. See note 5.
28. Talantov in AS 752; the ASCULP Programme, see note 2.
29. Talantov in AS 752; Zniakov in AS 374.
30. Talantov in AS 752; Ruslanov, *op. cit.*; Zniakov in AS 374; the ASCULP Programme—AS 525.
31. Talantov in AS 752.
32. Zniakov in AS 374.
33. The ASCULP Programme—AS 525.
34. See note 10.
35. In an anonymous article "What is it you want?" in *Posev* (1970) No. 10.
36. Chistov's letter, quoted in note 9.
37. In *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?*
38. A. Mikhailov, "Thoughts on the liberal campaign of 1968", *Chronicle* No. 17 (Summary).
39. London 1969.
40. AS 374.
41. See note 9.
42. See note 9.
43. AS 525.
44. See note 9.
45. AS 525.
46. See, for instance, V. Shavrov, "Vesennie mysli i vospominaniia" (Spring thoughts and memories), *Grani* (1966) No. 63.
47. See note 8.
48. *Grani* (1968) No. 67.
49. AS 374.
50. Ruslanov, *op. cit.*, p. 100; Chistov, in his letter quoted in note 9.
51. This document is known only from an excerpt in *Chronicle* No. 13.
52. Cf. the statement in *Demokrat* No. 6 (AS 1175).
53. Cf. *Medvedev*, p. 80.
54. Russian text in AS 1455.
55. Published in *Novyi Zhurnal* (1972) No. 109.
56. Quoted from the summary in *Chronicle* No. 27.
57. Most of the *Feniks* materials have been published in the West in *Grani* (1962 and 1967 volumes).
58. See note 9.
59. Some of these in Michael Bourdeaux, *Patriarch and Prophets*, New York-Washington 1970.
60. *Chronicle* No. 18.
61. A collection of essays by Pomerants was published in 1972 by *Posev* Publishing House (Frankfurt a/M.) under the title *Unpublished Works* (*Neopublikovannoe*).

62. Published in *Posev* (1967) No. 7.
63. Mentioned in *Chronicle* No. 27.
64. See note 11.
65. *Posev* (1966) No. 46.
66. *Posev* (1971) No. 3.
67. *Posev* (1972) No. 11.
68. *Posev* (1973) No. 9.
69. *ibidem.*

Notes to Chapter 6

CONFRONTATION AND REPRESSION

1. This phenomenon has not gone unnoticed in *samizdat* literature; several documents protest specifically against the expulsion of writers, e.g. V. Nekrasov on 5 March 1974, AS 1635.
2. AS 1470, Recorded part of press conference in Sakharov's apartment on 21 August 1973; AS 1474, Telephone interview with *Der Spiegel* on or about 15 September 1973 (*The Times*, 17 September 1973); AS 1482, statement to Western correspondents on 8 September 1973 (*The Times*, 10 September 1973, *Sunday Times*, 9 September 1973).
3. E.g. on 23 August 1973, AS 1525 (*The Times*, 29 August 1973; *The Observer*, 2 September 1973).
4. *The Times*, 9 August 1973; *The Observer*, 9 September 1973.
5. *The Times*, 7 September 1973.
6. *The Times*, 29 August 1973.
7. *Pravda*, 14 January 1974; *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, 16 January 1974.
8. E.g. AS 1526, 1527, 1528, 1582, 1613, 1656, 1657.
9. E.g. AS 1623, 1664, 1681, 1763.

NATIONALISM AS A POLITICAL PROBLEM AND A POLITICAL FORCE IN THE USSR

1. R. Medvedev, *Kniga o sotsialisticheskom demokratii*, Amsterdam/Paris 1972, p. 327.
2. Cf. *Reddaway*, pp. 127-149 and *Chronicle* No. 12.
3. Cf. W. Kosyk, *Violation des Droits de l'Homme en Ukraine et en U.R.S.S.*, Paris 1969, p. 46.
4. English text in M. Browne (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine*, London 1968, p. 55 ff.
5. *Chronicle* No. 17.
6. *The Chornovil Papers*, Toronto 1968.
7. I. Kandyba, *Pour la Vérité et la Justice*, Paris 1968.
8. S. Karavansky, *Le Problème National en U.R.S.S.*, Paris 1968.
9. The Ukrainian Herald is reprinted in the West by Ukrainian émigré publishing firms: *Ukrains'kyi Visnyk*, Paris (P.I.U.F.) and Baltimore (Smoloskyp).
10. See note 49, Chapter 2.
11. The collection of documents compiled by Karavansky is included in Chornovil's *The Misfortune of Intellect* (*Lykho s Rozumu*), which itself constitutes the main part of the Chornovil Papers (the French version of the Karavansky collection is quoted in note 8).
11. At pp. 116-117.

SOME SELECTED TOPICS DISCUSSED IN SAMIZDAT LITERATURE

1. On the Fetisov Group: *Reddaway*, pp. 431-433.
2. *Medvedev*, p. 53.
3. Mentioned by Amalrik in *Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?* and by *Reddaway*, p. 430.
4. *Posev* (1968) No. 5.
5. *Medvedev*, p. 267.
6. In *Svobodnaia Mysl'* (Free Thought) No. 1 (AS 1180).
7. See note 5, chapter 4.
8. *Medvedev*, p. 267.
9. *id.*, p. 264.
10. AS 597; also in *Posev* (1969) No. 7.
11. *Posev* (1969) No. 6.
12. *Grani* (1962) No. 51.
13. *Posev* (1968) No. 1.
14. For instance, a letter by N.P. from Rostov-on-the-Don, *Posev* (1968) No. 6, or a series of letters by M. Nikitin in *Posev* (1966) Nos. 17, 32 and 42.
15. See note 4.
16. "How I came to Dissent", *New York Review of Books*, 21 March 1974.
17. *ibid.*
18. *ibid.*
19. See note 6, chapter 4.
20. Cf. *The Times*, 3 October 1973.

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Names of persons who have published their works (incl. letters) in *samizdat*, or who may be regarded for other reasons as having been dissidents at one moment or another, have been italicized.

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This book discusses and analyzes the various political currents which have recently become manifest in the Soviet Union through *samizdat* publications: hand- or typewritten documents, produced and disseminated at considerable risk by Soviet citizens who want to avoid censorship and make their voice heard at home and abroad. The political currents represented in *samizdat* range all the way from Stalinist and dissident Leninist to Western liberal and Christian-nationalist. The book is based on a study of large numbers of Russian *samizdat* documents, most of them little known in the West and not available in any Western language. Liberal quotations from these documents throw an unexpected light on a dramatic and fascinating aspect of social and political life in today's Soviet Union and provide a wealth of information which is not available from official Soviet sources.

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